

Research Report on

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**CYBERCRIMINALS LURE INTERNET USERS TO GET INTO  
A MEDICAL SUBSIDY SCAM OF RS. 6000**

**WITH THE NAME OF APOLLO HOSPITAL**



**CyberPeace**  
— Foundation —

# DISCLAIMER

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
This report is purely based on technical findings made by the research team during an investigation. It does not intend to malign or in any way target any country, actor or person. All the information provided in this report has been extracted during the investigation and information might be changed after generating the reports.



## RESEARCH REPORT ON

## CYBERCRIMINALS LURE INTERNET USERS TO GET INTO A MEDICAL SUBSIDY SCAM OF RS. 6000 WITH THE NAME OF APOLLO HOSPITAL

The Research Wing of CyberPeace Foundation received a link via Whatsapp related to Apollo Hospitals Medical subsidy which asks users to click on the link and win 6000 rupees.



## Link

<http://gspnovh.cyou/ApolloHospitals-india/tb.php?gmqbajcu1659584547219>



## Summary



## WARNING SIGNS



- ◆ The campaign is pretended to be an offer from Apollo Hospital but is hosted on the third-party domain instead of the official Apollo Hospital website which makes it more suspicious.
- ◆ The domain names associated with the campaign have been registered in very recent times.
- ◆ Multiple redirections have been noticed between the links.
- ◆ No reputed site would ask its users to share the campaign on WhatsApp.
- ◆ The prize is kept really attractive to lure the laymen.
- ◆ Grammatical mistakes have been noticed.



## CYBERPEACE ADVISORY



- ◆ CyberPeace Foundation recommends that people should avoid opening such messages sent via social platforms.
- ◆ Falling into this trap could lead to whole system compromise such as access to the microphone, Camera, Text Messages, Contacts, Pictures, Videos, Banking Applications, etc as well as the financial loss for the users.
- ◆ Do not share confidential details like login credentials, and banking information with such a type of scam.
- ◆ Never share or forward fake messages containing links to any social platform without proper verification.
- ◆ There is a need for International Cyber Cooperation between countries to bust the criminal gangs running fraud campaigns affecting individuals and organisations to make Cyberspace resilient and peaceful.



The Research Wing of CyberPeace Foundation along with Autobot Infosec Private Limited has looked into this matter to reach a conclusion that the website is either legitimate or online fraud.

On Visiting the link users were redirected to

[https://upceshop.cn/XF8yZiK2/ApolloHospitals-india/?\\_t=1659720746024#XX](https://upceshop.cn/XF8yZiK2/ApolloHospitals-india/?_t=1659720746024#XX)


\*\*Where XX represents a unique 13 digits number, for example 1633075913900.



On the landing page, there is an image of Prathap C. Reddy (founder of Apollo) and a message that says (Through the questionnaire, you will have a chance to get 6000 rupees).



At the bottom of this page, there is a section that seems like a social-media comment section.



**Question 1 of 4 : Do you know Apollo Hospitals ?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**Question 2 of 4 : How old are you ?**

☐ 18-24

☐ 25-34

☐ 35-44

☐ 45+

**Question 3 of 4 : How do you think of Apollo Hospitals ?**

☐ Very good

☐ Satisfactory

☐ Not

☐ Not so good

**Question 4 of 4 : Are you male or female ?**

☐ Male

☐ Female

The user has to answer four questions to win a price of 6000 rupees. It starts with some basic questions like -

**“Do you know Apollo Hospitals?**

**How old are you?**

**How do you think of Apollo Hospitals?**

**Are you male or female?” etc.**



After answering all four questions a congratulatory message appears.

**“Congratulation!**


**Your answer has been saved successfully!**

**You have a chance to win gifts.**

**You must select the correct box with your prize inside.**

**You have 3 attempts. Good luck!”**



After Clicking the **OK** button users are given three attempts to win the prizes with multiple gift boxes.







After Clicking the OK button users are given three attempts to win the prizes with multiple gift boxes.





On the 2nd attempt, it says that the user has won a Gift card worth 6000 rupees.

**“Congratulation!**

**You did it! You won 6000 Rupee”**


Clicking on the ‘OK’ button, it instructs users to share the campaign on WhatsApp.

Clicking on the ‘OK’ button, it instructs users to share the campaign on WhatsApp, strangely enough, the user has to click the WhatsApp button until the blue bar reaches 100%.



After clicking the Continue button, a new box appears, here the user has to complete registration according to the given steps.

When the user clicks on the Complete registration button it redirects users to multiple advertisement pages and it varies every time the user visits the URL.



