

An Independent Study

Contributions of Latin America and the Caribbean to UN Peace Operations and Recommendations to Increase this Participation

Joachim A. Koops
María José Maldonado

September 2023

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United Nations Peacekeeping
Integrated Training Service



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The Authors

Professor Joachim Koops is a Member of the Board of the Global Governance Institute in Brussels and its former Founding Director. He is also Professor of Security Studies and Scientific Director of the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the University of Leiden in The Netherlands. He has more than 15 years of experience in leading and conducting scholarly and policy-oriented research and advice projects on UN peacekeeping, regional approaches to peacekeeping as well as on topics related to the protection of civilians, crisis management and peacebuilding. He is the lead editor of the Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (OUP, 2015, with Paul D. Williams, Thierry Tardy and Norrie Macqueen) and of the forthcoming Elgar Global Encyclopaedia of Peacekeeping: Theory and Practice. Recent think tank publications include work on protection of civilians for the International Peace Institute in New York and the Stimson Ce in Washington D.C. Professor Koops has led multinational research teams for advice projects on peacekeeping for various national ministries (including the French and German Ministries of Defence) and has previously served as the Lessons Learned Advisor for the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations as well as Advisor (via the UN Volunteer scheme) to the Head of the Partnership Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2012 and to the Head of the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels.

María José Maldonado is a Non-Resident Fellow in the Global Governance Institute's Peace and Security Section. Her research and work focus on peacekeeping, peacebuilding and international development, countering organised crime and terrorism, violent extremism, the risks and impact of misinformation and disinformation, and forms of governance of non-state armed groups. Prior to joining the Global Governance Institute, Maria was the Programme Manager of Europe, Middle East and North Africa at the Institute for Economics & Peace for Europe, Middle East and North Africa, where she developed experience in resilience-building, capacity enhancement, and in the peace, security and development nexus. María is currently finalising her Master of Science in International Development and Humanitarian Emergencies at the London School of Economics & Political Science and has completed a variety of trainings in diverse areas, such as EU Development & Project Management (Vocal Europe 2019), Conflict Transformation (LSE 2023), and Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation through Human Rights Education (Council of Europe 2021). María holds a Bachelor's Degree in Global Communication with a Minor in European Peace and Security Studies and a Bachelor's Degree in International Affairs from Vesalius College in Brussels, Belgium.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the numerous individuals and institutions that supported the recommendations identified in this study. The authors are especially grateful to Herbert Loret and Sophie Aloë from the UN Light Coordination Mechanism for their helpful guidance and support of this research report. In addition, we are grateful for the numerous interview partners in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) as well as within the UN Department of Peace Operations for their time and for generously sharing their views on the opportunities and challenges of LAC contributions to UN peace operations. Particular thanks to Ivo Werneck, Oliver Ulich and Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz for sharing their insights. We express our gratitude to Gral. Osvaldo Vallejos, Gral. Jorge Maldonado, and Gral. Miguel Salguero. We would also like to thank the various regional scholars we had the opportunity to speak with, especially Professor Kai Michael Kenkel and Professor Arturo Sotomayor. We benefited from the excellent support at the Global Governance Institute and would like to express our thanks to Joseph Duffy and Hien Anh Truong for their research assistance.

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1. Introduction, Overview of the Study and Methodology

In early September 2022, the Government of Peru—in cooperation with and supported by the United Nations (UN) Secretariat through the Office of Military affairs (OMA) and the Light Coordination Mechanism (LCM)—organised the first Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Conference on UN Peace Operations in Lima. One of the main objectives of the conference was to kick-start a dialogue on deepening cooperation between LAC countries in the realm of UN peace operations and to create the LAC Network for Cooperation in Peacekeeping Operations or *Red Latinoamericana y del Caribe para la Cooperación en Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz* (RELACOPAZ) in Spanish.

As outlined in the conference’s Declaration of Lima of 7 September 2022, the 16 signatory States stressed their intention to “promote regional collaboration among the Ministries of Defence or their equivalent, to increase or optimize, as the case may be, the participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”¹ In this vein, the signatory States also commit to advancing variety of topics and themes related to strengthening regional cooperation for the enhancement of LAC countries’ participation in UN peace operations.

The signatory States requested that a study be developed to examine the current obstacles that LAC countries face in contributing to UN peace operations and how participation from the region could be increased in the future. The present document offers an independent perspective on the matter. It puts particular emphasis on current, past and future cooperation modalities in the LAC region and the role the RELACOPAZ could play in a complementary fashion to existing cooperation mechanisms in the realm of UN peace operations.

¹ Declaration of Lima “Living in Peace”, 7 September 2022, para 1, page 2. The signatories of this declaration comprise Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Oriental Republic of Uruguay, United Mexican States.

Overview and Objectives of the Study

This study has been carried out at the request of and in cooperation with the signatory States of the Declaration of Lima and in coordination with the LCM. The objective of the study is to examine the main obstacles LAC countries currently face in contributing to UN peace operations and to suggest recommendations for addressing those challenges. This analysis will be placed in the wider context of the evolution of the LAC countries' past contributions and a discussion of the main strengths and added value to UN peace operations more generally. The study will also examine some lessons from past and current cooperation arrangements across the region (at the bilateral and multilateral levels) and will explore opportunities and limitations for strengthening regional approaches of cooperation and coordination (ranging from training to co-deployments) for enhanced participation in UN peace operations. Particular emphasis will be placed on pragmatic recommendations that take into consideration the specific political, socio-economic and military contexts of the region and countries. To this end, wide ranging interviews and background conversations have been carried out by the authors of this study with national representatives of the Declaration of Lima signatories. Interview partners ranged from members of the national permanent representations to the UN in New York, officials from national ministries of defence and foreign affairs to regional scholars and members of the think tank community. This approach ensured that the main analysis reflects the views of the 16 countries as well as insights from scholars and policy analysts that are intimately familiar with the region and topic (see method section below).

In addition, the study will outline the possible role the UN Secretariat could provide in supporting the LAC countries with a variety of innovative tools. It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide some useful input for further refining and utilizing the RELACOPAZ initiative in a mutually reinforcing manner with existing cooperation schemes in the region and with external partners.

Methodology

This report is based on a qualitative research method through an extensive analysis of the secondary literature, data and policy reports on Latin American countries'

contributions to UN peacekeeping carried out by scholars and think tanks, published both in Spanish and English. In addition, it relies in particular on a wide range of semi-structured interviews with representatives from the signatory countries of the 2022 Declaration of Lima and additional countries from the LAC region. Interviews were conducted with representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Armed Forces, Police Forces, Directors of National Training Centres of Peacekeeping Operations, and Police Advisors, Naval Advisors, and Military Advisors to the UN. A total of 70 officials from the region were contacted and invited for interviews with the support of the LCM. The overall response rate was 31 responses. These interviews were complemented by background conversations with senior officials from UN departments and units dealing with peace operations. Furthermore, insights were gathered from former Force Commanders from the region, university scholars from the region as well as international think tanks and experts. All interviews were carried out online via MS Teams or Zoom platforms.

The semi-structured interviews were carried out on the basis of a standard questionnaire of 11 questions (see Appendix 1) and were used as the basis for the expert interviews in order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the LAC countries' perspectives on the following areas: their respective capacities and contributions; their perceived main obstacles and potential opportunities to engage in UN peace operations; potentials and obstacles related to enhanced cooperation within the LAC region in the realm of UN peace operations; cooperation with partners outside of the LAC Region; obstacles to achieving gender parity targets; requirements and opportunities for benefiting from UN and UN member support for increasing capacities, knowledge and participation; views on innovations in the realm of UN peace operations and a reflection of the respective countries' priorities for the future of UN peace operations.

Wider Context: Regional Approaches to UN Peace Operations

The RELACOPAZ initiative should be seen as an opportunity in the wider context of regional approaches to enhancing participation in UN peace operations. The UN Secretary General's "Our Common Agenda" of 2021 placed renewed emphasis on enhancing regional approaches to peace and

security.² Similarly, his briefing paper on “A New Agenda for Peace” of July 2023 stresses the importance of UN partnerships with “regional frameworks and organizations” for the maintenance of peace and security.³ New partnership initiatives, such as the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) in the Department of Operational Support (DOS) and the LCM in particular have been important innovations for engaging peace operation providers, for ‘enhancing international collaboration and coordination’ and for encouraging a wide range of partnerships for enhanced peacekeeping at the bilateral and regional levels. In this context, encouraging cooperation among past and potential future troop contributors on a regional basis can facilitate the exchange of best practices, the enhancement of synergies and efficiency gains, capacity-building and collaborative approaches to UN peace operations.

Countries from the LAC region have a strong tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping since some of the earliest operations in the 1950s. Beyond the extraordinarily heavy presence within the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 to 2017 LAC countries have also continued to contribute to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 operations, ranging from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to sizable contributions to the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (see below and Appendices 2-4). There is unanimous agreement among officials and experts interviewed for this study that LAC contributions to peace operations are highly valued for their high quality of troops, strong mindset, high level of training and strong performance in the field. There is therefore an understandable amount of interest in the RELACOPAZ initiative and in the possibility of enhancing troop contributions and regional cooperation.

Even though some advances have been made during the last two decades in terms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks and initiatives (particularly in the realm of co-deployment and cooperation in the area of training) the region has still not seen the creation of a durable and effective region-wide framework for reinforcing multi-faceted cooperation amongst LAC countries in matters related to UN peace operations.

A strong and proud tradition of national approaches to peace operations and preferences for autonomous initiatives means that the advancement of region-wide initiatives in this field require extra commitment and joint political leadership. That said, the fact that a wide range of interview partners from the region expressed their appreciation of the RELACOPAZ initiative as an innovative opportunity for regional cooperation and potential collaborative benefits can be seen as encouraging. Despite various challenges at the national, regional and international level, RELACOPAZ could provide an important impetus for a more ambitious, effective and sustainable peace operations partnership across the region.

2 See United Nations (2021) Our Common Agenda – Report of the Secretary General, p. 61.

3 See United Nations (2023) Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace, July, p. 12.

2. Latin American and Caribbean Contributions to UN Peace Operations: Evolution, Trends and Core Capacities

Countries from the LAC region have been effective contributors since the early beginnings of UN peacekeeping in the late 1940s.⁴ As Appendix 2 highlights, countries from the LAC region have participated in most of all UN peace operations between 1948 and 2023. While many deployments consisted of smaller and larger detachments of military observers and Chapter VI operations during the Cold War (with the exception of Brazil's and Colombia's large troop contributions to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) and Argentina's and Brazil's participation in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960), LAC countries have also built up a strong track-record of providing larger troop contingents to post-Cold War operations such as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) in the 1990s. In addition, the LAC region has also seen during the 1990s the stationing of UN peacekeeping operations themselves (such as the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Verification Mission (MINUGUA) in Guatemala) with contributions from troop contributors from the region. Thus, both as troop contributor outside the region and a recipient of peacekeeping operations, LAC countries have built up an intimate knowledge of the advantages and limitations of UN peace operations since the 1990s. LAC countries have also often been identified by peacekeeping scholars as "pioneers" of early peacekeeping efforts of the 1990s in terms of doctrine and the early creation of training centres solely dedicated to the training of UN-related content.⁵

A major turning point for the region and LAC commitment to UN peacekeeping was in the context of MINUSTAH in Haiti from 2004 to 2017. It was the first time LAC countries contributed the majority of troops (more than 70% of the mission's military contingents at peak times) for an entire UN operation and took the lead in diplomatic formats alongside the peacekeeping operation.⁶ MINUSTAH was also in many ways seen as an important learning experience for robust peacekeeping (including combatting urban violence) and an important context for experimenting with bilateral co-deployments.⁷ As can be gleaned from the overviews below, MINUSTAH (and in particular the LAC surge after the 2010 earthquake) represents the clear peak of LAC contributions to UN peace operations during the last 33 years. The fact that the operation was undertaken in the LAC region itself and that various LAC governments at the time saw it as an opportunity for demonstrating a particular national approach to peacekeeping and to assuming regional responsibility for peace and security goes a long way in explaining the strong contributions from LAC countries.⁸ Brazil and Uruguay contributed the bulk of troops and for Brazil MINUSTAH was also seen as an opportunity to experiment with the narrative and implementation of a "Brazilian approach" to peacebuilding.⁹ Brazil senior military leaders also gathered extensive experience as force commanders – the fact that all force commanders were provided by Brazil throughout the 17 years duration of the operation was also a unique feature of the mission.

