

AFRICA REVIEW

A L G E R I A

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*How the 'War on Terror' has
affected Muslims and justice*

Contents

2 ALGERIA, THE COUNTRY

3 HISTORY

7 WESTERN COMPLICITY IN VIOLENCE

- Algeria a key UK ally in falsifying the case for the Iraq War
- The Tiguentourine gas plant hostage crisis

11 POST-2001 ANTI TERRORISM LEGISLATION

- Legislation following Algiers Convention
- Due process violations
- Laws to prevent recruitment
- Countering the Financing of Terrorism
- Countering Violent Extremism
- Counter Terrorism Policing

17 RECENT TERRORISM CASES UNDER LEGISLATION

- Lawyers defending terrorism suspects imprisoned and tortured

20 RENDITION AND TORTURE

24 RECOMMENDATIONS

Executive Summary

This review provides a snapshot of how the 'War on Terror' has affected justice and society in Algeria. It starts by looking briefly at the history of the country up to its recent role in the US-led war. The review also explores counter-terrorism legislation, prominent terrorism cases, instances of rendition and the history and current situation regarding torture as a practice in the country. Specific instances where the West has been complicit in violence are also explored.

CAGE is opposed to both the overt and more covert, structural violence of the 'War on Terror'. Overt violence such as torture, detention-without-trial, and military activity including extrajudicial killings are not only a violation of international law, but they are counter-productive. Torture is not only illegal and inhumane, but it does not provide reliable evidence.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in particular Articles 5 and 8 protect the right to life and prohibit torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment as read with the Convention on Torture 1984. These rules have evolved into jus cogens, which every state has the duty to punish. These are absolute values.


Detention-without-trial and extrajudicial killings violate due process and as a result deny both perpetrator and victim of their humanity, and can lead to further violence. Covert violence includes 'hearts and minds' propaganda in the form of countering violent extremism programmes which target Islamic belief in order to reform it into something palatable to the state. These programmes are a more underhanded violence implanted and facilitated by law, which most often result in the of criminalisation of social justice activity. This too, is counter-productive, serving to alienate and anger people who are engaging in legitimate political activity. Both these forms of violence work hand-in-hand under the direction of dictatorial governments, supported and in some cases openly facilitated by the United States and other Western countries.

True to CAGE's remit, special attention is paid in this review to due process violations that result from these violent approaches, and the effect on Muslims and broader society. Several recommendations are made with the view of bringing about a more peaceful and equal society that is healed from its turbulent past.

ALGERIA, THE COUNTRY



Image: Map of Algeria¹



- Population of Muslims: 96%
- Total Population: 40.4 million (2015)³

Languages: Standard Arabic² and Tamazight (Berber). Algerian spoken Arabic and French dominate spoken discourse and media.

Colonised: Algeria gained independence from France in 1962.

Total Population: 40.4 million (2015)³
Ninety nine percent of the population is

classified ethnically as Arab-Berber and 96% religiously as Sunni Muslim. There are also almost 100,000 Christians. There are nearly 2,000 Jews still living in Algeria, but their numbers are decreasing due to emigration, mostly to France and Israel.⁴

¹ Lonely Planet, Map of Algeria, 2016 available at: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/algeria/> and University of Texas Libraries, Algeria Tribes, available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria_tribes_1971.jpg And University of Texas Libraries, Algeria Population, available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria_pop_1971.jpg

² Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons, and Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2016. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Nineteenth edition. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. [online] Available at: <http://www.ethnologue.com>

³ Trading Economics (2016) Algerian Population 1960 – 2016. [online] Available at: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/algeria/population>

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, Africa: Algeria, The World Factbook [online]. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html>

HISTORY⁵

France has long denied that it committed genocide in Algeria during the colonial period between 1830 and 1962, despite ample oral and recorded evidence. The brutal role of France in Algeria's history and the French government's continued refusal to apologise or compensate victims of its atrocities, is a key grievance of violent organisations.⁶

The anti-colonialist movement grew over decades, but a turning point occurred the day Nazi Germany surrendered in 1945, in a protest in Setif when 4000 protestors took to the streets to demand an end to French colonial rule and freedom for imprisoned intellectual Messali Hadj, who had spoken against the brutality of the occupying regime and demanded more rights for Muslims. The march turned violent when French police shot a 14-year-old Muslim scout who refused to hand over an Algerian flag to the police.⁷

Eventually, after five days of clashes, the French army moved in and launched an all-out killing campaign that lasted two months. In the end, the number of Muslims killed ranged between 1000 (the official French figure) and 45 000 (figure from Radio Cairo), though the exact number

remains disputed to this day. 102 Europeans were killed.

Terrible images of bodies piled up in the countryside and tales of torture, rape and mutilation of bodies testify to what has become known as the Setif massacre. To this day, France refuses to acknowledge the full extent of its role in the atrocities committed, but Setif set the wheels in motion for the beginning of the end of French rule in Algeria.

Algeria's war of independence against the French, led by the newly formed Front de Libération Nationale (FLN; National Liberation Front), began on 31 October 1954. After a long and bloody conflict in which it is estimated over one million Algerians were killed, independence was declared on 5 July 1962. Journalist Robert Fisk describes the

⁵ Gascoigne, Bamber. "History of Algeria" HistoryWorld.Net From 2001, ongoing. Available at: <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?ParagraphID=okz> ; also see

Algeria.com, 'History of Algeria' (1995-2016 and ongoing) Available at: <http://www.algeria.com/history/> ; and see also Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations. "Algeria." 2007. [Encyclopedia.com](http://www.encyclopedia.com). 1 Jul. 2016 Available at: <http://www.encyclopedia.com> ; and also LonelyPlanet.com, Algeria-History 2016 Available at: <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/algeria/history> ; and also Sutton, Keith. Algeria Last Updated 4-30-2016. [Britannica.com](https://global.britannica.com/place/Algeria) Available at: <https://global.britannica.com/place/Algeria>

