

Negotiating the Transition to Democracy and  
Reforming the Security Sector: The Vital  
Contributions of South African Women

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With Contributions by Camille Pampell Conaway

Women Waging Peace Policy Commission

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**WOMEN WAGING PEACE** is a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund that advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world.

**THE POLICY COMMISSION** is conducting a series of case studies to document women's contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide. The series was conceived and developed by Sanam Naraghi Anderlini.

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Sanam Naraghi Anderlini joined Women Waging Peace as the director of the newly formed Policy Commission in 2002, with the goal of producing 15 field-based case studies on women's contributions to peace processes. Prior to joining Waging, she was the senior policy advisor at International Alert on the global campaign Women Building Peace, advocating for UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. She has written numerous pieces on the role of women in peace processes, including *Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference* for the UN Development Fund for Women in 2000 and *Women's Leadership, Gender, and Peace* for the Ford Foundation in 2001. Prior to her work on women and peace building, Ms. Anderlini was the managing editor at the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, a conflict early-warning network, and in 1996 she co-authored *Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution*. Ms. Anderlini has conducted numerous workshops worldwide, including Fiji, Iran, and Jordan, on women's involvement in conflict prevention and peace building. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini holds a master of philosophy degree in social anthropology from Cambridge University. She was born in Iran and currently lives in Washington, DC with her husband and twin daughters.

## PROJECT BACKGROUND

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Wars and internal conflicts do not end simply with the signing of peace agreements. To avoid a resurgence of violence, it is necessary to develop and support measures for strengthening the governance, security, justice, and socioeconomic capacities of a state. This is a complex task in any society, but daunting in post-conflict situations. While the international community can provide assistance and valuable resources, the local population, which has no “exit strategy,” has the greatest commitment to building a sustainable peace. It is therefore essential to draw on the assets, experiences, and dedication at the local level and among all sectors of society. One sector often overlooked and underestimated is women. In most post-conflict societies, women are more than 50 percent of the population and are actively engaged in peace building while addressing the basic survival needs of their families and communities. Yet they are often portrayed as passive victims, and little regard is given to their actual and potential roles in fostering security.

In October 2000, for the first time in its history, the UN Security Council acknowledged that women have a key role in promoting international stability by passing Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. It called on all parties to ensure women’s participation in peace processes, from the prevention of conflict to negotiations and postwar reconstruction. The Women Waging Peace Policy Commission was established to examine peace processes, with a particular focus on the contributions of women. This report, *Negotiating the Transition to Democracy and Reforming the Security Sector: The Vital Contributions of South African Women*, documents the strategies women used to gain full participation in the negotiations and in the transition, as well as their influence in shaping security sector policies and institutions.

## KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### Key Findings

1. By taking the visionary steps of consulting the public about the role of the security sector and placing human security and development at the center of its national security framework, South Africa went beyond mere reform to transform the security sector. These steps helped repair the security sector's legitimacy and credibility with the country's people.
2. Despite differing views and values, women of all races—as pacifists, militarists, feminists, and grassroots activists—were central to articulating a vision and shaping the process by which the security of the people became a priority for the state.
3. Women from across the political spectrum mobilized to attain 50 percent representation in the negotiations leading up to the 1994 election and 28 percent of parliament afterwards. In parliament and throughout the government, they continue to encourage public participation in policy shaping and remain the strongest proponents of human security.
4. Within the security establishment, it is increasingly acknowledged that women 1) bring a critical perspective to the planning and implementation of programs, 2) have a positive influence as members of the security forces—including peacekeeping units, and 3) are critical to building peace and security.
5. Security sector transformation will remain incomplete if the institutional culture is not changed; overcoming gender-based discrimination, as with racial discrimination, is a key indicator of transformation.

### Recommendations

In promoting security sector reform the **international community** should:

1. Encourage countries to use public consultations to ensure that
  - Public opinion regarding security threats are heard and addressed, and
  - The security sector gains legitimacy and credibility with the public.
2. Undertake capacity-building programs to enable women to participate effectively in discussions about the security sector.
3. Encourage defense ministries to promote full inclusion of women and gendered perspectives in regard to peace and security issues. South Africa's innovative programs, including focal points in defense structures, gender budgeting, and the "Women at the Peace Table" initiative—could be adapted elsewhere.

