# Using TDISP to Extend Attestation Devices Connected to a TEE

Alec Fernandez

**Azure Confidential Computing** 

Microsoft


## Agenda – Smart NICS

- TEEs can maintain confidentiality of the file and network I/O streams by encrypting data within the TEE boundary (Confidential Disk Encryption). This uses the CPU in the TEE to do the crypto which consumes CPU cycles
- Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) use hardware/software running on the Smart NICs to perform encryption for Network and File System I/O
  - Increases Performance designed for CSP infrastructure
  - Reduces Cost-of-Goods-Sold designed and built by the CSPs
- Customers who desire higher performance/cost can choose to trust the Smart NIC to do encryption. This frees cycles on the TEE CPU and adds the Smart NIC to the TCB.
- CCC requirements for Remote Attestation involve using <u>SPDM</u> and TDISP
- NorthStar question: How to measure the trustworthiness of a CSP's Smart NIC

### Evolution of CC and TCB Boundaries

- Enclave
- Entire VM Guest OS, File System, Network
  - CPU plus other devices (Smart NIC)

#### Confidential Disk and Network Encryption



# Encryption Performance Overhead

- The CPU
  - encrypts all data enter/exiting the TEE
  - In addition to what it's "supposed" to be doing
- Can Impact IOPS and reduce performance
- Can increase cost

#### **Encryption Offload**

18

Encrypt Decrypt with

Data Englishin Key

..... ......


 $\overline{}$ 

TITL


Guest OS

CPU

<del>.....</del>



#### How much of the Smart NIC must be Attested?



## How is Attestation Accomplished?

- Security Protocol and Data Model (<u>SPDM</u>)
  - Creates a secure connection between the TEE the attached device. Negotiates PCIe Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) keys to secure traffic over the PCIe.
  - Allows the TEE to query the attached HW device and get signed attestation reports


## How is Attestation Accomplished?

- TEE Device Interface Security Protocol (TDISP)
  - Allows the TEE to get configuration data from the HW device and enforce the TEE boundary within that device.

#### What must be Attested?

• Simple Answer:

Everything in the Trusted Compute Base (TCB)



Smart NIC Applications/Agents

Smart NICOS

Firmware

Hardware Root-of-Trust

Hardware

## Confidential Computing Requirements

- Hardware-Based, Attested TEE
- Hardware Root-of-Trust
- Remote Attestation

For more info: Confidential Computing Consortium: Common Terminology for Confidential Computing

#### What must be Attested?

- Hardware/Silicon (Chip Suppliers)
- Programmable Logic on Silicon (CSPs et al.)
- Firmware (Chip Suppliers, CSPs et al.)
- Root-of-Trust Platform Management Controller
- Memory Management System
- Possibly, the Smart NIC Operating System/Applications/API

### What must be Attested?

- Hardware/Silicon
- Programmable Logic on Silicon
- · Firm and ependently
- Root-of-Trust Platform Management Controller
- · Memory Maparticinable
- Possibly the Smart NIC Operating System/Applications/API

### Trust in the Verifier

- Attestation of TCB components ensures the HW/FW and configuration measurements meet CSP requirements, not that the TCB is trustworthy.
- Trustworthiness principles include
  - Code Publishing
  - Code Auditing
  - Code Transparency

## Establishing Verifier Trustworthiness

- **Code-Publishing** does not prove that code is safe. Allows the community to inspect code for back-doors and bugs.
- **3**<sup>rd</sup>-**party audits** provide proof of whatever claims the audit sponsor paid for. Difficult to keep pace with a production release cadence.
- Code Transparency Service (CTS) coupled with a Reproducible Build System (RBS). The CTS provides an immutable ledger where production build components and their configuration can be registered. An RBS is an environment to reproduce the production build measurements.

# Agenda – Confidential Smart NICS

- Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) offload Network and File I/O to proprietary hardware/software devices (Smart NICs)
  - Increases Performance
  - Reduces Cost-of-Goods-Sold
- TEEs can maintain confidentiality of the file and network I/O streams by encrypting data within the TEE boundary (Confidential Encryption). This consumes TEE CPU cycles which affects workload performance.
- Customers who require higher performance can choose to expand the TCB boundary using SPDM and TDISP to gain better performance and lower cost
- NorthStar question: How to measure the trustworthiness of CSP Smart NIC code and hardware

Thanks! See you at the Q&A!