⁶ Berman, E. (Jan 2015) 'The History of French-Muslim Violence Began on the Streets of Algeria' [online] TIME. Available at: time.com/3664161/france-algeria-muslim-violence/ (Accessed 24 Feb 2017)

⁷ Kara-Mustoupha, H (May 2015) '8th May 1945: Remembering Algeria's Setif Massacre' [online] 5 Pillars. Available at: 5pillarsuk.com/2015/05/08/8th-may-1945-remembering-algerias-setif-massacre/ (Accessed 24 Feb 2017)

uneasiness in the aftermath as *“a cold peace in which Algeria’s residual anger, in France as well as in the homeland, settled into long-standing resentment.”*⁸

FLN candidate Ahmed ben Bella, became Algeria’s first president but was quickly overthrown in 1965 by former colleague Colonel Houari Boumédiène, who returned the country to military rule. Boumédiène died in December 1978 and the FLN replaced him with Colonel Chadli Benjedid, who was re-elected in 1984 and 1989. Opposition to Boumédiène and Chadli was underground; the FLN was the sole political party, pursuing basically secular, socialist policies. In October 1988, thousands of people protested against government austerity measures and food shortages. The army was called in, and some 500 people were killed.⁹

The government reacted by pledging to relax the FLN monopoly on political power and work towards a multiparty system. Elections held in early 1990 produced a landslide victory for the previously outlawed Front Islamique du Salut (FIS; Islamic Salvation Front) and another round of voting in December 1991 produced

another landslide win for the FIS. The FLN won only 16 seats.¹⁰

But before the FIS could assume power, the Algerian army conducted a coup. Ben Lombardi, who was with the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at the Department of National Defence in Ottawa, Canada wrote that in 1991, at this time, the West supported this coup to prevent an Islamic government from coming to power.¹¹ The United States, therefore, tacitly supported the coup to undermine the democratic result. This unleashed untold violence and atrocities in the country, and a civil war that claimed up to 200 000 lives. This duplicity remains the cause of much anti American sentiment.

A five-person Haut Conseil d’Etat (HCE; High Council of State) headed by Mohammed Boudiaf, a former leader of the Algerian revolution, was put in control of the country. The second round of elections was cancelled, and FIS leaders Abbas Madani and Ali Belhadj were arrested while others fled into exile. Tens of thousands of Muslims who had supported the winning party were arrested and imprisoned in prisons in the Sahara where they were

⁸ Berman, E. (Jan 2015) ‘The History of French-Muslim Violence Began on the Streets of Algeria’ [online] TIME. Available at: time.com/3664161/france-algeria-muslim-violence/ (Accessed 24 Feb 2017)

⁹ Anon (n.d) Encyclopaedia of Nations: Algeria [online]. Available at: <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Algeria-HISTORY.html#ixzz4Zb0bocdC> (Accessed 24 Feb 2017)

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Lombardi, Ben, ‘Turkey: The Return of the Reluctant Generals’, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1997, Vol. 112, No. 2.

tortured and abused.¹²

A succession of leaders contributed to political instability. Boudiaf lasted six months before he was assassinated and replaced by former FLN hardliner Ali Kafi, who oversaw the country's rapid descent into civil war before he was replaced by a retired general, Liamine Zéroual, in January 1994. Zéroual attempted to defuse the situation by holding fresh elections in 1995, but Islamic parties were barred from the poll and Zéroual's sweeping victory came amid widespread claims of fraud.

New elections held in April 1999 resulted in a controversial victory for the establishment candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign minister, who was elected unopposed after the rest of the candidates in the field claimed fraud and withdrew. Within weeks of his election, Bouteflika announced a "*Civil Concord Plan*" which included an amnesty for those militants who renounced violence, and some 85% of fighters accepted the amnesty. During this year, there was a marked decline in violence.

However, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the United States called upon

all states to implement counterterrorism measures. Algeria pledged its support for the Bush administration's campaign against terrorism. It accelerated its own activities against 'Islamists' and sent the United States a list of 350 so called Islamic extremists known to be living in Europe and the United States¹³ who may have had contacts with al-Qaeda. Bouteflika made two official state visits to President Bush in 2001, the first such visits by an Algerian president in 15 years. In return for Algeria's aid, the Bush administration agreed to ease restrictions on arms sales to Algeria. In a landslide victory Bouteflika was re-elected to a second term in April 2004. In January 2005, the arrest of rebel Armed Islamic Group (GIA) head Nourredine Boudiafi was announced. His deputy was killed. It was declared that the group was virtually dismantled.

In 2005 voters approved by referendum Bouteflika's proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which ended the Ad Hoc Mechanism established in 2003 to account for the thousands who had disappeared between 1992 and 1999. Today, families of the disappeared still remain with thousands of unfinished stories and no answers as to where their loved ones are, or

¹² Amirouche, Hamou, 'Algeria's Islamist Revolution: The People Versus Democracy?', Middle East Policy, January 1998, Vol. V, No. 4.

¹³ Zoubir, Y. (March 2002) 'Algeria and US Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy' [online] Middle East Policy Vol IX, No. 1. Available at: <http://www.academia.edu/20797022/> (Accessed 19 June 2017)

if they are still alive. The human rights organisation Alkarama, has said that the government relies on the charter to keep these answers hidden from families, since it *“punishes ‘anyone who, through his statements, writings or any other act, uses or exploits the wounds of the national tragedy to harm the democratic institutions of the Republic of Algeria, to weaken the State, to harm the reputation of its agents who served it with dignity, or tarnish Algeria's image internationally’.”*¹⁴

The charter went into effect in 2006, and granted amnesty to security forces and state-sponsored groups, in fact all those who had fought for the government in the 1990s. The amnesty also covered individuals involved in “Islamist” groups but excluded those implicated in mass killings, rapes, or bomb attacks in public places. Criticism from several NGOs claim that the Charter allowed security forces impunity for their crimes.¹⁵

The U.S. State Department lists two Algerian groups as designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was most active from 1991 to 2001 and last attacked in 2006. Former GIA

members have accepted the government amnesty or joined other groups.