The **South African government** should:

1. Strengthen peacekeeping units by increasing gender-based training for all personnel and creating mechanisms to hold accountable personnel who violate international codes of conduct.
2. Renew its policies of engagement with civil society on security and defense issues.
3. Ensure adequate support and funding for programs that promote gender equity and awareness.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Introduction

A decade after its transformation from an aggressive state grounded in racial discrimination and supported by a ubiquitous secret security system, South Africa is now a democratic country in which civilian structures control the military. To reform the security sector—including the military, police, and secret services—and dispel tensions among soldiers, South Africa, led by the African National Congress (ANC) and its supporters, took the extraordinary and courageous step of revisiting notions of state security. They explored basic questions—such as “what is security?” and “what are the threats facing the nation?”—through a participatory approach involving civil society. As a result, while widening the scope and definition of security, they also “democratized” the debate, enabling the population to articulate its concerns in a national dialogue. This inclusive approach enhanced the security services’ public credibility and legitimacy but also altered the national security framework. In effect, South Africa demilitarized security by recognizing that “human security” issues, such as “[u]nderdevelopment, poverty, lack of democratic participation, and the abuse of human rights are . . . grave threats to the security of the people. Since they invariably give rise to conflict between individuals, communities, and countries, they threaten the security of states as well.”<sup>1</sup>

Despite their differing views and values, South African women—as pacifists, militarists, feminists, and grassroots activists—were vital in shaping and articulating this innovative vision of security. They injected new perspectives and influenced the debate via cross-party alliances. During multi-party negotiations and in every committee, they also fought for gender equality, an end to sex-based discrimination, and the inclusion of gendered perspectives. As decision makers, they have stood by these values and struggled to realize this inclusive vision of security. This study documents the strategies women used to gain full participation in decision making and their subsequent contributions to the transformation of security sector policies and structures.

### A Place at the Peace Table: Women’s Strategies

Women were essential to the struggle against apartheid through trade unions, the Communist Party, and other

forums. In the 1970s, increasing numbers of women joined the guerrilla forces, including the ANC’s armed wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Simultaneously, white middle-class women became the leading voices of important opposition efforts like the End Conscription Campaign (ECC).

As the potential grew for a transition to democracy, women in the ANC and other political movements struggled to gain equal representation in the negotiations. In 1992, ANC women led the formation of the Women’s National Coalition (WNC), an initiative of some 100 organizations, to develop a common agenda for women’s rights. A seminal gathering, the WNC assembly was the first venue at which representatives from across the political and ideological spectrum met publicly. A subsequent two-year consultative process involving hundreds of workshops and an estimated three million people nationwide resulted in the “Women’s Charter,” which included demands for full participation in political decision making.

As the broader women’s movement gained strength, women in the political sphere secured 50 percent representation in the 1993 Multi-Party Negotiations Process (MPNP), which led to the 1994 elections. They also began asserting their views regarding the security sector. A key outcome of the MPNP was the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to monitor and work with the apartheid government in preparing for the elections. Women were active in the TEC, including in the sub-councils addressing defense and security structures. Despite pressure to define “security” more traditionally, they pushed to maintain the focus on human security broadly, and gender equality in the armed forces.

Following the 1994 elections, women made up 28 percent of the National Assembly. They also held key posts in parliamentary committees, including defense. In 1996, the publication of the *White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa* (“White Paper”) enshrined the principle of civilian control over the military, gave priority to human security, affirmed a commitment to gender equality and affirmative action based on race and sex, and promoted distinctly non-militaristic values within the framework of national security.

### Influencing Defense and Security Policies: Women's Contributions

Attaining full representation in the 1992 to 1994 negotiations and a strong presence in subsequent parliamentary and government structures, women had both the necessary critical mass and the expertise to help redefine and ensure implementation of the new security agenda. They influenced the development of the new security paradigm as academics and activists, as members of the MK and ANC leadership, and as voices from the grassroots.

#### *Academics and Anti-Conscription Activists*

A relatively small group of anti-apartheid, anti-militarist white women successfully promoted the view of demilitarization as a precondition for viable democracy. As leaders of groups such as Black Sash and the Ceasefire Campaign (an offshoot of the anti-conscription movement), their demands ranged from calling for reductions in military expenditures and transfers of resources to development, promoting disarmament, and advocating for the elimination of the arms industry in South Africa.<sup>2</sup> While mainstream, largely male military strategists focused primarily on technical issues such as the size of the military, budgets, and weaponry, Jacklyn

Cock, a leading academic and critic of the apartheid regime, was among the first South Africans to reveal the extensively militarized nature of the apartheid state and to emphasize its social and political costs. The highly influential Military Research Group (MRG), cofounded by Cock, developed and tested ideas for the ANC within the international and national security and development communities. Drawn to the new discourse on “human security” emerging from North America and Europe, the MRG and others argued that militarized states siphon power and resources from development, cause ecological harm, and tear at the fabric of society.