4 Chile and Uruguay were amongst the first contributors to UNMOGIP in 1948, Brazil (providing 545 troops) and Colombia (522 troops) were among the top 5 contributors at the beginning of UNEF I in 1956, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru contributed to UNOGIL in Lebanon in 1958, Argentina and Brazil contributed to ONUC in 1960.

5 Expert interview with Professor Arturo Sotomayor, 21 July 2023. An important early example is the creation of the *Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz de Uruguay* (ENOPU) by Uruguay in 1982 and the *Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz* (CAECOPAZ) created by Argentina in 1995.

6 See also International Peace Institute (2014) *Beyond Haiti: Enhancing Latin American Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping*. New York: IPI, April 2014. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_beyond_haiti.pdf

7 Examples of LAC cooperative deployments in MINUSTAH include the involvement of Paraguayan troops in a Brazilian battalion, a joint Argentinian-Chilean contingent and a joint Chile-Ecuador engineering company.


8 See also International Peace Institute (2014) *Beyond Haiti*, op. cit.

9 Interview, 25 July 2023.

Whilst the drawdown of MINUSTAH in 2017 also signified a reduction of LAC's overall share of UN peacekeeping troop contributions, it by no means signified the end of major participations. Indeed, Uruguay and Guatemala have continued their contributions to MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo with more than 800 and 150 troops respectively, Peru contributes more than 200 troops to MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and El Salvador contributes more than 100 troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Brazil led UNIFIL's Maritime Task Force until 2020 and Argentina continues to contribute 240 troops to UNFICYP. In addition, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay and Mexico contribute with experts

on missions and staff officers to a variety of missions in the LAC region as well as in Africa (see Appendix 4 for details).

Interviewed experts, former force commanders and UN officials praised the quality, professionalism, mindset and impact of the LAC contributions to these operations. It is in particular appreciated that most LAC nations deploy their troops with relatively few national caveats. Furthermore, carrying out more complex tasks, such as the protection of civilians (POC) and jungle warfare were also pointed out as strengths of LAC contingents deployed on the African continent.¹⁰



Source: IPI Peacekeeping Database and own data collation from UN Peacekeeping Website¹¹


¹⁰ Interview with former UN force commander, 27 July; Interview with Senior UN officials 20 July and 21 July.

¹¹ See <https://www.ipinst.org/providing-for-peacekeeping-database?sp=28202#sub> and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

At the same time, there have also been recent unsuccessful attempts to contribute additional LAC troops to missions on the African continent. Peru's plans to contribute a Quick Reaction Force to MINUSMA and Paraguay's plans to deploy troops to MINUSCA ran into various difficulties in the planning, approval and deployment process. It is important to learn from these obstacles and how to avoid them in the future (see section on obstacles, below). Some challenges were related to the substantial time it requires to receive political approval for deploying a contingent – this can lead to substantial delays during which the previously pledged units are no longer available.¹²

Thus, despite the reduction of contributions by LAC countries in the wake of the completion of MINUSTAH in 2017, several initiatives and openings indicate potentials for continued participation of LAC countries in UN peace operations. Despite some domestic constraints, countries such as Mexico and Colombia as well as Jamaica have also indicated their readiness for potentially more contributions in the future.

Beyond the realm of direct troop or expert contributions, LAC countries have by now also built up a considerable pool of highly experienced force commanders and senior personnel, potentially a further dimension of LAC contributions to peacekeeping institutions.



Source: IPI Peacekeeping Database and own data collation from UN Peacekeeping Website¹³

¹² For instance, in the case of Paraguay, one of their units set for deployment to MINUSCA could no longer be offered after the deployment process lasted too long. From the perspective of Paraguay, the reasons for the dismantling of the unit were due to a variety of factors surrounding the delay of the deployment, including the eventual promotion of personnel within the unit (which made them ineligible to the mission), the relocation of staff to other countries, and the overall change of priority for the staff. Interview with a representative from Paraguay on July 28, 2023.

¹³ See <https://www.ipinst.org/providing-for-peacekeeping-database?sp=28202#sub> and <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

Furthermore, based on LAC countries' long tradition of organising comprehensive UN trainings and setting up training centres and exchanges, further reinforced by lessons learned from deployments during the last two decades, LAC countries, such as Brazil, have begun to dispatch mobile training teams (MTTs) to international partners and to various peacekeeping missions (such as, for instance, Brazil's jungle training in MONUSCO) for in-mission trainings. This provides another important trend for reinforced contributions to the UN's peacekeeping endeavours (see below).

Added Value and Strengths of LAC Capabilities

The LAC countries' long-standing tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping since its very beginnings means that most LAC countries have built up considerable expertise, peacekeeping cultures, mindsets, training curricula and professional standards that are highly valuable for current and future UN peace operations. As previously mentioned, interview partners have praised the high standards and past contributions related to LAC participations.

LAC troops can perform the entire spectrum of military tasks – both in Chapter VI, but also Chapter VII environments. Even though the region's main peacekeeping nations have had a long tradition in Chapter VI operation, participation in major robust peacekeeping operations (with POC mandates) has also led to a strong learning effect among LAC militaries and military leaders.¹⁴ LAC militaries have been singled out by interview partners as being particularly capable of carrying out POC tasks and the ability to dominate the area they are assigned to.

Experiences in MONUSCO and MINUSCA, for example, have highlighted that LAC troops are willing and capable to patrol hotspots and take calculated risks in their area of operation. This impression is also echoed by interview partners from LAC militaries themselves. There is both a

sense of pride and confidence in the abilities of LAC troop contributors across the entire spectrum of UN peacekeeping tasks.

Experiences in MINUSTAH have led to various rounds of learning cycles among participating LAC nations, including in the need for an integrated approach, cooperation with NGOs and humanitarian sectors as well as robust policing and tackling urban gang violence.

Several LAC peacekeeping countries have also built-up expertise in maritime tasks (through the participation in ONUCA and UNIFIL). In addition, LAC troop providers have high capacities for collecting human intelligence and for handling and analysing information for intelligence purposes.

LAC troop contributing countries barely attach major caveats to their troops and have a reputation for impartiality.¹⁵

Despite a relatively low deployment of police officers (and in particular Formed Police Units - with the exception of Argentina's deployment of a Special Police Unit in Haiti) when deployed, LAC countries also have a reputation for good policing tasks in peacekeeping missions.¹⁶

In addition to larger contributors, such as Argentina and Brazil, even smaller countries, such as Peru and Guatemala, have built up a strong reputation across the spectrum of peacekeeping, including their special forces.

As mentioned above, with a tradition of the built up and refinement of training centres for UN peacekeeping that reaches back to the early 1980s, LAC countries have developed an excellent reputation in the realm of training.¹⁷ It is also one of the areas where intra-regional cooperation has been developing with frequent exchanges between officers, instructors and learners between the different training centres (see table below). Yet, there is scope for even further and deeper cooperation (see section on obstacles).

¹⁴ Interviews with senior UN leaders and former force commanders.

¹⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁶ Due to resource constraints and the need for police forces in their own fights against organised crime at home, LAC have very limited extra capacities to provide to UN peacekeeping operations. One of the few exceptions has been Argentina's deployment of a special police unit of 139 police officers to the police mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) between 1997 and 2000. See Blanca Antonini (2014) MIPONUH, in Koops et al.(eds.) Oxford Handbook on United Nation Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 581.

¹⁷ Interviews with Professor Arturo Sotomayor and UN officials. See also, Marcondes, D., Siman, M., & Oliveira, R. (2017). South-South Cooperation and Training for Peacekeeping Participation: Expertise and Status in Brazil's Involvement in Africa and Latin America. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 21(3-4), 197-223. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-02103002>.

Table 1: Overview of Major Training Centres for UN Peace Operations

Year	Country	Training Centre	Added Value and Potential for Enhanced Peacekeeping Contributions
1982	Uruguay	Escuela Nacional de Operaciones de Paz de Uruguay (ENOPU)	Extensive cooperation with US Global Peace Initiative; training and equipment.
1992	Argentina	The Gendarmerie Training Centre for Peace Operations	Trained Argentine and foreign personnel in police and security-related capacities for UN peace operations. It remains the only centre of its kind in South America.
1995	Argentina	Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ)	Courses also offered for external stakeholders and civilians; extensive cooperation across the region from the beginning (e.g., with Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) and externally with the US; Joint Argentina-Chile course on the Cruz del Sur force.
1999	Bolivia	Departamento de Operaciones de Paz del Ejército de Bolivia	External Cooperation with Canada and The Netherlands.
2011	Brazil	Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB), evolving from the 'Centre of Preparation and Evaluation of Brazilian Army Peace Missions' of 2001 and the Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre (CIOpPaz) of 2005.	Courses also offered for external stakeholders and civilians; Specialised trainings for UNIFIL operation – hence experience from leading maritime task forces in peace operations; bilateral cooperation with officers from Paraguay, Ecuador and Peru, Argentina, Chile and France as well as Ethiopia; Mobile Training Team Cooperation with Colombia and Mexico as well as Angola, Mozambique and Namibia; routine hosting of officers from LAC partner countries (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador).
2002	Chile	Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC)	Trainings on preparation for UNFICYP and lessons from participation in Bosnia; Participation in organising joint trainings with Argentina in context of Cruz del Sur initiative.
	Colombia	Escuela De Misiones Internacionales Y Acción Integral (ESMAI)	
2003	Ecuador	Unidad Escuela Misiones de Paz de Ecuador (UEMPE)	Includes course on language skills in French – particularly to enable better performance in French-speaking countries and with French-speaking partners.