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) split from GIA in 1998, declared its opposition to attacking civilians and announced its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2003. Abdelmalik Droukdel (aka Abu Musab Abdulwadood) became its leader, and the organisation took the name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

In July 2009, the leaders of Algeria, Libya, and Mali agreed to work in concert against AQIM. In August, the military chiefs of Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania met in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset and agreed to cooperate more to counter terrorism and related crime and developed the so-called *“Tamanrasset Plan.”* They began to set up a joint command centre for security and military coordination in Tamanrasset.

The Algerian government has firmly aligned itself with the UK and US in the so called global War on Terror.

¹⁴ Alkarama (Nov 2015) Algeria: The Families of Enforced Disappearances Victims Still Demand Justice [online] Available at: <https://www.alkarama.org/en/articles/algeria-families-enforced-disappearances-victims-still-demand-truth-and-justice> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

¹⁵ US Department of State (2010) Algeria [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154458.htm> (Accessed 3 March 2017)

WESTERN COMPLICITY IN VIOLENCE

Little attention has been given in the Western media to the violence in Algeria, between 1991 and 1999, which claimed between 100 000 and 200 000 lives. The United States and her allies refused to condemn or take action against the violence meted out by the Algerian army, since the actions of the military were excused by the oft-cited reason that they were ‘fighting Islamic terrorism’, with civilian deaths blamed on the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a group formed in 1992 and made up allegedly of Afghan mujahideen and disaffected FIS leaders and supporters.

However it is worth noting here that reports by Amnesty International record that blaming the GIA solely for civilian deaths during that period is problematic, since most of the civilian massacres took place in highly militarised areas or within close distance of army barracks, or took place over a period of time during which the army could easily have intervened to stop the violence, but didn’t. AI also said that “the Algerian authorities have systematically failed to carry out investigations and to bring those responsible to justice” for civilian deaths.¹⁶

Furthermore, there were also reports in the UK press suggesting that the GIA had been infiltrated and directed by the Algerian intelligence services, the Département du renseignement et de la sécurité (DRS), including during the bombings claimed by the GIA in Paris in 1995. Though these are still unverified, the claims demand to be investigated further.

A report dated 10 November 1997 by the UK-based Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) points out that a series of articles in the British press on the situation in Algeria “*have revealed that the Algerian secret services have been deliberately massacring its citizens, and orchestrating bombing campaigns in France to discredit Islamists.*”¹⁷

Western intelligence services were also reportedly complicit in these activities. The journalist Nafeez Ahmed writes for the New Internationalist:

“In the late 1990s, evidence began to emerge from dissident Algerian Government and intelligence sources that the GIA atrocities were in fact perpetrated by the state. ‘Yussuf-Joseph’, a career secret agent in Algeria’s sécurité militaire for 14 years, defected to Britain in 1997 and told the Guardian that civilian massacres in Algeria, blamed on the GIA, were ‘the work of secret police and army

¹⁶ Ahmed, M (2000) Algeria and the Paradox of Democracy: The 1992 Coup, Its Consequences, and the Contemporary Crisis [online] Algeria International Watch. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/articles/1997_2000/paradox_democracy.htm (Accessed 24 Feb 2017)

¹⁷ Ibid.

death squads... not Islamic extremists'. GIA terrorism was 'orchestrated' by 'Mohammed Mediane, head of the Algerian secret service', and 'General Smain Lamari', head of 'the counter intelligence agency'. According to Joseph: 'The GIA is a pure product of Smain's secret service. I used to read all the secret telexes. I know that the GIA has been infiltrated and manipulated by the Government. The GIA has been completely turned by the Government... In 1992 Smain created a special group, L'Escadron de la Mort (the Squadron of Death)... The death squads organize the massacres... The FIS aren't doing the massacres.'

Joseph also confirmed that Algerian intelligence agents organized 'at least' two of the bombs in Paris in summer 1995. 'The operation was run by Colonel Souames Mahmoud, alias Habib, head of the secret service at the Algerian embassy in Paris.' Joseph's testimony has been corroborated by numerous defectors from the Algerian secret services.

Western intelligence agencies are implicated. Secret British Foreign Office documents revealed in a terrorist trial in 2000 showed that 'British intelligence believed the Algerian Government was involved in atrocities, contradicting the view the Government was claiming in

public'. The documents referred to the 'manipulation of the GIA being used as a cover to carry out their own operations', and that 'there was no evidence to link 1995 Paris bombings to Algerian militants'.¹⁸

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In a book entitled *La Sale Guerre* (2001), Habib Souaïdia, a former DRS officer, revealed how the DRS had not only infiltrated and manipulated armed Islamic groups but had also masqueraded as Islamists. This made them responsible for a large proportion of the estimated 200,000 killed in the 'Dirty War'.¹⁹

**Algeria a key UK ally in falsifying
the case for the Iraq War**

To add to the political intrigues, the final role of the false presentation of a Ricin Plot

¹⁸ Ahmed, N (n.d) 'Our terrorists' [online] New Internationalist Issue 426. Available at: <https://newint.org/features/2009/10/01/blowback-extended-version/> (Accessed 24 Feb 1027)

¹⁹ Keenan, J. (April 2013) 'Algerian gas plant terror: the real story' [online] New Internationalist. Available at: <https://newint.org/features/2013/04/01/real-story-terrorist-attack-algerian-gas-plant/> (Accessed 7 March 2017)

as a reason for the invasion of Iraq was played between the UK and Algeria. In January 2003, Scotland Yard received intelligence reports from the Algerian intelligence agencies. They claimed that a man in their custody, Mohammed Meguerba had confessed to a Ricin Plot after his detention in late 2002. Due to the confessions, the UK authorities made a number of arrests of Algerian men in the UK, and attempted to try them on the basis of the flawed intelligence.