## IN DEPTH INVESTIGATION :

Some of the key findings are as follows :

Domain Name	gspnovh[.]cyou
HTTP Status Code	200 [ OK ]
IP Address	172.67.182.206
ISP	Cloudflare
ASN	13335
Country	China
Continent	Asia

**Domain Name:** gspnovh.cyou

**Registrar URL:** <http://www.hkdns.hk>

**Registrar:** West263 International Limited

**Registrar IANA ID:** 1915



**Updated Date:** 2022-07-20T04:25:56.0Z

**Creation Date:** 2022-02-11T08:58:12.0Z

**Registry Expiry Date:** 2023-02-11T23:59:59.0Z

**Registrant State/Province:** Bei Jing Shi

**Registrant Country:** CN (China)

**Name Server:** GABRIELLA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM

**Name Server:** NICOLAS.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM

<b>Domain Name</b>	upceshop[.]cn
<b>HTTP Status Code</b>	200 [ OK ]
<b>IP Address</b>	104.21.59.190
<b>ISP</b>	Cloud flare
<b>ASN</b>	13335
<b>Country</b>	China
<b>Continent</b>	Asia

**Domain Name:** upceshop.cn

**ROID:** 20220717s10001s48552900-cn

**Domain Status:** ok

**Registration Time:** 2022-07-17 19:11:18

**Expiration Time:** 2023-07-17 19:11:18


**Registrant:** 刘甜甜 (Liu Tiantian)

**Registrant Contact Email:** evgeniyapbn5gle@mail.ru

**Sponsoring Registrar:** 阿里云计算有限公司 (万网)  
[Alibaba Cloud Computing Co., Ltd. (Wanwang)]

**Name Server:** raegan.ns.cloudflare.com

**Name Server:** maxim.ns.cloudflare.com





In source code analysis we found some information like –

☒ The title of the page is “Apollo Hospitals Medical subsidy!”

```
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<title>🏥 Apollo Hospitals Medical subsidy! 🏥 </title>
<meta property="og:title" content="🏥 Apollo Hospitals Medical subsidy! 🏥">
<meta property="og:description" content="🏥 Medicaid is available to every citizen! ❤️">
<meta property="og:image" itemprop="image" content="https://263cdn.com/upload/ApolloHos
<meta property="og:url" content="https://www.apollohospitals.com/">
<meta property="og:type" content="website">
```

☒ We found three Google tag manager ids (G-HZ2ZQY399T, G-LW7434MYMN, G-0C230YDF7G) in the source code.

```
599 <script aria-hidden="">
600     window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || [];
601     function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);}
602     gtag('js', new Date());
603     gtag('config', 'G-HZ2ZQY399T');
604 </script>

242 <script aria-hidden="true">
243     window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || [];
244     function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);}
245     gtag('js', new Date());
246
247     gtag('config', 'G-LW7434MYMN');
248 </script><script async= src= %F0%9F%8E%89%EF%B8%8F%EF%B8%8F%F0%9F

149 <script aria-hidden="true">
150     window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || [];
151     function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);}
152     gtag('js', new Date());
153
154     gtag('config', 'G-0C230YDF7G');
```

```
1 GET /gtag/js?id=G-LW7434MYMN HTTP/1.1
2 Host: www.googletagmanager.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/
8 Sec-Fetch-Dest: script
9 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
10 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
11 Te: trailers
12 Connection: close
13
```

```
1 GET /gtag/js?id=G-HZZZQY399T HTTP/1.1
2 Host: www.googletagmanager.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/
8 Sec-Fetch-Dest: script
9 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
10 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
11 Te: trailers
12 Connection: close
13
```

```
1 GET /gtag/js?id=G-OC230YDF7G HTTP/1.1
2 Host: www.googletagmanager.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/
8 Sec-Fetch-Dest: script
9 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
10 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
11 Te: trailers
12 Connection: close
13
```