Year	Country	Training Centre	Added Value and Potential for Enhanced Peacekeeping Contributions
2004	Guatemala	Comando Regional de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz (CREOMPAZ)	Close cooperation in context of UN Trainer of Trainer course with senior officers from El Salvador and Honduras.
2018/2020	Mexico	Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Operaciones de Paz de México (CECOPAM)	Newest of all the training centres in the LAC Region – cooperation in the run-up of the creation of the centre with, <i>inter alia</i> , Brazil; Signals further implementation of the 2014 decision to get more involved in UN peacekeeping.
2001	Paraguay	Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación Para Operaciones de Paz Paraguay (CECOPAZ-PARAGUAY)	
2013	Peru	Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación Para Operaciones de Paz (CECOPAZ-PERU)	Technical English and Technical French course.
2008	ALCOPAZ	Established by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay – now includes as full members also Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Colombia	Cooperation agreement for exchanging students and trainers; ALCOPAZ has also set up observer links with training centres in Germany, Canada, the US, Switzerland, France and Egypt.

Source: Own elaboration based on interviews and open sources.

All training centres also cooperate extensively with international partners, further increasing the region's networks and collaboration with other peacekeeping troop contributors.¹⁸ Many of the training centres also cooperate extensively with the United States through, *inter alia*, the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Furthermore, all LAC countries also make use of the sharing of online courses via the independent Peace Operations Training Institute. All training centres are also part of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). Interview partners have identified the region's training centres as a defining feature of the region and a sign of commitment to innovation and quality and a potential driver for increased contributions to UN peace

operations.¹⁹ However, there is also the danger that national emphasises on championing their own training centres might hamper a more effective, regional approach (see obstacles below).

As mentioned above, at the national level, LAC countries have also increased their international deployment of MTTs. Most recently Brazil deployed a "Jungle Warfare Mobile Training Team (JWMTT)" to MONUSCO. In 2021, it trained a South African Infantry Battalion on how to operate in difficult, jungle terrain. In 2022, it also trained a Malawian contingent of the Force Intervention Brigade on Protection of Civilians tasks in a jungle environment in close combat scenarios.²⁰

¹⁸ Cooperation partners include, *inter alia*, Spain, France, Canada, the United States and Germany.

¹⁹ See for example, Interviews with representatives from Mexico on July 7, 2023.

²⁰ See Hugo David Araújo, Luís Fernando Tavares Ferreira and Rafael Henrique Rodrigues de Souza (2022) A Equipe Móvel de Treinamento em Operações na Selva (JWMTT) na MONUSCO - resultados e contribuições para o Exército Brasileiro. *Observatório Militar da Praia Vermelha. ECEME*: Rio de Janeiro. Available online at <http://ompv.eceme.eb.mil.br/dqbrn/covid-19/65-areas-tematicas/sistemas-belicos-e-simulacao/564-equipe-movel-treinamento-operacoes-selva-jwmtt-monusco-resultados-contribuicoes-exercito-brasileiro>.

Similarly, other LAC countries have teamed up with international partners, such as the United States and its Mobile Training Team of the Southern Command, to develop courses on Women, Peace and Security issues. The US MTT has teamed up between 2015 and 2019 with Uruguay, Peru, Chile and El Salvador with the aim of enabling these countries to internalise and provide these courses themselves in the future.²¹

There have also been attempts to strengthen the regional cooperation of LAC training centres beyond *ad hoc* bilateral cooperation channels. In 2008 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay cofounded the *Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamiento para Operaciones de Paz* (ALCOPAZ – Latin American Association of Training Centres for Peacekeeping Operations). At present, it has 12 full members (in addition to the founding members, Bolivia, Paraguay, Colombia and El Salvador and Mexico are also full members now). The aim of ALCOPAZ has been to foster closer cooperation between the different training centres in the LAC region and work towards fostering a common doctrine and operative capabilities. The presidency rotates among the members every two years and every year an annual general assembly meeting takes place. ALCOPAZ has also opened the possibility of observer status to international training centres and currently includes 10 international observers from training centres in, *inter alia*, Germany, Canada, the US, Switzerland, France and Egypt.

Interview partners have lauded ALCOPAZ as an important step towards more cooperation between LAC countries but view the success more in the political realm rather than in the practical training realm for the militaries. Thus, the full potential of ALCOPAZ has not yet been fully realized. Interview partners identified in particular the lack of

institutionalisation (and comprehensive memorandums of understanding (MoU) between the training centres), problematic channels of communication and differing standards (rather than unified UN standards) as a challenge (see obstacles below). Thus, addressing these weaknesses would provide further, practical gains for the added value of the LAC region in terms of training expertise.

In addition, a cross-cutting benefit of LAC countries and their contributions to UN peacekeeping is the fact that participation in UN-led peace operations is seen as a highly sought after career-enhancing step within the militaries of the region. As a result, the demand for applications by individual members of all branches of the LAC militaries to serve in blue helmet operations is considerable and the selection process is highly competitive. Participation at the individual level is also financially attractive, due to the high deployment supplements. As a result, as interview partners highlighted, the selection of individuals to participate in UN peacekeeping operations leads to the appointment of highly skilled and professional staff.

Finally, as alluded to above, the LAC region has built up an excellent regional source of experienced senior military and peacekeeping leaders. In MINUSTAH and MONUSCO a wide range of Brazilian force commanders have been appointed.²² In UNFICYP force commander and SRSG²³ positions have been occupied by Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Mexico and Ecuador and Chief Military Observer positions in the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) have been allocated to Uruguay and Argentina (for an overview, see Appendix 2). These senior appointments not only strengthen the region's influence and standing within the UN peacekeeping system, but also provide an important source of knowledge and impetus for reinforced expertise in the region.

²¹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/growing-number-women-peacekeeping-through-us-department-state-s-global-peace-operations>.

²² Exceptionally, all force commanders in MINUSTAH were Brazilian and 4 successive Brazilian force commanders served in MONUSCO. This highlighted Brazil's commitment to supplying senior leadership to UN peacekeeping on the one hand and also provided it with operational leadership experiences in UN peacekeeping operations.

²³ See the UNFICYP information in the overview Table of Annex 2.

3. Facilitating Factors for Participating in UN Peace Operations

There has been a range of recurring and relatively consistent factors behind the decision of LAC countries to commit to UN peace operations. These factors can be categorised as geographical considerations and co-deployments, economic considerations and military/operational experience factors and, above all, political factors. In addition, several context-specific factors can be identified that apply for specific countries within the LAC region, due to social or international partnership factors.

Geographical Considerations and Co-Deployments

Even though MINUSTAH remains a rather exceptional instance of LAC engagement, an important facilitating factor are often geographical considerations and the fact that a conflict situation was unfolding in Haiti – within the LAC region and in close proximity. Several sources also cite diplomatic pressure and involvement of external actors, nudging some LAC governments into taking the diplomatic and peacekeeping initiative in their own geographic area. Close geographical proximity also facilitates deployment, due to fewer demands on complex logistical arrangements.

In the wake of MINUSTAH, several smaller LAC countries also decided to deploy smaller contingents as part of a co-deployment or bilateral initiative where small units were integrated into more experienced peacekeeping partners for the region. This way countries with less operation experience could gather important expertise and experience that could be used for their own further development. This was, for example, an important facilitating factor behind the Brazil-Paraguay and the Argentina-Chile and co-deployments in the context of MINUSTAH. In addition, co-deployment considerations can also be a facilitating factor for two smaller troop contributing countries, such as the combined military engineering company between Chile and Ecuador in MINUSTAH.

Economic Considerations

Budgetary considerations can play an important part in facilitating decisions to deploy under the UN reimbursement system in certain circumstances. Whilst for some LAC countries deployment for a UN peacekeeping operation can be too costly and thus an obstacle, for other countries it can be financially beneficial, particularly when deployments also go hand in hand with modernisation and procurement projects for the armed forces. In general, deployments with the UN cover between 30%-40% of the full costs – thus financial incentives are often not strong enough reasons on their own.²⁴ Yet, reimbursements do matter, particularly in enabling otherwise too costly tasks, such as logistics, transport and support for administrative processes.

Financial factors can thus be an additional consideration in combination with political and other factors. As mentioned above, financial considerations can also be a factor at the individual level if additional financial compensations for being deployed abroad are directly passed on to the individual deployed person. In combination with military considerations of training and operational experience, financial considerations can be a factor within the military for being generally supportive of UN peacekeeping operations, but it is not a decisive one.

²⁴ Interview with UN official.

Military and Operational Experience Factors

As already alluded to, participation in UN peace operations is in general seen favourably by members of the military in LAC countries. In the absence of other regional or international fora (unlike other regions, such as Europe or North America) there is no other regional organisation or fora that competes for international peace operations. For the military, participation in peace operations can be seen as important opportunities for gathering important operational experience, for advancing the capacities of the armed forces and for contributing to the institutional modernisation of the military. Respondents from the military branches or ministry of defence of various LAC countries have stressed that deployments with the UN are seen favourable and an important tool for capacity-building. Thus, it is in general mostly within the Ministries of Defence where the most pro-active supporters of a country's administration are to be found.

Political Factors

In this category, LAC countries have pursued an active political agenda to contribute to specific UN peace operations or to peacekeeping under the UN umbrella more generally because it is seen to be in line with a government's normative discourse and re-orientation or foreign policy objectives. Interview partners from most LAC countries stressed that peacekeeping can be seen as the country's contribution to international peace and security and multilateral problem-solving and is thus in line with the respective country's constitution or political consensus. From a normative and legitimacy-relevant perspective, deploying under a UN banner is also seen as less controversial than, for example, alongside coalitions of the willing or bilateral partnerships. During the 1990s, military contributions to UN peacekeeping operations were also seen by some LAC countries (particularly those with a recent history of military dictatorship) as an important mechanism of confidence-building and

improvement of civil-military relations in the eyes of a public that had been sceptical of the military and police.²⁵

Participation in specific peacekeeping operations at particular moments in time can also be advanced due to other, related strategic foreign policy objectives. One of the most prevalent facilitating factors is the election cycle as non-permanent member of the Security Council. Countries planning their bid for election often increase ahead of their bid their contributions to UN peacekeeping operations to signal their commitment to one of the core functions of the UN system. This facilitating factor has also been applicable to various LAC countries.

Furthermore, governments may choose to increase their participation to reinforce their international brand and image in foreign policies. Many respondents underlined that their country's participation in major UN peace operations enhances their international visibility, influence and prestige as a supporter of multilateral approaches to peace and security.

In addition to these political factors, there might also be very context-specific factors. One factor identified for Brazil's decision to provide a more substantial contribution to UNIFIL has been brought into connection to the effective lobbying of Brazil's substantial Lebanese-descendant diaspora.²⁶

The decision to deploy to a particular operation is rarely the result of just one factor. In most cases, a combination of the above factors must be present in order to facilitate a country's decision to deploy – this has also been the case for most of the LAC region's past decisions. Most importantly, the political climate and calculation of the incumbent government must be aligned with the preferences of the senior leadership of the military and ministries of defence. In the past, governments that sought to increase the internationalist and multilateral profile of their country and administration tended to also pursue a foreign policy strategy of deployment.²⁷ Yet, peacekeeping operations are rarely a matter of wide political debate or wider public interest.

²⁵ Yet, in the scholarly literature, this aspect and function of peacekeeping has been controversially discussed – see for example Arturo Sotomayor "Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not?" *An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations*, *Security Studies*, 19:1(2010): 160-95.

²⁶ See for example, Kai Michael Kenkel (2010) *South America's Emerging Power: Brazil as Peacekeeper*, *International Peacekeeping*, 17:5, 644-661; or John Tofik Karam (2007) *Another Arabesque: Syrian-Lebanese ethnicity in neoliberal Brazil*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007.