The case went before the House of Lords on appeal, where Dame Eliza Mannigham-Buller, the then Director-General of MI5 attempted to justify the need to use information that may have been extracted under torture. She claimed that due to the threat of international terrorism, there was, “*..the need for enhanced international cooperation.*” She further went on to specifically say that “*The Meguerba case provides an example of full co-operation with our Algerian partners.*”²⁰ It was precisely this information, well documented to have been gleaned through a false confession based on torture, that was sent to the US to fabricate their case for the invasion of Iraq. The outcome of the appeal case was that those involved in the alleged plot were all acquitted.

The Tiguentourine gas plant hostage crisis

The complicity of intelligence services, foreign and local, has also been called into question in relation to another reported ‘terrorist’ incident. Recently, in March 2017, Professor Jeremy Keenan, a visiting Professor at the School of Law at Queen Mary University of London, launched a report that provided evidence of UK, US and French complicity in the Tiguentourine gas plant hostage crisis, where 80 people died when armed men attacked a gas plant near In Amenas in Algeria’s Sahara Desert.

According to Keenan’s report, the In Amenas Report, the subsequent inquest held in London at the Royal Courts of Justice and Old Bailey, “*covered up*” the West’s complicity in long being aware of the DRS’s association with terrorist groups and their false flag operations. Keenan’s report “*reveals how the British government used a PII (Public Interest Immunity) certificate to mask its intelligence shortcomings and complicity in an even greater state crime involving the training of Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Algeria.*”²¹

These and other intrigues around the ‘War

²⁰ Qureshi, A, Begg, M, Mafille, A. (July 2016) ‘The Iraq War was Born and Raised in Torture’ [online] Middle East Eye. Available at: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/iraq-war-was-born-and-raised-torture-1531773609> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

²¹ ICSI (March 2017) ‘The International State Crime Initiative Presents Professor Jeremy Keenan’s In Amenas Report Launch’ [online] Available at: <http://us9.campaign-archive1.com/?u=f4fa7aa83feab92db49d9e28e&id=2e5b3aed73&e=69e97e876c> (Accessed 2 March 2017)

on Terror' in Algeria need to be interrogated and explored, especially since they occur against backdrop of, and work hand in hand with, increasingly draconian and broad counter-terrorism legislation which has affected civil society.

POST-2001 ANTI TERRORISM LEGISLATION

Algiers Convention

In 2002, members of the Organisation of African Unity, including Algeria, put into action the Algiers Convention, which was ratified in 1999 in Algiers.

The Convention defines a “terrorist act” as:

- (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
 - (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles;
- or
- (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
- (iii) create general insurrection in a State.

- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement,

encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).²²

A special provision, however, also notes that: “*Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 (above), the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.*”²³

Legislation following Algiers Convention

The Algerian Penal Code, which has been in force since 1976 with several amendments made under the global War on Terror, defines a “terrorist act” as any act targeting state security and national unity, territorial integrity, and the stability and normal functioning of institutions by any action whose objective is to:

²² Council on Foreign Relations (July 1999) ‘Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers Convention)’ [online] Available at: www.cfr.org/terrorism/organization-african-unity-oau-convention-prevention-combating-terrorism-algiers-convention/p25182 (Accessed 28 February 2017)

²³ Ibid

- Spread terror among the population and create a climate of insecurity through moral or physical assault on people, through exposing their lives, freedom, or security to danger, or through damaging their properties;
- Obstruct traffic or freedom of movement on the roads and gather or sit in in public spaces;
- Assault the symbols of the Nation and the Republic and unearth or desecrate graves;
- Assault the means of transportation and transport, the public and private properties, and possess or occupy them without legal justification;
- Assault the environment or introduce into the atmosphere, into the earth or on its face, or into the waters, including territorial waters, a substance that would expose the health of humans or of animals, or the natural environment to danger;
- Obstruct the work of public authorities, the freedom of worship, the exercise of public liberties, or the functioning of the establishments assisting public services;
- Obstruct the functioning of public institutions, assault the lives or

properties of their representatives, or impede the implementation of laws and regulations²⁴

Due process violations

As with similar legislation around the world, the broad and vague definitions of terrorism open the way to abuse. The definition is broad enough to include in the definition of terrorism, all activities targeting a government or the political regime, even when such activities may involve legitimate political dissent or protest.

This is especially concerning when the crime of terrorism is punishable by the death penalty, and death sentences under special terrorism legislation were imposed in 2014. According to Algeria's Ministry of Justice, in December 2014 over 200 prisoners were sentenced to death, including 30 women. Middle East Eye reported that *"they had been convicted of crimes including premeditated murder and terrorism-related crimes"*.²⁶

Furthermore, several due process restrictions on investigations are suspended when the act being dealt with falls under

²⁴ Library of Congress (n.d) Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia: Responses to Terrorism [online] Available at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/counterterrorism/algeria-morocco-saudi-arabia.php> (Accessed 28 February 2017)

²⁵ Anonymous (2014) Amnesty: Alarming Surge in Executions Around the World [online] Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/amnesty-alarming-surge-in-executions-across-the-world/a-19165430> (Accessed 2 March 2017)

²⁶ Staff (Feb 2015) 'Maghreb's al-Qaeda leader, 25 others sentenced to death in Algeria' [online] Middle East Eye. Available at: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/al-qaeda-leader-25-others-sentenced-death-algeria-1113141111> (Accessed 2 March 2017)

these broad definitions of terrorism.