■ The section which seems to be a social media comment area is static and not a dynamic one. The section has been created with some HTML and CSS.

```
<div class="detail_right">  
  <h3>  
    <div class="comm_name">Aparna Suresh</div>  
  </h3>  
  <p>I thought it was a joke, but it was delivered this morning! So surprised! @Apollo is the best company I've ever met!</p><span class="fbblue smaller" href="javascript:void(0);"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet" focusable="false"><g class="style-scope yt-icon"><path d="M1 21h4V9H12m22-11c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-6.3l1.95-4.57.03-.32c0-.41-.17-.79-.44-1.06L14.17 1 7.59 7.59C7.22 7.95</path></g></svg></div>&nbsp;<div class="fbblue smaller" href="javascript:void(0);"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet" focusable="false"><g class="style-scope yt-icon"><path d="M15 30c-.83 0-1.54-.5-1.84-1.22l-3.02 7.05c-.09.23-.14.47-.14.73v1.91l.01.01l 14c0 1.1 9 2 2h6.31l-.95 4.57</path></g></svg></div>&nbsp;<span>1 minutes ago</span></div>  
  </div>  
  <div class="detail_block">  
    <div class="detail_left"></div>  
    <div class="detail_right">  
      <h3>  
        <div class="comm_name">Siv Sandeep Reddy</div>  
      </h3>  
      <p>I can't believe it! I won a gift, thanks @Apollo! 🎁🎁</p><span class="likebar"><div class="fbblue smaller" href="javascript:void(0);"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet" focusable="false"><g class="style-scope yt-icon"><path d="M1 21h4V9H12m22-11c0-1.1-.9-2-2-2h-6.3l1.95-4.57.03-.32c0-.41-.17-.79-.44-1.06L14.17 1 7.59 7.59C7.22 7.95</path></g></svg></div>&nbsp;<div class="fbblue smaller" href="javascript:void(0);"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" preserveAspectRatio="xMidYMid meet" focusable="false"><g class="style-scope yt-icon"><path d="M15 30c-.83 0-1.54-.5-1.84-1.22l-3.02 7.05c-.09.23-.14.47-.14.73v1.91l.01.01l 14c0 1.1 9 2 2h6.31l-.95 4.57</path></g></svg></div>&nbsp;<span>3 minutes ago</span></div>  
    </div>  
  </div>  
  <div class="detail_block">  
    <div class="detail_left"></div>  
    <div class="detail_right">  
      <h3>  
        <div class="comm_name">Singavarapu Prathyusha</div>  
      </h3>  
      <p>I got Apollo Hospitals Medical subsidy! 🎁🎁🎁 files/Abid%20AI%20Hutto.jpg rsary gift!</p><span class="likebar">
```

- Users are insisted on sharing the campaign with WhatsApp friends and groups.

```

    }
    location.href = 'whatsapp://send?text=' + jurl + new Date().getTime();
    setTimeout(function() {
        get_cookie('prog') == '' ? value = 1 : value = parseInt(get_cookie('prog'));
        if (value >= g_share_step) {
            continueBtn();
        } else {
            value == 2 || value == 4 ? swalert("The same group or the same friend is not correct. Please check and share again.",
                "Sharing failed!") : void(0);
        }
        set_cookie('prog', value + 1);
    }, 1000);

```

- In background analysis we found that this website is sending requests to other domains like-

[uprimp.com](https://uprimp.com)

[qoaaa.com](https://qoaaa.com)

```

1 GET /bnr.php?section=General&pub=593174&format=300x50&ga=g HTTP/1.1
2 Host: uprimp.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/
8 Sec-Fetch-Dest: script
9 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
10 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
11 Te: trailers
12 Connection: close
13

```

```

1 GET //4fe48aebd6/4f59451604/?placementName=Flow&randomA=0_4550&maxw=0 HTTP/2
2 Host: qoaaa.com
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/ih3kOYjv/ApolloHospitals-india/?_t=1659897281474
8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
12 Te: trailers
13

```

- We found some Chinese language written in the source code.



```

<span id="line1206"></span>
<span id="line1207"></span>
<span id="line1208"></span>
<span id="line1209"></span>
<span id="line1210"></span>
<span id="line1211"></span>
<span id="line1212"></span>
function getMainHost() {
    // 获取主域名
    let key = `mh_${Math.random()}`;
    let keyR = new RegExp( `(^|;)\s*${key}=12345` );
    let expiredTime = new Date( 0 );
    let domain = document.domain;

```

■ In source code analysis we found some javascript functions that collect the browser and system information from the user's device.

```

<span id="line846"></span>
<span id="line847"></span>
<span id="line848"></span>
<span id="line849"></span>
<span id="line850"></span>
<span id="line851"></span>
<span id="line852"></span>
<span id="line853"></span>
<span id="line854"></span>
<span id="line855"></span>
function getBrowser() {
    if ((navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Opera") || navigator.userAgent.indexOf("OPR")) != -1) {
        return "Opera";
    } else {
        if (navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Chrome") != -1) {
            return "Google Chrome";
        } else {
            if (navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Safari") != -1) {
                return "Safari";
            }
        }
    }
}

<span id="line871"></span>
<span id="line872"></span>
<span id="line873"></span>
<span id="line874"></span>
<span id="line875"></span>
<span id="line876"></span>
<span id="line877"></span>
<span id="line878"></span>
<span id="line879"></span>
<span id="line880"></span>
function getPlatform() {
    if (window.navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Windows NT 10.0") != -1) {
        return "Windows 10";
    }
    if (window.navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Windows NT 6.2") != -1) {
        return "Windows 8";
    }
    if (window.navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Windows NT 6.1") != -1) {
        return "Windows 7";
    }
}

```

### **\*\*Important\*\***

During the analysis, we found some javascript code in the background called hm.js was being executed from the host ([hm.baidu.com](http://hm.baidu.com)) which is a subdomain of Baidu and is used for Baidu Analytics, also known as Baidu Tongji.