²⁷ Interview with Brazilian and Uruguayan representatives 24 July 2023.

Most interlocutors emphasised that there is an absence of wider political discussions on questions related to decisions of their country to increase their participation in UN peace operations. Instead, issues related to domestic security, the drug trade, economic hardship, migration and border security and other political priorities are more in the focus of governments and the political elite. In addition, frequent rotation of governments and election cycles often make the continuity of political peacekeeping strategies difficult. Attempts to engage civil society and parliamentarians (particularly members of security and defence as well as foreign policy committees) more comprehensively are also relatively rare.

This makes political facilitating factors for peace operation contributions difficult to predict and subject to favourable constellation of factors that are difficult to plan or maintain over a long period of time. Instead, operational path dependencies (i.e., prior commitments to preceding operations in the same region or additional, incremental increases to existing missions) are more likely predictors of future contributions.

4. Obstacles to LAC Contributions to UN Peace Operations

Obstacles to enhancing LAC countries' participation in UN peace operations range from competing political priorities and resource constraints to more technical factors.

Economic and Resource Obstacles

By far the most frequently cited obstacle to increasing LAC countries' participation in more UN peace operations centre on economic and resource obstacles. Many countries in the LAC region have undergone severe economic shocks during the last three decades. Whilst the last decade saw some recovery in selected LAC countries, the recent double shock of the COVID19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have further fuelled economic difficulties and inflationary pressures. As a result, fiscal and budgetary rooms for manoeuvre remain tight. In addition, domestic security considerations and threats, such as instability as a result of socio-economic hardship, border security and migration as well as transnational crime networks pose a variety of security risks and bind in many LAC countries resources from the military and police. Some respondents underlined that in such a security and economic context, the "donation" of soldiers, police and equipment is difficult to justify. International partnerships and efficiency gains through cooperation among LAC countries could provide some alleviation but will not offset major resource constraints. Respondents also pointed towards the challenge of increasingly outdated military equipment and the absence of adequate replacements as further barriers.

Political Priorities

As mentioned previously, the financial resources are tied to the political priorities of the country, which allocates the

resources to the country's contributions to peacekeeping operations.²⁸ Various respondents from LAC countries that face internal security challenges from such as gang and urban violence, drug cartels and the security spill over from migration flows. As a result, governments prioritise these domestic challenges in political debates and subsequent resource allocations.²⁹ While political arguments in favour of peace operations have featured in some LAC countries in the 2010s, these instances become rare, not only in debates on domestic security concerns, but also in the context of international and foreign policy debates. Thus, the initiative and discussion related to RELACOPAZ offers a scarce opportunity for engaging wider segments of the political landscape in each country in the discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of more engagement in UN Peace operations (see section below). For the time being, the combination of economic, resource and competing political priority barriers signify strong obstacles.

Operational and Technical Obstacles

Respondents also cited more technical and operation-specific obstacles that the military can face on different levels that may make speedy deployments or a general tendency to increase participations in peace operations more challenging.

Firstly, due to delays and typically long durations of procurement processes, some units that were already earmarked for deployments may face insurmountable delays that will lead to the eventual inability to deploy.

²⁸ Interview with a representative from Chile, July 18, 2023.

²⁹ Interviews with representatives from Mexico on July 7 and 11, 2023; and interviews with representatives from Chile on July 18 and 28, 2023.

Respondents from one major LAC troop contributor mentioned that “the process to procure, confirm and acquire essential equipment needed for the anticipated deployment often take too long, thereby jeopardising the entire plans for deployment.”³⁰ Maintaining units awaiting deployment can be costly. This limitation applies in particular to LAC countries with smaller personnel in their armed and police forces and thus with a smaller pool of available candidates for participating in peacekeeping operations (and for being on reserve). Interviewees noted that, indeed, the deployment process and its long duration decreases their opportunities to send units, increase contributions, and gain further experience.³¹ For instance, in some cases, the equipment may even become damaged during the waiting period.

Countries with higher current contributions and expertise in operations are not directly impacted by this obstacle in the same detrimental manner, but nevertheless recognise that the duration of the process can diminish the contribution of countries with lower resources, expertise, and personnel. In particular, they reflected on the first-time offer for deployment process and indicated that it may, indeed, take time and effort.³² In their case, they now rely on renewing their contingents, which lessens the impact from the process. However, LAC countries lacking contingents are directly exposed to the 2-3-year process of pre-deployment.

In a similar vein, delays of political confirmation or general delays between the time of a composition of a unit for deployment and the actual final green light to deploy often leads to situations where core members of the unit are no longer available and already moved on to different posts. Thus, avoiding lengthy decision-making processes prior to deployment was cited as an important goal.

In addition, respondents cited the sometimes rivalrous relations between different branches of the military. Since sometimes the navy, army and air force are all competing for sending their units to a peacekeeping operation opportunity, the lack of coordination and coherence might make the decision-making process more complicated and eventually an obstacle to a smooth decision-making process. It might also undermine the attempts to speak with one voice with other core decision-making actors in

the political realm. One respondent also mentioned that such fragmentation also makes the coordination with other countries for the purposes of co-deployment or joint training more difficult.

Several respondents also mentioned the lack of institutionalised partnerships with international partners with far-reaching capacity-building experience as an obstacle. While some LAC countries have had good relations with international partners such as Canada, the United States or Spain that have led to important capacity-building relations or even “in-mission” training opportunities, other respondents pointed out that the absence or cessation of such partnerships can be seen as obstacles to increasing LAC contributions.

Finally, a major obstacle remains the limited availability of strategic airlift capacities – this in particular would be an area in which a pooled and regional cooperation approach would be beneficial.

Challenges and Obstacles in the Realm of Training

Even though many LAC countries acknowledge that many countries in the region have access to strong training centres, respondents from one country stressed that its own national training offers are too small to cover the full spectrum of UN-required training. In this context, the country still requires external assistance in the development of its training in terms of both content and infrastructure.³³

Another topic that was frequently raised was the issue of inadequate or only most recently developed language training. Indeed, as also interview partners within the UN stressed, in peacekeeping operations, language skills are essential to ensure effective communication between both troop contingents from different troop contributing countries as well as with the local population. Adequate language skills are also important for planning and logistics, and the overall success of the missions. In particular, the technical language used for peacekeeping operations requires a high level of fluency in the respective language of the mission, particularly in English and French.

³⁰ Interview with representative from LAC country, 11 July 2023.

³¹ Interview with representatives from Mexico, July 11, 2023; Interview with representative from Paraguay, July 28, 2023.

³² Interview with a representative from Uruguay on July 11, 2023.

³³ Interview with a representative from smaller LAC country on July 19, 2023.

The vast majority of the countries in the LAC region have Spanish as their first and official language. Yet, LAC officers are increasingly deployed to countries where a good command of French and English is needed. As a result and in response to these demands, several LAC countries have made efforts and investments to enhance the language skills of their personnel, particularly in English.³⁴ The training centres – such as in Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay – offer language courses. Specifically, Uruguay's National Academy for Peace Operations includes language courses in French. However, the opportunities for the personnel to practise the languages and increase their fluency remain scarce.³⁵ Therefore, all LAC countries included in the interviews have identified *language capacities* as one significant challenge and obstacle.

Regarding this area, the participants from LAC countries have identified two main approaches to address this obstacle. Firstly, national training centres must put an even stronger emphasis on providing language training for beginners, intermediate and proficient levels as part of the core curriculum. This should not only include English, but also French. One recent example that was cited is the "Survival French Course for Peacekeeping operations" offered by the Ecuadorian Peace Operations Training Centre (UEMPE).³⁶ In addition, training curricula should identify and anticipate other specific languages that could be useful in the context of other peacekeeping missions. Secondly, training centres must prioritise and establish more opportunities for exchanges with other countries. The exchanges can provide important opportunities for practising and increasing their fluency in other languages. The various partnerships of ALCOPAZ with international partners and the opening up of other bilateral partnerships with, *inter alia*, African countries would be helpful here.

Respondents pointed out that one down-side of the proliferation of national training centres is the tendency of each LAC country to prioritise the advancement of its own

training centre instead of advancing a more collaborative approach that could also include, for example, specialisations and divisions of labour. While some positive examples of outward-looking and collaborative approaches exist (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Mexico were cited as examples of training centres with a strong collaborative approach and international networks), other LAC with fewer resources tend to advance a more national and "individualistic" approach. In response, one respondent suggested that it would be useful for training centres to focus on specific specialised trainings and then make these trainings available to all partner countries in the region and beyond. This would on the one hand allow for economies of scale and would avoid duplication and would mean that cooperation is being reinforced. For instance, the training centre in Argentina is recognised for its programme on negotiation and mediation, Uruguay's National Academy of Peace Operations has specialisations in 'Women, Peace, and Security', while Paraguay's training centre offers a complex programme to showcase the reality of peacekeeping missions.³⁷ With a strong focus on specialising in the training centres (i.e. creating centres of excellence) cooperation at the regional and international level could increase. Yet, it needs to be kept in mind that Member States have the sole responsibility for carrying out pre-deployment trainings in line with UN standards. There is scope, however, for regional cooperation in "Training of Trainer" approaches.

Finally, some respondents pointed out that training centres across the region differed widely in terms of the implementation of UN standards and the constant updating to the newest training materials (ranging from training on Protection of Civilians to environmental security factors). ALCOPAZ could play a more pro-active role in harmonisation of training curricula and ensuring that all UN-related training materials used by training centres are up-to-date and closely coordinated with the UN's Integrated Training Services.

³⁴ Interviews with representatives from Mexico on July 7, 2023.

³⁵ Interviews with representatives from Argentina on July 25, 2023.

³⁶ <https://uempe.ccfpaa.mil.ec/cursos-de-frances-de-supervivencia-para-operaciones-de-mantenimiento-de-paz/>.

³⁷ Interview with a representative from Paraguay, July 28, 2023.

5. Opportunities and Challenges Related to Partnerships

During the last three decades, there have been numerous attempts to increase peacekeeping cooperation and partnerships among LAC countries. Table 2 below provides a non-exhaustive overview of some illustrative cases. In the mid-1990s, Argentina integrated contingents from Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay in its task force for UNFICYP in Cyprus. In a similar vein, Argentina cooperated with Chile in 1997 within the context of a joint contingent – also for UNFICYP. This practice of integrating smaller, less experienced contingents from the region by troop providers with long-standing experience in a particular operation has been replicated during numerous occasions, including in the context of MINUSTAH. Less experienced countries agree to co-deployment, but often only as a precursor and preparation for their own autonomous deployments in the future. As several respondents from within the region mentioned, the strong culture of sovereignty and pride in national autonomy makes it sometimes difficult for different LAC militaries to overcome the national reflex and to develop a culture of co-deployment. Instead, many countries want to demonstrate and showcase that they can launch peacekeeping contributions on their own. At national level, this well-known “show the flag syndrome” (i.e., an emphasis of national visibility rather than multinational integration) is not a reflex particularly limited to the LAC region, but has also been noted in other regions when it comes to UN peacekeeping contributions, including among Europeans or in the case of the now defunct Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations, to which both Argentina and Chile contributed as observers. Indeed, the popularity and norms of the UN’s habit of publishing monthly country rankings of troop contributors admittedly reinforces this culture, but of course serves other important functions of transparency and incentives. However, it could be worth considering to add a “multinational cooperation” metric that highlights combined deployments and cooperation.