Whereas normally, police are only allowed to search a premises before 5:00 a.m. or after 8:00 pm, and in the presence of the accused or his representative, if the offense being investigated is terrorist in nature, a search warrant does not need to be obtained, a search can take place any time during day or night; and the presence of the accused or his representative is not necessary.²⁷

For a crime, the accused can be taken into custody during the investigative process under certain conditions for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours, but if the crime is classified as a terrorist act this period can be extended by up to twelve days.²⁸

Under Algerian law, pre-trial detention is allowed under certain strict conditions and limited to a period of four months, which can be renewed twice. But in the case of a terrorist act, pre-trial detention may be renewed five times and, if the crime is transnational in nature, the detention period may be renewed eleven times.²⁹

This creates long periods of detention—without-trial.

Provision is also made in terrorism legislation for the removal of individuals accused of terrorism to undisclosed locations. Judges are allowed to place suspects in “*protected residence*.” The law allows this form of custody to take place in a secret location and authorizes prosecution for revealing its whereabouts. During this time, suspects are cut off from contact with families and lawyers.³⁰

Provision is also made in terrorism legislation for the removal of individuals accused of terrorism to undisclosed locations in “protected residence.” During this time, suspects are cut off from contact with families and lawyers.

The basis of this is found in Article 6 of the 1992 Emergency Decree, which imposed the

²⁷ Library of Congress (n.d) Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia: Responses to Terrorism [online] Available at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/counterterrorism/algeria-morocco-saudi-arabia.php> (Accessed 28 February 2017)

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Human Rights Watch (January 2012) Algeria [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/algeria_2012.pdf (Accessed 2 March 2017)

state of emergency in Algeria, which allows government *“to assign to a residence any adult whose activity is determined to be harmful to the public order or to the functioning of public services.”*³¹ The locations of these “residences” is not known.

Laws to prevent recruitment

In November 2015, according to the US Country Report on Terrorism: Middle East and North Africa Review, *“Algeria’s Minister of Justice presented to Parliament a bill to add provisions to the criminal code to prohibit traveling to other countries to take part in armed conflict, and providing financing or organizing travel operations to other countries for the purpose of committing or inciting terrorist acts, including by using information and communication technologies, or by any other means”*.³²

During the debate over the bill, deputies stressed the need to “define terrorism and assimilated acts.”³³

Countering the Financing of Terrorism

Special provisions are made to prevent the financing of terrorism, which is a separate crime independent from the terrorist act itself. The Penal Code prescribes a five to ten years imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Algerian dinars for anyone found to be praising, encouraging, or financing by any means acts of terrorism.³⁴ Again, the word ‘encouraging’ is open to subjective interpretation by authorities, as is ‘by any means’.

In 2005, a special law was enacted to criminalise money laundering and financing of terrorism, which made all suspicious financial transactions subject to scrutiny. The law compelled all financial and some other institutions to refer to a special investigative unit any transactions suspected of involving the crime of financing of terrorism. The special investigative unit must refer its findings to the competent criminal legal authority.³⁵

³¹ Human Rights Watch (June 1012) Long Delays Tainting Terrorism Trials [online] Available at: http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Algeria,_12_06_18,_Long_delays_tainting_terrorism_trials.pdf (Accessed 6 March 2017)

³² US Department of State (2016) Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257517.htm> (Accessed 28 Feb 2017)

³³ Anon (April 2016) Algeria: Amendment to Penal Code Aims at Combating Recruitment for Terrorist Organizations [online]. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201604131673.html> (Accessed 28 Feb 2017)

³⁴ US Department of State (2016) Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257517.htm> (Accessed 28 Feb 2017)

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Ibid

Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)–style regional body. Its financial intelligence unit, known as the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF), is a member of the Egmont Group.³⁶ The Egmont Group, headquartered in Toronto, Canada, is an informal network of some 132 financial intelligence units from countries around the world. The FIUs are not accountable to the public, and rather report suspicious activity to public prosecutors, who then instigate action against individuals.

Under pressure from the US and the UN, Algeria has gradually tightened its legislation in connection with financing. In 2015, laws allowing for the freezing and seizure of assets thought to be linked to terrorist activity were broadened, and an executive order relating to seizures was signed in May that year.³⁷

Countering Violent Extremism

The Algerian government does not allow anyone to preach in mosques other than those appointed and trained by the government to do so.³⁸ The government

also monitors the contents of prayers and gives credentials to imams that tow the government line. The penal code outlines punishments, including fines and prison sentences, for anyone other than a government–designated imam who preaches in a mosque.³⁹

This is to supposedly lessen the possibility of importing “*violent Islamist extremist ideologies*,” and gives the government the free range of monitoring mosques for what it reasons to be “*possible security-related offenses*,”. It goes so far as to “*prohibit the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours*.”⁴⁰

Employing the 2006 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, Algerian continues to offer amnesty to former terrorists who have rejected violence. These individuals have often gone on to become spokespeople to prevent youth from “*radicalisation*”.

In terms of utilizing the media, government–driven content on radio also counters “*extremism*” and include lectures. Posting any “*terrorism-related*” content on the internet is prohibited.

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid

Counter Terrorism Policing

Counter terrorism policing is shared between the 130,000 members of the Gendarmerie, which operates outside of urban areas, and the 210,000 members of the DGSN (Directorate General for National Security), organized under the Ministry of Interior. In 2015, the Algerian intelligence service, the DRS, was restructured, so that the Algerian Central Service for Anti-Terrorism (SCAAT) was placed directly under the control of the Vice Minister of Defense.⁴¹

Police have been accused of multiple abuses, including extended periods of pre-trial detention during which terrorism suspects are tortured into making confessions,⁴² a situation so severe that in 2016, the UK's Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled against the Home Office and in favour of six men who fought deportation orders to Algeria, saying that there was a *“real risk”* that they would be tortured if imprisoned there.⁴³

Police have used counter-terrorism legislation to crack down on legitimate political opponents to President Boutiflika, in addition to rounding up and detaining demonstrators demanding government reforms, and shutting down independent television stations.