#### *ANC and MK Women*

Women members of the ANC and those who served in the MK were also critical in developing the security agenda. They were strong advocates for the inclusion

of gender equality principles into the policy and programs of the security sector. They were also extremely supportive of human security as the normative framework for national security. This was a result primarily of their political training, which had given them a solid grounding in the political goals of the liberation movement, including the interrelationship between gender, class, and racial oppression. They exerted influence, says Jenny Schreiner, ANC member and chair of the Constitutional Committee on Security Services, because they were “coming through the mainstream political party. They [could] hold their own in the leadership structures of those parties.”<sup>3</sup> Deputy Minister of Defence Nozwise Madlala-Routledge, the first woman and Quaker to hold a senior defense post, agrees: “The [approach] that women brought into the discussions was that security is a broad issue. It is not simply about state security, but it is about human security—where the security of the person, of the individual,

is part of the whole equation.” Schreiner notes that men in the ANC delegation also advanced the human security framework during the talks; however, she says, the women “wouldn’t allow anyone to budge off the issues.”

*“The [approach] that women brought into the discussions was that security is a broad issue. It is not simply about state security, but it is about human security where the security of the person, of the individual, is part of the whole equation.”*

*—Nozwise Madlala-Routledge*

#### *Grassroots*

Women at the grassroots level and in rural areas also helped shape security policy. They were involved indirectly in the conceptual processes through consultations and workshops the WNC and think tanks organized, pre-election negotiations, and post-1994 parliamentary activities. These women conveyed the spirit of “human security” as they reflected on their own experiences and demanded greater freedom; equality in the eyes of law and society; the right to property ownership; access to safe housing, employment, and education; and protection from all forms of violence. Commenting on the evolution of the human security paradigm, Frene Ginwala, speaker of the National Assembly, gives particular credit to women’s movements in Africa and their ability to “[link] the struggle for national independence and security to the struggle for equality and social equity.”<sup>4</sup>



Thandi Modise, former MK fighter and chair of the Joint Committee on Defence from 1999 to 2004, suggests that South African women drew on their own experiences to define peace and security and to identify priorities for moving forward. She credits women with having “acted as the conscience of the nation” on military issues, embracing the principles of defense and conflict prevention rather than armed action:<sup>5</sup> “[They have] demanded that the defense force should not be a machine used against the people, but that its function should be broadened to include preventive and rescue work.”<sup>6</sup>

### **Shaping the New Security Sector: Women’s Roles**

In the decade following the transition to democracy, women’s roles were central in several initiatives related to security reform.

#### *The Defence Review*

Conducted between 1996 and 1998, South Africa’s National Defence Review identified the military needs of the country. The Review fulfilled a mandate of the 1996 White Paper, which had provided a normative framework for security sector reform and emphasized the need for the military to serve the citizens. At the insistence of women parliamentarians, the Review was undertaken as a nationwide consultative process. The defense establishment hosted numerous public meetings during which people could express their views. Grassroots women’s organizations were vital in drawing attention to the links between security and the environment. Their focus on the military’s use of land and the resultant impact on the health and livelihood of local populations was a significant contribution to the national debate. Most importantly, the consultative and transparent nature of the process changed the perception of the military in the eyes of the public, giving the Review revitalized legitimacy and credibility.

#### *Women and the Arms Scandal*

In 1998, following the Defence Review, the Subcommittee on the Procurement Program of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) recommended six defense procurement programs and suppliers to the cabinet. By December 1999, at a cost of approximately \$4.5 billion, the government had contracted five major arms transactions. Despite initial outcries from civil society that the deal made no sense in the absence of a credible military threat, and despite

internal governmental questioning of the details, the ANC launched an aggressive inquiry only after several months. As the arms deal moved forward, women parliamentarians from across political parties spoke out. Female ANC parliamentarians resigned from key positions in protest, and others risked their positions to criticize political parties’ involvement. Across the spectrum, according to Inkatha Freedom Party parliamentarian Suzanne Vos, “When [women MPs] spoke out, it wasn’t about helicopters and dealing with obsolete equipment, it was about the amount of money being spent on the military when the country needed it so much more for development.” Such activism demonstrated a continued focus on human security priorities and an ability to unite across party lines for a cause.