Table 2: Overview of Collaboration/Co-Deployment Initiatives

Year	Initiative	Countries involved	Cooperation Scope and Potential for enhanced Peacekeeping Contributions
1995 - 1997	Joint contingents of officers from Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay contributing to Argentinian task force in UNFICYP	Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay	Early cooperation experiences in the field within the context of a UN Peacekeeping Operation under Chapter VI
1997	Joint Argentinian-Chilean contingent in UNFICYP	Argentina and Chile	After joint trainings, cooperation within Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation
2005	Chile and Ecuador create combined military engineering company in Haiti	Chile and Ecuador	Joint deployment in MINUSTAH

Year	Initiative	Countries involved	Cooperation Scope and Potential for enhanced Peacekeeping Contributions
2005 – 2017	Strong cooperation in Haiti peacekeeping operations from 2005 to 2017 between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay at senior command level	Argentina Brazil, Chile, Uruguay	Force Commander continuously from Brazil and higher military posts (deputy commander, etc.) rotating among Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay
2006	Southern Cross Joint and Combined Peace Force (<i>Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada Cruz del Sur</i>)	Argentina and Chile	<p><i>Cruz del Sur</i> comprises a Joint and Combined Command, as well as a land component (two self-sustaining infantry battalions, alongside the Chilean engineer company and the Argentine mobile hospital); a naval component (a transport vessel, four Dabur type patrol boats, and two Meko 140 Corvettes provided by Argentina, plus a missile frigate operated by Chile) and, an aerial component (four sections of helicopters, two from each country's army and air force). A bilateral Working Group has been established to further develop combined resources and capabilities regarding logistics, procurement, exercises, and doctrinal guidance; Creation of a computer-based simulation system in 2007 (<i>Sistema Computacional de Simulación para Entrenamiento en Operaciones de Paz – SIMUPAZ</i>; Provided to UNSAS in 2011 (since 2015 PCRS);</p> <p>Not been deployed yet, but for example the Chilean Training Centre still has a "Southern Cross" training course in its 2023 curriculum, indicating that at the training side of things, interest continues.³⁸</p>
2008	South American Defence Council (<i>Consejo de Defensa Suramericano – CDS</i>)	UNASUR	<p>"Within the framework of UNASUR, the CDS aims to consolidate South America as a zone of peace by constructing a shared vision on defence, strengthening cooperation, and building consensus towards common positions in multilateral fora."</p> <p>Mostly defunct as of 2019</p>

³⁸ See <https://cecopac.cl/programa-academico-2023>, p. 26.

Year	Initiative	Countries involved	Cooperation Scope and Potential for enhanced Peacekeeping Contributions
2008	Libertador Don José de San Martín Combined Engineering Company (Compañía de Ingenieros Combinada Peruano-Argentina)	Argentina and Peru	"The company, which comprises 168 military personnel, was established in 2006 and is the result of bilateral cooperation developed as part of the Permanent Committee of Coordination and Cooperation on Security and Defence. Significantly, the capabilities of this combined unit have been specifically designed to address some of the most pressing humanitarian needs in Haiti, most notably the collection, purification and distribution of water in densely populated areas and improve infrastructure and housing for the most vulnerable sectors." ³⁹
		Brazil and Paraguay	Involvement of Paraguayan troops in Brazilian battalion for MINUSTAH
2015	South American Defence College	UNASUR	Six countries suspended membership in 2018
	Joint Argentinian-Chilean contingent to MINUSTAH	Argentina and Chile	
2015	South American Defence College	UNASUR	Six countries suspended membership in 2018
2016	Uruguayan battalion with Peruvian soldiers in MINUSTAH	Uruguay, Peru	Peruvian soldiers formed a joint battalion with Uruguay in MINUSTAH - the so-called URUPERBATT

Yet, there are more practical obstacles to co-deployment. Various interviewees emphasised that the lack of interoperability posed severe obstacles to a more frequent and prevalent approach to co-deployments. Interoperability refers not only to different training standards and mindsets, but in particular to different military hardware, technology, etc. Lack of interoperability not only makes cooperation in the field more difficult, but can also, in serious cases, lead to heightened risks in theatre.⁴⁰ Thus, the facilitation of more comprehensive partnerships between LAC troop contributors requires a more institutionalised approach beyond *ad hoc* initiatives related to specific UN peacekeeping operations. In this context, two initiatives are worth mentioning.

In 2006, building on its previous cooperation in the field, Argentina and Chile created the so-called

'Southern Cross Joint and Combined Peace Force' (*Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada Cruz del Sur*). The objective of this initiative has been to further develop combined resources and capabilities regarding logistics, procurement, exercises and doctrinal guidance. The unit consists of a Joint and Combined Command, as well as a land component (two self-sustaining infantry battalions, alongside the Chilean engineer company and the Argentine mobile hospital); a naval component (a transport vessel, four Dabur type patrol boats, and two Meko 140 Corvettes provided by Argentina, plus a missile frigate operated by Chile) and, a helicopter-based aerial component. In 2011, the unit was pledged under the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS, now Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System - PCRS). According to its design, the bilateral unit should be deployable within 30 to 90 days and self-sustainable for 90 days in theatre.

³⁹ Christian Bonfili (2013) Contributor Profile: Argentina, New York: IPI, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Interview with former Force Commander.

Both training centres of Argentina and Chile run a Cruz del Sur training course in order to contribute to the build-up of shared knowledge and a shared culture. Various joint large-scale exercises have been conducted between both countries for the Cruz del Sur unit since 2012. While the bilateral initiative has been described by various interview partners as a “very successful political statement”, a “good confidence-building measure between the militaries of both countries” and by some scholars even as “one of the most significant experiences in the field of Latin American integration,”⁴¹ the expectations of actually deploying the unit in a UN peacekeeping operation have not been met thus far. Both countries came closest to deploying the bilateral force in 2014 in MINUSTAH, but this did not materialize, due to delays of decisions at the political level. While the numerous initiatives and advances of training, exercises and institutionalisation have led to far-reaching consolidation at the military level – stronger coordination at the political level for ultimate deployment decisions is still needed. In various ways, Cruz del Sur suffers from the same challenges experienced by other bilateral or multilateral standby arrangements dedicated to the UN (e.g., EU Battlegroups, UN SHIRBRIG), where military cooperation and interoperability advance significantly, but political decision-making remains complex. Nevertheless, the Cruz del Sur initiative remains an important initiative for further and deeper cooperation.

A second bilateral LAC initiative for peacekeeping worth mentioning is the bilateral engineering unit created by Argentina and Peru in 2008. The so-called *Libertador Don José de San Martín* Joint Engineering Company (*Compañía de Ingenieros Combinada Peruano- Argentina*) has been a result of experiences in MINUSTAH in Haiti and are also geared towards civilian infrastructure repairs.

At the multilateral level, various initiatives have been advanced within the remits of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (see table above). However, since its recent *de facto* demise, UNASUR initiatives will no longer play any role in the field of multinational cooperation.

Interviewees confirmed that bilateral cooperation schemes and being integrated in other armies can be very beneficial, particularly for smaller countries that lack

experience in different peacekeeping contexts.⁴² Benefits have also been mentioned in terms of co-deploying more women and thereby increasing targets for more female peacekeepers.

Yet, various respondents also highlighted challenges of partnerships and co-deployments. Various countries pointed out that *ad hoc* arrangements lead to uncertainties and that more institutionalised arrangements (including clear MoUs) should be pursued. Apart from interoperability issues, some respondents also confirmed that there is a tendency and preference to deploy autonomously in order to also gain more visibility and credibility in the eyes of the UN and international community.

This also means that joint deployments or integrating into a larger contingent of another country can often be “one-off” occurrences and used to gain enough experience to eventually deploy on their own.

That said, respondents did confirm that the instances of co-deployments in the past (particularly in the context of MINUSTAH, but also in Cyprus and Lebanon) were also viewed as positive examples of cooperation from the military point of view.

A particular fruitful avenue of cooperation that could be considered in the future would be the pooling and sharing of niche and costly capacities and equipment in order to also reap economic efficiency gains. For example, pooling mine clearing capacities or the provision of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) would make sense to enhance the provision of these capacities for peacekeeping deployments. Yet, while this way of cooperation makes sense from an economic point of view, it nevertheless runs into political and “sovereignty” issues as various interviewed countries prefer the practice of owning equipment themselves rather than having to rely on a partner country’s equipment. Similarly, potential “lending” countries are reluctant to provide their costly equipment to other countries.⁴³ A common pool of equipment through a multinational infrastructure could thus indeed be an important innovation. No such forum exists at present and RELACOPAZ should seriously consider developing such structures.

⁴¹ See Luis Valentín Ferrada Walker and Juan Fuentes Vera (2021) *La Fuerza de Paz Conjunta Combinada Cruz del Sur: instrumento de integración chileno-argentino y aporte a la evolución de las Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones Unidas*, *Estudios Internacionales* 200, pp. 9-44.

⁴² Interview with a representative from Paraguay, July 28, 2023.

⁴³ Interviews with LAC countries and UN official.

6. Obstacles and Challenges Related to Deploying More Female Peacekeepers

The UN has set the targets of deploying female peacekeepers as 10% for troops and 20% for all other staff categories. Even though LAC countries have made some clear progress in this regard (see also the male-female ratios of current deployments in Appendix 4), respondents still identified it as one of the most persistent challenges to meet these targets. One main reason cited is that historically most LAC militaries only began very recently (in some cases in the mid-1990s) to open all branches to female members of the military. Previously female soldiers were excluded from most combat-related positions. This means that it will take some considerable time until enough female soldiers will have reached senior career levels.

Some interviewees cited the ELSIE Initiative Fund as a useful instrument and source of information for tackling this challenge. In particular, Uruguay has dedicated efforts to better analyse this issue through the ELSIE initiative. As part of this analysis, they identified four main barriers: (1) the lack of information about deployment; (2) the socio-cultural restrictions that limit the availability of to participate in deployment; (3) the previous negative experiences during the operations; and (4) the gender roles during the operations and deployment.⁴⁴

While the ELSIE Initiative Fund has been a useful resource, not all countries are eligible to request support from the initiative due to inadequate data. This can be disadvantageous to countries with less resources.⁴⁵ In order to tackle this barrier, countries would like to see more opportunities for funding, data, and event analyses from the UN and other agencies.

Interviewees pointed out three main aspects. Firstly, LAC countries were historically relatively slow in terms of opening all posts and roles in the military to women and even restricted access to core career paths. For example,

in Uruguay, women were not able to join the Military Academy until the late 1990s. “Similarly, in the case of Argentina, the recruitment of women remains challenging for the military for various socio-economic reasons. However, Argentina places strong emphasis on encouraging deployments of existing female soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions and thus far all women who apply to join the peacekeeping missions are, indeed, deployed.”⁴⁶

Secondly, interviewees pointed out the challenge of reaching gender parity is more acute for countries that deploy thousands of troops to UN peace operations compared to those that deploy only a handful. While respondents confirmed their commitment to the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and female peacekeeper targets, many also admitted that it is a significant challenge in the short-term, particularly for troop providers whose deployed troops are in the thousands.