Furthermore, in the city of Gardaia, police have been accused of frustrating conflict. Blog posts featuring videos showed how security forces were turning a blind eye to individuals who were vandalizing the city, in order to *“increase sectarian conflict between the Ibadites [minority] and the Sunnis [Muslim majority]”*.⁴⁴

⁴¹ US Department of State (2015) Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Review [online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257517.htm> (Accessed 3 March 2017)

⁴² Amnesty International (2006) Algeria: Torture in the War on Terror: A Memorandum to the President [online]. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_en/ai_torture_war_terror.pdf (Accessed 3 March 2017)

⁴³ Bureau of Investigative Journalism (April 2016) 'Bid to Deport Six Terror Suspects Blocked After UK Judges Site Torture Fears in Algeria' [online] Available at: <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2016-04-18/bid-to-deport-six-terror-suspects-blocked-after-uk-judges-cite-torture-fears-in-algeria> (Accessed 3 March 2017)

⁴⁴ Kabylia (Feb 2014) 'When Algeria's Police Fail to Act, Citizen Journalists Step in' [online] Available at: <https://kabyliya.me/2014/02/12/when-algerias-police-fail-to-act-citizen-journalists-step-in/> (Accessed 3 March 2017)

RECENT TERRORISM CASES UNDER LEGISLATION

There have been a great many terrorism cases heard in the courts of Algeria, including many in which the death sentence was passed⁴⁵ – this report notes those cases that achieved some prominence in local and international media.

In 2011, after being held for more than six years in a secret location Amari Saïfi, the alleged ringleader of the kidnapping of 32 European tourists in the Algerian desert in 2003, was finally brought before a judge. Algerian courts had previously tried him in absentia, sentencing him to death in one trial and life in prison in another. In 2011, he was transferred to Serkadji Prison in Algiers. But his trial was again delayed, and judges have also refused to summon him as a witness in the trials of the men he allegedly led in the kidnapping operation. Human Rights Watch in 2012 said his case *“illustrates the unjust treatment to which terrorism suspects can still be subjected”*.⁴⁶

In 2012, Abdelmalek Droukdel, the head of AQIM was sentenced to death in absentia, for a series of bombing attacks in 2007. Twenty-four other co-defendants,

including Abdessalam Samir, Ait Said Salem, Ait Said Meziane, Ziani Said, Ghiatou Rabah, Chemini Toufic, Niche Djamel and Bou Djalki Abderrahmane were sentenced with him.⁴⁷ Only one defendant, al-Adawi Walid, appeared in court to answer charges of belonging to a terrorist organisation.⁴⁸

In 2015, the Criminal Court in Algiers addressed twenty-seven cases related to terrorism, the most prominent being a case that involved friends and family members of AQIM militant commander Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (who was killed in 2013), who were charged with belonging to an armed terrorist group, compromising the security of citizens, incitement of terrorist acts, and financing an armed terrorist group.⁴⁹

In 2016, a 40-year-old Algerian man was arrested and charged in Austria in

⁴⁵Staff (Feb 2015) ‘Maghreb’s al-Qaeda leader, 25 others sentenced to death in Algeria’ [online] Middle East Eye. Available at: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/al-qaeda-leader-25-others-sentenced-death-algeria-1113141111> (Accessed 2 March 2017)

⁴⁶Human Rights Watch (June 1012) Long Delays Tainting Terrorism Trials [online] Available at: http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Algeria,_12_06_18,_Long_delays_tainting_terrorism_trials.pdf (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁴⁷AFP (March 2012) ‘Death sentence for Qaeda’s fugitive North Africa chief’ [online] Modern Ghana. Available at: <https://www.modernghana.com/news/383257/1/death-sentence-for-qaedas-fugitive-north-africa-ch.html> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁴⁸Staff writers (June 2015) Maghreb’s al-Qaeda leader, 25 others sentenced to death in Algeria [online] Middle East Eye. Available at: <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/al-qaeda-leader-25-others-sentenced-death-algeria-1113141111> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁴⁹Anon (Dec 2014) Supplementary List by the Felony [Court] in the Capital: 140 Cases Ready for Trial, 27 of which Are for Terrorism [online] Radio Algerie. Available at: <http://www.radioalgerie.dz/news/ar/article/20141214/22621.html>

connection with the 2015 attacks in Paris. He was charged alongside a 26 year-old Moroccan. Both were not named due privacy laws. According to reports, the two were accused of helping another two suspects with “logistics as well as through gathering information and arranging contacts”.⁵⁰

Lawyers defending terrorism suspects imprisoned and tortured

Lawyers who have acted on behalf of terrorism suspects have been subject to harassment and legal enquiry, the most prominent being Rachid Mesli, a French-Algerian defense lawyer and legal director of the Geneva-based human rights group Alkarama (which highlights Algeria’s human rights abuses). Mesli was part of the defense team for Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, arrested leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front in the 1990s.

On 31 July 1996, he was abducted by security services, detained secretly for over a week, tortured and charged with belonging to a terrorist group. A year later, he was acquitted of this charge and instead convicted of having “encouraged

terrorism”, a charge that had not been brought against him in the trial and against which he had no opportunity to defend himself. Amnesty International said the trial had “clearly violated international standards for fair trial”.⁵¹

In December 1998, his conviction was quashed by the Supreme Court; he was kept in prison while awaiting retrial, contrary to Algerian law. In June 1999, he was found guilty of belonging to a terrorist group and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He was released in July 1999, one and a half weeks before his sentence was to end, as part of a presidential pardon. In 2000, fearing for his and his family's safety, he left the country to live in Geneva.

Mesli became an Amnesty International prisoner of conscience. According to an AI statement,⁵² he “was arrested again on 19 August 2015 at the Swiss-Italian border between the Swiss canton of Valais and the Italian Aosta Valley as he was about to go on holiday with his wife and teenage son”. Deprived of his right to speak to a lawyer he was detained at Aosta prison.