**Note:** "Baidu is a Chinese multinational technology company specializing in Internet Related services, products, and artificial intelligence, headquartered in Beijing's Haidan district, China."

```

1245     var _hmt = _hmt || [];
1246     (function() {
1247         var hm = document.createElement("script");
1248         hm.src = "https://hm.baidu.com/hm.js?bbb3e86814c9ceef66d180a6c15fa17d";
1249         var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
1250         s.parentNode.insertBefore(hm, s);
1251     })();
1252     var _hmt = _hmt || [];
1253     (function() {
1254         var hm = document.createElement("script");
1255         hm.src = "https://hm.baidu.com/hm.js?14023b72d60769772946d154adb8f350";
1256         var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
1257         s.parentNode.insertBefore(hm, s);
1258     })();
1259     var _hmt = _hmt || [];
1260     (function() {
1261         var hm = document.createElement("script");
1262         hm.src = "https://hm.baidu.com/hm.js?8b68846a3ac1769b8ec7199084ee5ea8";
1263         var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
1264         s.parentNode.insertBefore(hm, s);
1265     })();
1266     </script>

```

```

1273 </html><script>
1274     var _hmt = _hmt || [];
1275     (function() {
1276         var hm = document.createElement("script");
1277         hm.src = "https://hm.baidu.com/hm.js?770f5f07b8105f501ec0a2de78be68631";
1278         var s = document.getElementsByTagName("script")[0];
1279         s.parentNode.insertBefore(hm, s);
1280     })();
1281 </script>

```

```

1 GET /hm.js?14023b72d60769772946d154adb8f350 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: hm.baidu.com
3 Cookie: HMAccount=84811DBE3DDCB324; HMAccount_BFESS=84811DBE3DDCB324
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0
5 Accept: */*
6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Referer: https://upceshop.cn/
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: script
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
12 Te: trailers
13 Connection: close
14

```



Domain Name	hm.baidu.com
HTTP Status Code	200 [ OK ]
IP Address	103.235.46.191
ISP	Baidu (Hong Kong)
ASN	555967
Country	Hong Kong
Continent	Asia

**Domain Name:** baidu.com

**Registry Domain ID:** 11181110\_DOMAIN\_COM-VRSN

**Registrar WHOIS Server:** whois.markmonitor.com

**Registrar URL:** <http://www.markmonitor.com>

**Registrar:** MarkMonitor, Inc.

**Registrar IANA ID:** 292

**Updated Date:** 2022-01-25T09:23:56+0000

**Creation Date:** 1999-10-11T11:05:17+0000

**Registrar Registration Expiration Date:** 2026-10-11T07:00:00+0000

**Registrant Organization:** Beijing Baidu Netcom Science Technology Co., Ltd.

**Registrant State/Province:** Beijing

**Registrant Country:** CN (China)







## CONCLUSIVE SUMMARY :

The campaign is pretended to be an offer from Apollo Hospital but hosted on the third-party domain instead of the official website of Apollo Hospital which makes it more suspicious.

During the investigation we have noticed multiple redirections between the links.

We have investigated the URLs in a secured sandbox environment where the WhatsApp application was not installed. If any user opens the link from a device like a smartphone where the WhatsApp application is installed, the sharing features on the site will open the WhatsApp application on the device to share the link.

The prizes are kept really attractive to lure the laymen.

Both the domain names used in this campaign have the registrant country as China.

The domain names associated with the campaign have been registered in very recent times.

Cybercriminals used Cloudflare technologies to mask the real IP addresses of the front-end domain names used in this gift scam campaign. But during the phases of the investigation, we have identified a domain name that was requested in the background and has been traced as belonging to China.





## CYBERPEACE ADVISORY :

CyberPeace Foundation and Autobot Infosec recommend that people should avoid opening such messages sent via social platforms.

If at all, the user gets into this trap, it could lead to a whole system compromise such as access to the microphone, Camera, Text Messages, Contacts, Pictures, Videos, Banking Applications, etc as well as financial losses.

Do not share confidential details like login credentials, or banking information with such a type of scam.

Do not share or forward fake messages containing links without proper Verification.

There is a need for International Cyber Cooperation between countries to bust the cyber-criminal gangs running the fraud campaigns affecting individuals and organisations, to make Cyberspace resilient and peaceful.



## ISSUED BY :

Research Wing, CyberPeace Foundation.

Research Wing, Autobot Infosec Private Limited.





[www.cyberpeace.org](http://www.cyberpeace.org) | [secretariat@cyberpeace.net](mailto:secretariat@cyberpeace.net)