Thirdly, respondents also pointed out that a significant challenge are still socio-cultural factors, gender stereotypes and gender inequalities. Most of the identified barriers are indeed in line with barriers identified internationally for women in the armed forces. Several interview partners recognised socio-cultural factors as key aspects of this barrier.⁴⁷

In general, all respondents emphasised the importance of the targets and the need for more analyses on how to overcome known barriers and to increase female deployments to UN peacekeeping.⁴⁸ Particular pinpointing parts of the militaries where women are still underrepresented or even absent (such as in the branch of Special Forces in many countries) is required to devise more targeted gender parity plans.

Several LAC training centres have begun to include WPS- and gender-focused courses in their curricula, but this should also receive more sustained attention in the years to come.

⁴⁴ Interview with a representative from Uruguay, July 11, 2023.

⁴⁵ Interview with a representative from El Salvador, July 19, 2023.

⁴⁶ Interview with a representative from Argentina, July 25, 2023.

⁴⁷ Interview with a representative from Argentina, July 25, 2023; Interview with a representative from Uruguay, July 11, 2023; Interview with a representative from Peru, July 11, 2023.

⁴⁸ Interview with a representative from Peru, July 11, 2023; Interview with a representative from Uruguay, July 11, 2023.

7. Opportunities for Strengthening LAC Countries' Contributions to UN Peace Operations

While the LAC region and UN peacekeeping itself are currently facing a variety of challenges, the timing of the RELACOPAZ initiatives provides an important opportunity and impetus for strengthening LAC countries' contributions for UN peace operations and an important impetus for increasing intra-regional cooperation and collaboration.

The LAC region has a long and proud tradition of both hosting peacekeeping operations on their own territory and sending significant deployments to a wide range of peace operations since the early beginnings of UN peacekeeping itself. This provides for a rich culture and collective experience of peacekeeping. In the wake of the MINUSTAH mission several forms of co-deployment or joint battalions were carried out – yet relatively few collective lessons learned exercises were carried out on the successes and limitations of these exercises. RELACOPAZ, in cooperation with ALCOPAZ, could provide an important platform for doing so and for feeding into the refinement and improvement of co-deployment options for future UN peace operation deployments.

LAC countries have built up a very strong tradition of national training centres and feeding back national lessons from deployments to promote innovation and improve preparations for future deployments. Despite a good level of exchanges between different LAC countries' training centres and the work conducted under the ALCOPAZ umbrella, there are still further opportunities to institutionalise a more pro-active regional approach to UN peace operation training. As a first exercise, a full inventory of all available training curricula in each LAC training centre could help to organise a more specialised approach among the centres. Instead of focusing on the full spectrum of topics in each country, certain centres that have a long and excellent tradition in certain topics could

specialise in these in particular (whilst covering the basics required for certification) and offer them more comprehensively and in a more institutionalised manner to LAC partner countries. This would further increase regional cooperation and harmonisation. Specific trainings on “LAC approaches to peacekeeping” could be created to encourage the sharing of lessons and specific national approaches to UN peacekeeping, thereby further building up a shared culture that will help co-deployments in the future. RELACOPAZ could also reinforce the regional sharing of core lessons. Tools such as the UN Deployment Review mobile app⁴⁹ and the LCM Online System⁵⁰ currently under development, should provide support to Member States in this regard.

LAC countries have also built up a track-record of successful trainings of international partners in ongoing peacekeeping operations with the help of Mobile Training Teams (e.g., in jungle warfare). Lessons learned from the provision of MTT training should be shared and regional MTTs could be considered, thereby increasing LAC region countries' participation in the training of other forces. Increasing links with African troop-contributing countries could also be helpful for strengthening the partnership between the UN and African Union and sub-regional initiatives in the future. In addition, given the presence of European Union Training missions on the African continent (particularly in the Central African Republic, but also Mozambique), cooperation between LAC countries and EU countries could also be enhanced.

The single most-cited obstacle to increasing LAC participation in UN peacekeeping is the factor of economic and resource constraints. The LAC region is experiencing significant economic pressures. This makes the argument for shared capabilities (pooling and sharing) and economies of scale even more apparent.

⁴⁹ The UN Deployment Review Mobile App was developed by the LCM to offer a methodology and templates for troop- and police-contributing countries to collect and share operational experiences gathered in UN peace operations, and support the development of lessons learned and best practices to improve preparations for future deployments.

⁵⁰ The LCM Online System, currently under development, will offer an opportunity for Member States to share training and capacity-building calendars, deconflict activities and facilitate partnership opportunities.

There have been several suggestions in the past on a division of labour in terms of core assets to be provided to UN peace operations. One concrete proposal that was mentioned during interviews was for example a collective, division of labour approach to providing air assets. LAC countries face major resource constraints when it comes to the provision of aviation units (helicopters/airplanes) for long durations during peace operations. Yet, a division of labour could provide a cooperation arrangement where one country provides the assets for a much shorter time, another country provides the logistics, a third country provides the staff for maintenance, etc.⁵¹ A combined LAC air assets unit would also allow that countries could rotate, minimizing the length of costly commitments (i.e., providing helicopters for three months is more achievable than for 3 years). Given LAC countries' past experience in setting up joint units (particularly the Cruz del Sur) there are precedents and opportunities for doing so for specific niche capabilities.⁵² Similar opportunities could be explored for other niche capabilities in a regional framework that RELACOPAZ could support and encourage.

The Cruz del Sur initiative has both been perceived as a political and military integrative success, but it has not yet led to an actual deployment in UN peace operations. Lessons learned from various financial and political barriers should be fully explored and taken as basis for future, pragmatic scenarios. It remains an important and unique initiative with various spin off benefits (i.e., the development of innovative training simulations) and should be further looked into in the framework of RELACOPAZ.

LAC countries that initially had fewer experience in deploying to new types of peace operations and thus saw this as a barrier used the opportunity of teaming up with fellow LAC countries with more experience or teamed up with international partners. El Salvador, for example, was trained by Spanish forces for their deployment to UNIFIL. Most initiatives are bilateral. Yet, RELACOPAZ could provide the opportunity to share lessons and experiences from bilateral training initiatives with external partners and move to multinational partnerships. When it comes to

important capacity-building partnerships for peacekeeping with external support, the relationship with the US remains an important one. Possibilities should be explored for a more regional approach to this partnership.

At the individual level, participation in UN peace operations has – in contrast to the perception and career structures in other regions – in general been perceived as a career-advancing and economically attractive option. This perception has not waned and provides opportunities for encouraging more participation of smaller contingents of peacekeepers from the LAC region. Given the closure of MINUSMA and discussions about the future of large-scale multidimensional mission, a focus on small contingent contributions could also yield important benefits for future deployments. The relatively strong involvement of LAC countries in the UN Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC) could provide opportunities for harnessing their experience for future deployments of a similar nature.

Smaller deployments of individual specialists also increase opportunities for deploying more female members of the military. Given the high political commitment and unanimously shared commitment among all interviewed partners to the WPS agenda and increasing targets of more women in deployed missions, a regional working group should be established within RELACOPAZ to share best practices and lessons for increasing female participation in UN peacekeeping missions. A database of recent senior appointments in peace operations and UN peace operation units in New York can also be compiled in order to highlight successful career paths as a model.

Despite its strong tradition on training, several respondents also pointed out that there is sometimes a lack of timely integration of new learning materials and innovations offered by the UN. A more systematic and regular engagement with DPO (including ITS and LCM) in this realm would benefit the region and could also be another opportunity for both RELACOPAZ and ALCOPAZ to focus on from a regional perspective.

Finally, the most important factor for a country's and region's decision to deploy is not the military, but the main

⁵¹ An example of such cooperation can be found in the Dutch-German cooperation initiative within MINUSMA.

⁵² Interview with UN official 20 July 2023.

political decision-making bodies. Political commitment from the countries' governments, parliamentarians, Foreign Ministries and civil society writ-large plays a crucial role in decisions to contribute more to the efforts of the UN in peace and security. Respondents were unanimous in their perception that discussions of the pros and cons of contributing to UN peacekeeping are rarely part of the wider political debate and political discussion culture in LAC countries. The RELACOPAZ initiative thus also provides an opportunity to place more emphasis on reflecting how more sections of society and the political spectrum can become involved in this important discussion for the future of UN peacekeeping and the role the LAC region wants to play. It would therefore also be of added value to ensure that in addition to the commitments and participation of Ministries of Defence other stakeholders take part in the RELACOPAZ initiative.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations

Countries from the LAC region have been strong supporters of and participants in UN peace operations. Their contributions have been appreciated by internal and external observers and the significant participation in MINUSTAH marked the peak period of LAC engagement. Since 2017 countries from the LAC region have substantially reduced their troop contributions and are currently collectively amounting to 2.8 % of all deployed UN peacekeepers world-wide. COVID19 and economic challenges have had some negative effects on deployment numbers as well as internal security challenges that involve the commitment of a wide range of military and police capacities. Yet, several LAC countries continue to deploy small and larger contingents to a wide range of 11 UN peace operations and four special political missions. This also includes substantial contributions to UNFICYP, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA. Beyond mere “numbers”, the strength of LAC countries also lies in the contribution of “niche capabilities”, particularly counter-IED, demining and other high-end capabilities.

The RELACOPAZ initiative provides an important opportunity for a collective focus on the role of the LAC region in the future of UN peacekeeping and on how the LAC region can enhance their contributions.

Based on the preceding analysis, the report proposes the following recommendations:

- 1** Call on the members of the RELACOPAZ to consider engaging political actors, ministries, parliamentarians, all branches of the military, police, justice and corrections system, civil society and academic representatives and think tanks to develop a national strategy to support and contribute to peacekeeping objectives of the United Nations, with national objectives and regional partnership opportunities.
- 2** Take the opportunity of the momentum of RELACOPAZ to engage different ministries and stakeholders in an exchange of ideas on how a renewed political commitment to UN peace operations can be translated into concrete increased troop contributions and the provisions of niche capacities. Utilise RELACOPAZ as a forum that brings together different political actors, ministries, parliamentarians, all branches of the militaries and UN representatives in order to exchange information about future priorities, objectives and strategies related to contributing to UN peace operations. Encourage additional Member States of the LAC region to join the RELACOPAZ.
- 3** Utilize RELACOPAZ and ALCOPAZ to develop, in close cooperation with UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), a regional common knowledge management process that identifies lessons learned and best practices of the recent deployments of LAC countries in UN peace operations. Make this shared body of knowledge widely available and feed it back into the training centres. This lessons learned process should also allow for the systematic identification of comparative advantages, opportunities for division of labour in peacekeeping tasks and joint capability offers.
- 4** Explore institutional frameworks for joint asset provisions (particularly in the realm of air assets) and consider possibilities of division of labour approaches. Consider the division of labour of provision of assets, logistics, maintenance, etc. Consider the advantages and benefits of cooperation and short-term rotation. Explore similar “low hanging fruit” arrangements across RELACOPAZ members.
- 5** Identify future opportunities and assess limitations of existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the bilateral Cruz del Sur initiative for future deployments. If the deployment of the full unit is

unrealistic or unworkable, explore options of a more modest deployment.