⁵⁰ Robinson, J (September 2016) ‘Austria charges Moroccan and Algerian terror suspects over links to ISIS attack on Paris that left 130 dead’ [online] Daily Mail. Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3779922/Austria-charges-Moroccan-Algerian-terror-suspects-links-ISIS-attack-Paris-left-130-dead.html> (Accessed 7 March 2017)

⁵¹ Amnesty International “Algerian human rights defender at risk of extradition must be released immediately”, Public Statement, Index: MDE 28/2313/2015, 21 August 2015. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2823132015ENGLISH.pdf>

⁵² Amnesty International (August 2015) ‘Algerian Human Rights Defender At Risk of Extradition Must Be Released Immediately’ [online] Available at: https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1441013396_mde2823132015english.pdf (Accessed 6 March 2017)

Rachid Mesli, a French Algerian defense lawyer and legal director of the Geneva-based human rights group Alkarama, was charged in absentia in Algeria with belonging to an “armed terrorist group” based on evidence gained from two men who were tortured.

Mesli was charged in absentia in Algeria with belonging to an “armed terrorist group” operating abroad and had been accused of providing "telephone information on a terrorist groups movement," and attempting to "supply terrorist groups with cameras and phones."

The charge relied on evidence gained from two men who were tortured into confessing these links.⁵³ He was placed under house arrest.⁵⁴ On 15 September 2015, the Turin Court of Appeal lifted the house arrest against Mesli and released him.

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ D. Parvaz (August 2015) Rights lawyer on house arrest in Italy accused of aiding 'terrorist group' [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/8/26/algerian-rights-lawyer-arrested-in-italy-on-2002-arrest-warrant.html> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

RENDITION AND TORTURE

Algeria likely received at least two extraordinary rendition victims from CIA custody and also permitted use of its airspace and airports for CIA extraordinary rendition operations.

In January 2004, Algeria took custody of Jamaldi Boudra, an Algerian militant and Chechen sympathizer, who had previously been held in CIA custody. In April 2002, he was abducted in Georgia by the mafia and handed over to the CIA. After spending nearly two years in CIA custody in Afghanistan, he was rendered to Algeria in January 2004. There, he was prosecuted for the crime of membership in a terrorist group active abroad, and in 2005, sentenced to five years of imprisonment, following which he was released in 2010.⁵⁵

It is likely that Algeria also took custody of a former CIA detainee Abu Bakr Muhammad Boulghiti, who was held by the CIA in secret detention most likely in Afghanistan until at least July 2006 before he was likely transferred to Algeria.⁵⁶

A 2006 Council of Europe report mentions Algiers airport as a stop in January 2004 in the path of extraordinary rendition flight N313P. This flight carried Binyam Mohamed, Al Habashi, and Khaled El-

Masri. Algiers is also noted in the flight logs of other rendition aircraft, however Algeria has not been held accountable for its participation in CIA secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations.⁵⁷

M'Hamed Benyamina, was detained secretly for more than five months in the 'Antar' barracks at Hydra (a detention centre of the DRS), and was freed in March 2006 within the framework of general amnesty. He was re-arrested in April 2006 by plain clothes DRS officers and when his brother went to the barracks to meet him, he was told that he had been transferred to Algiers.⁵⁸

According to the human rights group Algeria Watch, Benyamina had been living in France since 1997:

"In September 2005, he was arrested at Oran airport as he was about to return to France, after a month's stay in Algeria. At the time, he was told by the arresting officers that his arrest had been requested by French authorities. He was detained at an

⁵⁵ 'Globalising Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition' [online] Report. Available at: <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/except/torture.html> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Anon (April 2006) 'Fear of Torture or Ill Treatment' [online] Algeria Watch. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/hr/torture/ai_benyamina_ikhlef.htm (Accessed 6 March 2017)

undisclosed location without charge or trial and without access to the outside world for five months. In February 2006 he was charged with “belonging to a terrorist group operating abroad” and “joining a terrorist group operating in Algeria”.

In March 2006, all judicial proceedings against him in Algeria were ended following a presidential decree which led to the release of hundreds of detainees. According to media reports, M’hamed Benyamina is now wanted by judicial authorities in France in connection with alleged plans to commit violent attacks on targets in France. Several others have been arrested in France since the end of September 2005, on suspicion of involvement in these plans. According to reports in the French press, the arrests were connected to information given by M’hamed Benyamina while he was held in secret detention in Algeria.”⁵⁹

Abdelmajid Touati was arrested on 18 March

2006 and five months went by before his family learned that he was secretly detained. According to a newsletter from the Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie, on 11 September he was accused of belonging to a terrorist group, and of falsification and of using false documents. The next day he was transferred without notice to Chlef prison, 250 km west of Algiers and 168 km north of Tiaret.⁶⁰

Algerian nationals have also been subjected to extraordinary rendition by other participating states. These include Soufian al-Huwari,⁶¹ Abu Yousef al-Jaza’eri,⁶² Khayr al-Din al-Jaza’eri,⁶³ Ahcene Zemiri and Adil al-Jazeeri⁶⁴ and Abu Bakr Saddiqi.⁶⁵

Laid Saidi, an Algerian citizen and member of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation in Tanzania,⁶⁶ was arrested there in May 2003, driven to Dar es Salaam, and put in jail. Three days later he was moved to a detention facility in Malawi, and from there

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Collectif des familles de disparu(e)s en Algérie (July/Sept 2006) Newsletter [online] Available at: <http://www.algerie-disparus.org/app/uploads/2015/12/Newsletter-20-ENG-2006.pdf> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁶¹ U.N. Joint Study on Secret Detention at 63, 65; New York Times (n.d) “The Guantanamo Docket,” Profile: Soufian Abar Huwari, Available at: <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/1016-soufian-abar-huwari> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁶² Human Rights Watch (2008) “Double Jeopardy” [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/jordan0408/> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Worthington, A (Jan 2010) Two Algerian Torture Victims are Freed From Guantanamo [online] Available at: <http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2010/01/25/two-algerian-torture-victims-are-freed-from-guantanamo/> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch (2008) “Double Jeopardy” [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/jordan0408/> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

⁶⁶ Machennet, S and Smith C (July 2006) ‘Algerian Tells of Dark Term in US Hands’ [online] New York Times. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html> (Accessed 6 March 2017)

flown to Afghanistan where he was held in the CIA's Dark Prison, and the Salt Pit and another unidentified prison. A year later, he was flown to Tunisia where he was detained for another 75 days before being returned to Algeria where he was released.⁶⁷

Torture as a historical phenomenon

The language of the United States led 'War on Terror' has slipped easily into the Algerian lexicon. Throughout the Algerian War of 1954 – 1962, members and supporters of the National Liberation Front (FLN) were called "*terrorists*".

According to Raphae Ile Branche, a lecturer in contemporary history at the Sorbonne: *"This kind of categorization serves to blame them, as the initial troublemakers, for any violence they may suffer. In the end, it denies their actions any legitimacy – particularly by treating them as the actions of a minority. Above all, it is a refusal to consider that they are acting for political motives and with a political plan in mind."*⁶⁸

Much the same could be said for the United States War on Terror. In fact, the similarities between Algerian history and the United States' military aggression abroad are acknowledged at high levels; in August 2003 the US Directorate for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

screened the film 'The Battle of Algiers' at the Pentagon (Defence Department) to "*emphasize features common to both wars to show that the Americans would not make the same mistakes as the French*".⁶⁹

In the case of the Algerian War, as with the American one (although it is often outsourced to compliant governments), torture was a key component of military activity. Torture was also used by the Armée de Liberation National (ALN), the armed wing of the FLN. French troops targeted members of militia but also civilians who were thought to support them. Torture techniques included waterboarding, electrocution, beatings, rape and burying alive.

But torture in Algeria went further back than the War of Independence and was initiated in July 1830 during the July Monarchy when the conquest of Algeria by France began under the watch of Thomas Robert Bugeaud, the first governor-general of Algeria. *"From the years 1840 to the 1962 independence, the physical body of the "Arab" has therefore been used as a terror instrument on which the colonial power has never ceased engraving the marks of its almighty power,"* writes historian Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison. It is not difficult to see

⁶⁷ U.N. Joint Study on Secret Detention at para. 133; Craig S. Smith and Souad Mekhennet, "Algerian Tells of Dark Term in U.S. Hands," New York Times, July 7, 2006.

⁶⁸ Branche, R. (2007) 'Torture of terrorists? Use of torture in a "war against terrorism": justifications, methods and effects: the case of France in Algeria, 1954–1962' International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 89 No 867 pp.543 – 560.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

the applicability of this statement to the United States' 'War on Terror'.

Today, it is known that security forces in Algeria torture prisoners, as is evident by cases such as that of Mohamed Harket in Canada,⁷⁰ a victim of entrapment by two informants, one of whom failed a lie detector test. Harket, like the British Algerians mentioned previously, is challenging his deportation based on the fact that he will be tortured if he is sent back to Algeria.

Not only is this torture a violation of international law, but it is also inflicted upon the most unsuspecting of people. In January 2016, the human rights organisation Alkarama brought the case of Lakhdar Guellil to the attention of the United Nations. Guellil was arrested in 1996 after transporting two “*terrorism*” suspects in his taxi. He was detained despite insisting

that he did not know the men and was only transporting them like he did any other client. He was tortured with the use of waterboarding, flogging and being burned with a blowtorch so severely that his arm had to be amputated in 1998. After eight years of arbitrary detention and further torture he was released in 2006. Guellil, now disabled, has still not seen the authorities brought to justice since security services are protected from legal action under the National Reconciliation Charter.

Legal impunity means the torture cycle in Algeria, inaugurated by the French in 1840, continues although it is not as systemic as it was in the 1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, the ‘War on Terror’, in its language and modus operandi, sustains torture. This continues to cause deep scars and grievances in Algerian society both in Algeria and abroad.

⁷⁰Black, D (Aug 2016) ‘Mohamed Harket girds himself for another challenge to stay’ [online] Toronto Star. Available at: <https://www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2016/08/02/mohamed-harket-girds-himself-for-another-fight-to-stay.html> (Accessed 2 June 2017)

RECOMMENDATIONS

CAGE has the following recommendations to make to make steps towards peace:

- The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation has given impunity to security forces who have committed atrocities in the past, and in so doing it allows this culture to persist in the present. Families of the disappeared of Algeria's wars need answers. Past and present officials must be held accountable in a transparent and fair national reconciliation process.
- Several objective, expert-led international investigations must take place: into the extent to which the Algerian intelligence services may have infiltrated the GIA, masqueraded as so called "Islamists" and meted out attacks, and secondly into the complicity of the UK, US and France in the Tiguentourine gas plant hostage crisis. Thirdly, the false presentation of a Ricin Plot as a reason for the invasion of Iraq by the UK and Algeria must also be investigated. Officials must be held accountable and their methodology scrutinised in public to prevent similar atrocities in the future.
- The role of Western governments in Algeria's wars must be openly acknowledged by their governments and France in particular must apologise for its role. It must adjust the way it presents and treats Algerian history in its schools, universities and media into a more balanced and self-conscious approach that acknowledges the deep scars of their invasions on the Algerian psyche. In approaching the Algerian people – those who live in France and those who do not – with humility and respect, both in its public relations and its laws, France can make concrete progress towards a safer society.
- Torture, rendition, detention-without-trial, the crackdown on dissent and other police and security services abuses that have been facilitated by the 'War on Terror' must end and a government that will abide by the rule of law must be implemented.