- 6 Explore further formations of Mobile Training Teams and support training of peacekeeping units in existing UN operations, based on the cumulative expertise and strengths of LAC countries.
- 7 Strengthen opportunities for language training, particular advanced training on peacekeeping-relevant language skills in languages spoken in countries to which LAC peacekeepers deploy (i.e., French).
- 8 Consider the creation of a RELACOPAZ working group on WPS and on gender parity targets in peacekeeping in order to share best practices and explore further analyses on the full range of barriers and obstacles and how to overcome them.
- 9 Utilize more comprehensively the tools and innovations, including the ones offered by the LCM such as the Deployment Review mobile app and the upcoming LCM Online System, as well as support materials and mechanisms for pre-deployment preparations and trainings. This can in particular be done through the channels of ALCOPAZ and RELACOPAZ in addition to the utilisation of the UN peacekeeping resources hub.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Guiding Questions For Semi-Structured Interviews

Study on Current Obstacles to the Participation of Member States of the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Region in UN Peace Operations and Recommendations to Increase this Participation.

The guiding questions aim to enable a more in-depth understanding of the LAC countries' perspectives on the following areas: their respective capacities and contributions; main obstacles and potential opportunities to engage in peacekeeping; cooperation within the LAC Region; and cooperation outside of the LAC Region.

1. In your view, what were the main **milestones** and past **track-records** of your country's contribution to UN peace operations? Where do the national **strengths** lie when it comes to contributing to peacekeeping?
2. What are the **current capacities** (both military and police) deployed by country to UN peace operations and how do they compare to contributions in the past? If these contributions have increased or decreased, could you explain, in your view, why that is.
3. Where do you see the main **obstacles / barriers** to your country's participation in UN peace operations now and in the future? (e.g. equipment, training, funding, languages, women participation, etc.).
4. Has your country been able to / would your country be able to achieve the UN **gender parity** targets for uniformed personnel (including the ones stipulated in the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018/2028)? If not, what support would be needed (from Member States of the region and/or the UN)? If so, could your country support other Member States in the region in their efforts to meet these gender parity targets, and how?
5. In your view, what **support from other Member States** of the region would facilitate your countries' participation in UN peace operations in the near future? Which kind of **capacities could you contribute**

either alone or in cooperation with partners? (e.g. equipment, training, infrastructure, logistics, funding, languages, technical support/ expert advice/mentoring, advise and assist, knowledge management/community of practice, etc.)

6. In your view, what **support** could be provided **from the UN and other partners** to facilitate your countries' participation in UN peace operations in the future? (e.g. creation of partnerships, collection and sharing of information and deconflicting of training and capacity-building activities.
7. How can **cooperation be further strengthened and enhanced within the LAC region**, including within the frameworks of the ALCOPAZ and RELACOPAZ, in the realm of UN peace operations? (e.g. co-deployments, interoperability, sharing of information (eg. on training calendars) and of knowledge (e.g. lessons learned and best practices), joint trainings, access to equipment, etc.)
8. What are **your countries' priorities** when it comes to the future of LAC contributions to UN peace operations?
9. What place do you foresee for **innovation** in the LAC region's engagement in UN peace operations (preparations and/or deployments to UN peace operations taking into account environmental considerations, use of technologies, etc.)
10. Do you have **any other views/ideas** you would like us to take into consideration while developing the study on obstacles to the participation of Member States of the LAC region to UN peace operations and recommendations to increase this participation?
11. Do you have any recommendations of **other people to interview** and **resources to review** as part of this study?

APPENDIX 2

LAC Countries' Contributions to UN Peace Operations 1948 - 2023

Source: Own Elaboration based on open UN Data and Academic Literature

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)	1948 – present	Argentina, Chile (4), Ecuador,	Argentina and Chile were the first LAC contributing countries in 1967
UNMOGIP	1949 - present	Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador	Major General José Eladio Alcaín (Uruguay) Chief Observer from 2018 to 2023; Replaced by Rear Admiral Guillermo Ríos (Argentina)
UNEF I UN Emergency Force I	1956 - 1967	Brazil (545 troops) Colombia (522 troops)	Major-General Carlos F. Paiva Chaves (Brazil) 1964; Major-General Syseno Sarmento (Brazil) 1965 - 1966
UNOGIL UN Observation Group in Lebanon	1958	Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru	Chairman of the Observation group: Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador)
ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo	1960 - 1964	Argentina, Brazil	
UNSF UN Security Force in West Guinea	1962-1963	N/A	
UNYOM UN Yemen Observer Mission	1963 -1964	N/A	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
UNFICYP	1964 - present	<p>Argentina (423 peak in year 1999), Brazil, Chile, Paraguay (14), Ecuador (7 police), El Salvador</p> <p>Force Commanders:</p> <p>-Major General Evergisto Arturo de Vergara (Argentina) 1997-99</p> <p>- Major-General Hebert Figoli (Uruguay) 2004-2006</p> <p>- Major-General Rafael Jose Barni (Argentina) 2006-2008</p> <p>- Rear Admiral Mario Sánchez Debernardi (Peru) 2008 - 2010</p>	<p>HoM/SRSG:</p> <p>-Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso (appointed as Mediator in September, Ecuador, 1964)</p> <p>- Mr. Carlos A. Bernardes (Brazil) 1964-7</p> <p>- Mr. Luis Weckmann-Muñoz (Mexico) 1974-5</p> <p>- Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru) 1975-77</p> <p>- Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (El Salvador) 1978-80</p> <p>- Mr. Hugo J. Gobbi (Argentina) 1980-4</p> <p>- Mr. James Holger (Acting, Chile) 1994-88, 1990-2000</p> <p>- Mr. Oscar Camilion (Argentina) 1988-93</p> <p>- Mr. Alvaro de Soto (Special Adviser, Peru) 200- 2004</p>
DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the UN General Secretary in the Dominican Republic	1964 - 1965	Brazil, Ecuador	Representative of the Secretary-General: José Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela)
UNIPOM UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	1965 - 1966	Chile, Brazil, Venezuela	
UNEF II UN Emergency Force II	1973 - 1979	Panama (406), Peru (49)	
UNDOF	1974 - present	Peru (358), Uruguay (167 since 2015)	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon	1978 – present (Significant restructuring in 2006)	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala (since 2006), El Salvador, Uruguay,	2011: First time Brazil provides a Maritime Task Force to UN peace-keeping; 260 troops – reduced again to 7 in 2021; Ecuador since 2008 (around 50)
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	1988 - 1990	N/A	Rep of the SRSG: Diego Cordovez (Ecuador)
UNIIMOG UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	1988 - 1991	Argentina, Peru, Uruguay (9)	
UNAVEM I UN Angola Verification Mission	1988 - 1991	Argentina (15), Brazil (15)	
UNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)	1989 – 1990	Barbados, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad Tobago	
ONUCA UN Observer Group in Central America	1989 - 1992	Argentina (31- provision of Argentine fast patrol boat), Brazil (13), Columbia (8), Ecuador (21), Venezuela,	Personal Rep of the SG for the Peace Process: Alvaro de Soto (Peru);
UNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission	1991 - 2003	Argentina (85 peak in 2001), Chile (50), Uruguay (8), Venezuela	Force Commander: Major-General Miguel Moreno (Argentina) 2001 –2002
MINURSO	1991 – present	Argentina (7), Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador (2), Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Honduras (10),	
UNAMIC UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	1991 - 1992	Argentina (2), Uruguay (1)	
ONUSAL UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	1991- 1995	Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela; Police: Brazil, Chile (28 police), Mexico (111 police officers)	SRSG and Head of Mission: Augusto Ramírez-Ocampo (Colombia) 1993-4; Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela) 1994-5;
			Police Commissioner:
			General Homero Vaz Bresque (Uruguay) 1994-5
UNAVEM I	1988 - 1991	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
UNAVEM II UN Angola Verification Mission	1991 - 1995	Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,	Chief Military Observer 1991: Brigadier-General Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil)
UNOSOM I UN Operation in Somalia I	1992-1993	N/A	
UNPROFOR	1992 – 1995	Argentina (904 peak in 1993; 30 police), Colombia (police 20-40)	
UNTAC UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	1992 - 1993	Argentina, Chile, Uruguay (940 troops), Costa Rica (150 police)	
ONUMOZ UN Operation in Mozambique	1992 - 1994	Argentina (40), Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay (857 troops peak)	Force Commander 1993 – 1994: Major-General Lélío Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva (Brazil)
UNOMIL Liberia	1993 - 1997	Brazil, Uruguay (31 EoM)	
UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia	1993 - 2000	Uruguay	
UNOSOM II UN Operation in Somalia II	1993 - 1995	N/A	
UNAMIR UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	1993 - 1996	Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay (21 EoM)	
UNOMUR UN Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda	1993 - 1994	Brazil	
UNMIH UN Mission in Haiti	1993 - 1996	Antigua and Barbuda (15 troops), Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras (119 in 1995), Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,	Special Envoy and Chiefs of Mission: Dante Caputo (Argentina) 1992-4; Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela)
UNASOG	1994	Honduras	
UNMOT	1994 - 2000	Uruguay (3 EoM)	Ramiro Píriz-Ballón (Uruguay) Special Envoy of SG 1993-1996
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995 - 2002	Argentina (43 Police peak in 1999), Chile (6 police)	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
UNAVEM III UN Angola Verification Mission	1995 - 1997	Brazil (739 troops, 14 police), Uruguay (856 troops, 15 police)	
UNPREDEP UN Preventive Deployment force	1995 - 1996	Argentina (1MOB), Brazil (1 MOB)	
UNCRO UN Confidence Restoration Operation	1995 - 1996	N/A	
UNMOP UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	1996 - 2002	Argentina (1)	Chief Military Observer: Colonel Rodolfo Sergio Mujica (Argentina) 2001 - 2002
UNSMIH UN Support Mission in Haiti	1996 - 1997	Trinidad and Tobago	Chief of Mission: Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela)
UNTAES UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	1996 - 1998	Argentina (74 troops, 30 police), Brazil (6 EOM)	
UNTMIH UN Transition Mission in Haiti	1997	Argentina	Chief of Mission: Enrique ter Horst (Venezuela)
MINUGUA UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	1997	Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador (3 police), Uruguay, Venezuela	
MONUA UN Observer Mission in Angola	1997 - 1998	Argentina (7 police), Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay	
UNTMIH	1997	Argentina	
MIPONUH	1997 - 2000	Argentina (Special Police Unit of 146 officers)	First time Latin America sent a Formed Police Unit
UNOMSIL UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	1998 - 1999	Bolivia, Uruguay	
UNPSG UN Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia)	1998	Argentina	
MINURCA UN Mission in the Central African Republic	1998 - 2000	N/A	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
UNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra Leone	1999 - 2005	Bolivia, Uruguay (13 staff)	
UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	1999 - 2002	Bolivia, Brazil, Chile (36), Uruguay Police: Argentina, Brazil	SRSG: Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil); Chief Military Observer: Brigadier General Sergio Rosario (Brazil)
MONUC	1999 - 2010	Argentina (3 police), Bolivia, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala (150), Uruguay (peak 1.800)	Significant contributions from Guatemala, which further transitions into MONUSCO and Uruguay
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999 - present	Argentina (147 police peak in 2002, 10 troops), Dominican Republic (15 police)	
UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	2000 - 2008	Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay	
UNMISSET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	2002 - 2005	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay	
UNMIL	2003 - 2018	Argentina (9 and 13 police), Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador (1 troop, 3 EoM), El Salvador, Paraguay (4), Peru (2)	
MINUCI UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	2003 - 2004	Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay	
UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2004 - 2017	Brazil (4), Ecuador, Guatemala (5 EoM), Uruguay (11 police), Paraguay, Dominican Republic	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004 - 2017	Brazil (1407), Uruguay (942), Argentina (721), Chile (674 peak), Ecuador (66), Peru (373), Bolivia (208), Paraguay (163), Guatemala (137), Honduras (47), Colombia	First UN Peacekeeping Operation with the majority of troops provided by LAC countries; Brazilian Force Commanders throughout the 14 years of the mission; <i>inter alia</i> : Lieutenant General José Luiz Jaborandy Lt. Gen. Ajax Porto Pinheiro General Santos Cruz (2007 – 2009)
ONUB UN Operation in Burundi	2004 - 2006	Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay	
UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan	2005 - 2011	Ecuador (17 EoM) El Salvador (4 police), Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru (2), Uruguay (Police)	
UNMIT UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	2006 - 2009	Brazil (troops and police), Ecuador (12 police), El Salvador (police), Uruguay (police)	Acting Police Commissioner: Juan Carlos Arevalo Linares (El Salvador)
UNAMID UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	2007 - 2020	Brazil (Police), Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala (2)	
MINURCAT UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	2007 - 2010	Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay	

Operation	Years	Contributors from LAC region	Comments
MONUSCO	2010 - present	Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala (150), Uruguay (1258 peak), Paraguay, Peru (3-5 EoM)	Guatemala contributes to MONUSCO with around 150 troops from the beginning until present; Uruguay since 2011 with 1258 as peak; Brazilian force commanders, including: Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz 2013-2015
UNISFA UN Interim Security Force for Abyei	2011 - present	Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala (1), Paraguay, Peru (2), Uruguay	
UNMISS UN Mission in South Sudan	2011 - present	Argentina (10 police, peak), Brazil, Ecuador (3 EoM), Guatemala (3 EoM)	
UNSMIS UN Supervision Mission in Syria	2012	Brazil, Paraguay	
MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	2013 - present	Mexico (2), El Salvador (111), Guatemala	El Salvador since 2015, contributing military helicopters; peak in 2019, 204 troops, down to 100 in 2023);
MINUSCA	2014 - present	Argentina (2 staff officers), Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala (2 troops), Peru (220), Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay (2), Paraguay	
MINUJUSTH UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti	2017 - 2019	Brazil,	

APPENDIX 3 LAC Countries Total Contributions (Uniformed Personnel and Staff Officers): 2017 – 2023

Country	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Argentina	UNFICYP (276), UNMC (94), UNMISS (4Pol) MINUSTAH (81/9Pol), MINURSO (3), UNTSO (3) Total: 461	287	281	266	288	283	UNFICYP (251), UNMISS (10Pol), MINURSO (4), UNMOGIP (4), UNVMC (5Pol) UNTSO (3), MINUSCA (2), UNIFIL (2), UNDOF (1) Total: 282
Brazil	MINUSTAH (979), UNIFIL (265), UNMISS (10/2pol) MINURSO (9), MINUSCA (5), UNIGBIS (4/3 pol) UNFICYP (3), UNISFA (2) Total: 1277	275	282	280	69	76	MONUSCO (24), UNMISS (17/5Pol), MINUSCA (13/3Pol), UNIFIL (11), MINURSO (9), UNISFA (4), UNFICYP (2), UNSOM (2), MINUSMA (1), UNITAMS (1), UNMHA (1) Total: 85
Chile	UNMC (69), MINUSTAH (60/2Pol), UNFICYP (14) MINUSCA (4), UNMOGIP (2), UNTSO (3) Total 152	42	36	30	16	16	UNVMC (7/3Pol), UNFICYP (6), UNTSO (3) Total: 16
Costa Rica	UNMC (3) Total: 3	3					
Colombia	MINUSTAH (37Pol), UNIOGBIS (3Pol), MINUSCA (2), UNIFIL (1) Total: 43	5	5	4	5	5	MINURSO (3), MINUSCA (2), UNIFIL (1) Total: 6
DomRep	UNMC (13) Total: 13	5	6	5	5	5	UNVMC (4), Total: 4
Ecuador	UNAMID (4), MINUSTAH (1) Total: 5	9	8	10	7	9	UNMISS (4), UNISFA (3), MINURSO (2), MINUSCA (2), Total: 11
El Salvador	MINUSMA (92), UNIFIL (52), UNMC (41), MINUSTAH (27Pol) UNMISS (3) MINURSO (3) UNISFA(1) Total: 219	183	293	290	250	245	MINUSMA (112), UNIFIL (52), UNVMC (12/10pol), UNMISS (4/1pol), MINURSO (1), UNISFA (1), Total: 182
Guatemala	MONUSCO (153), MINUSTAH (53), UNMC (19), UNMISS (6), MINUSCA (4), UNISFA (3), UNIFL (2), Total: 240	172	177	173	177	178	MONUSCO (157), UNMISS (5), MINUSCA (4), UNVMC (4), UNIFIL (3), UNISFA (2), MINUSMA (2), Total: 177
Honduras	UNMC (15 EoMs), MINURSO (12 EoMs) Total: 27	15	14	11	15	15	MINURSO (12), UNVMC (6), Total: 18
Paraguay	MINUSTAH (82), UNMC (37), MONUSCO (15), UNFICYP (14T) MINUSCA(3 SO), UNMISS (3) Total: 154	34	30	31	31	32	UNVMC (16/6Pol), UNFICYP (12), MONUSCO (6), MINUSCA (4), UNISFA (3), Total: 41
Peru	MINUSCA (213), MONUSCO (12), UNMISS (4), MINUSTAH (3), UNISFA (2), UNAMID (2) Total: 236	231	238	237	230	232	MINUSCA (237/2Pol), UNMISS (9/4pol), MONUSCO (5), UNISFA (5), UNIFIL (1), UNITMAS (1), Total: 258
Uruguay	MONUSCO (1200), MINUSTAH (48/4Pol), UNMC (21), UNMOGIP (2) Total: 1271	971	954	1126	1068	1061	MONUSCO (827), UNDOF (210), UNVMC (6/3Pol), MINUSCA (3), UNISFA (2), UNMOGIP (2), UNIFIL (1), Total: 1051
Mexico	UNMC (25EoM), MINURSO (4EoM), MINUSTAH(1SO) Total: 30	17	15	13	17	17	MINUSMA (9/5T)), UNVMC (5), MINURSO (4), MINUSCA (2), UNMOGIP (1), Total: 21
Total	3952 (4.09%)	2249 (2.4%)	2339 (2.6%)	2476 (3%)	2178 (2.8%)	2174 (2.9%)	2152 (2.8%)
All PKOs	96617	91585	87879	82210	77256	74330	76369

Source: Own Compilation from UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub (Reference months are December for 2017-2022 and April for 2023)

APPENDIX 4

Detailed break-down of Lima Declaration Signatories' Contributions to UN Peace Operations in 2023

Country	Type of Contribution	U N	U N	U N	U N	U N	M I	M O	U N	U N	M I	M I	U N	U N	U N	U N		Total Troops	Total Police	Total (FPU)	MOB/ MEMT	Total Staff	Total
		T	M	F	D	I	N	N	M	I	N	N	V	I	M	S							
		S	O	I	O	F	U	U	I	S	U	U	M	T	H	O							
		O	G	C	F	I	R	S	S	F	S	S	C	A	A	M							
			I	Y		L	S	C	S	A	M	C		M									
			P	P			O	O			A	A		S									
Argentina	Troops			240		2												242					
(282)	Police								10				5						15				
241:41	FPU																						
14.5% female	MoB/MEM	3	4				4														11		
	Staff officers			11	1							2										14	
	Total	3	4	251	1	2	4		10			2	5										282
Brazil	Troops			1		8												9					
(85)	Police								5			3				2			10				
69:16	FPU																						
18.8%	MoB/MEM						9	1	5	2		3		1	1						22		
female	Staff officers			1		3		23	7	2	1	7										44	
	Total			2		11	9	24	17	4	1	13		1	1	2							85

Country	Type of Contribution	U N T S O	U N M O I P	U N F C Y P	U N D O F I L	U N I N F R S C O	M I N U S C O	M O N U S S A	U N M I S S A	U N I N U M C A	M I N U S C A	U N V M C A	U N I M T H A M	U N N S O M		Total Troops	Total Police	Total (FPU)	MOB/ MEMT	Total Staff	Total
	Troops																				
	Police																				
	FPU																				
	MoB/MEM											4							4		
	Staff officers																				
	Total											4									4
Ecuador	Troops																				
(11)	Police																				
8:3	FPU																				
27.3%	MoB/MEM					2		1	2										5		
female	Staff officers							3	1		2									6	
	Total					2		4	3		2										11
El Salvador	Troops					52				111						163					
(182)	Police							1				10					11				
159:23	FPU																				
12.6%	MoB/MEM					1		2	1			2							6		
female	Staff officers							1		1										2	
	Total					52	1	4	1	112		12									182

[illegible]

Country	Type of Contribution	U N T S O	U N M O G I P	U N F I C Y P	U N D O F I L	U N I N F I L S O	M I N U R S C O	M O N U S C O	U N M I S S S A	U N I N U S A A	M I N U S C A	M I N U S C A	U N V M C	U N I T A S	U N M H A M		Total Troops	Total Police	Total (FPU)	MOB/ MEMT	Total Staff	Total
Peru (258) 218:40 15.5% female	Troops											220					220					
	Police							4			2							6				
	FPU																					
	MoB/MEM						4	3	3		7		1							18		
	Staff officers				1		1	2	2		8										14	
	Total				1		5	9	5		237		1									258
Uruguay (1051) 989:62 5.9% female	Troops				206			810									1016					
	Police											3						3				
	FPU																					
	MoB/MEM		2				5		2			3								12		
	Staff officers				4	1	12				3										20	
	Total		2		210	1	827		2		3	6										1.051
Mexico (21) 13:8 38%	Troops									5							5					
	Police																					
	FPU																					
	MoB/MEM		1			4					1	5								11		
	Staff officers									4	1										5	
	Total		1			4				9	2	5										21

Country	Type of Contribution	U N T S O	U N M O G I P	U N F O C Y P	U N D O F I L	U N I F I L O	M I N U R S O	M O N U S C O	U N M I S S A	U N I N S A A	M I N U S M A	M I N U S C A	U N V M C A S	U N I M T A M	U N M H A	U N S O M		Total Troops	Total Police	Total (FPU)	MOB/ MEMT	Total Staff	Total
Total 2.152	Troops			259	206	62		960			116	220											
	Police								16			5	27			2							
	FPU																						
	MoB/MEM	6	7				35	15	12	12		15	35	2	1								
	Staff officers			12	5	8		44	8	5	8	29	7										
	Total	6	7	271	211	70	35	1.019	25	17	124	269	69	2	1	2		1.823	54	0	150	125	2.152