#### *Peace Support Operations*

Given the apartheid regime’s policies of destabilizing neighboring countries, involvement in regional military operations was a sensitive topic for the new government. From the outset, however, there was a desire within the ANC to support international peacekeeping operations while taking a more holistic approach. According to General Rocky Williams (Ret.), there was recognition that if “the root causes of human insecurity are what are deeply ingrained . . . you can’t simply have a military approach.” A new notion of peace operations emerged, one that expanded beyond deployment of troops. Deputy Minister of Defence Madlala-Routledge notes that women policymakers helped broaden the scope. She observed that the new policy that emerged from the Defence Review “is more holistic and comprehensive,” adding that “[w]omen have contributed to the fact that you have to assist with reconstruction . . . with the rebuilding of communities where there has been violence. In order to have lasting peace, you have to get involved in the development of that country.” Today, South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that has recognized the need to integrate gender-based training into peacekeeping operations and has drawn on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide expertise for them.

Although the policy frameworks are in place and significant changes have been made, particularly in terms of ensuring civilian oversight of the military, the broader transformation of the security sector remains incomplete. In addition, the rise of HIV/AIDS among South African military personnel has limited the military’s capacity to engage in peacekeeping efforts, causing some concern among neighboring countries.<sup>7</sup>

### Institutional Mechanisms for the Promotion of Gender Equality

To promote women's inclusion in the security sector and redress policies that discriminate against them, ANC leadership and the defense ministry have used a number of strategies, including:

- The appointment of women to senior positions within the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Secretariat as role models and to demonstrate high-level commitment to gender equality;
- The provision of gender training to personnel at all levels of the defense ministry;
- Changes in personnel policies that affect women most directly, including those governing maternity leave and equal benefits for dependents of men and women in the forces;
- The creation of a gender focal point within the Equal Opportunities Directorate, with outreach across the services and divisions within the ministry; and
- The annual organization of "Women at the Peace Table," a Deputy Defence Minister-hosted gathering of women in the armed forces and in civil society to explore and address peace and security issues.

Many of these measures are new and underfunded. If supported, they could promote gender equality and foster continued transformation of the security sector. Moreover, like many South African initiatives, they could be used to inform efforts in other countries.

### Conclusions

Women played a creative and influential role in South Africa's democratic transition and security sector reform. They were critical in pushing the defense community toward greater openness in its strategic deliberations. By widening the scope and definition of security, they in effect "democratized" the debate, enabling large sectors of their population affected by security policies to articulate their concerns and contribute to the national dialogue. This not only helped to strengthen the security services' credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public but also led to a new framework that placed human security—the security of

people and the need for development—at the center of the national security framework. This human security paradigm has proved prescient, as new security threats have increased, including the spread of HIV/AIDS, regional immigration, street crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

At the same time, the slow pace of change frustrates many of the original architects of reform, including those in civil society. Tensions among the political leadership, the needs of the traditional military and defense establishment, and the interests of the arms industry have hindered progress. Since the 1999 elections, there has been a gradual shift towards increased executive power, diminished parliamentary control, and decreased public participation. Additionally, external challenges and new security threats have meant that the more far-reaching ideals of the 1996 White Paper have not become reality.

Despite these challenges, South Africa's vision and its transformation of the security sector are groundbreaking. Women's participation in the decision-making process and implementation of this reform was and remains a key component of its success. Whether security sector reform is undertaken as a means of conflict prevention or as a means of establishing security in post-conflict societies, South Africa's process is a model from which lessons should be drawn.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>*Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa Adopted at the National Conference, 28–31 May 1992*. 30 June 2004 <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html>>.

<sup>2</sup>See Beri, Ruchita, "South Africa: An Overview of the Defence Industry." *Strategic Analysis* XXV.4 (2001): 569–584.

<sup>3</sup>Unless otherwise stated, all quotes are drawn from interviews conducted by the author between November 2002 and February 2004.

<sup>4</sup>UN Commission on Human Security. *Human Security Now*. New York: UN, 2003. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/FinalReport.pdf>>. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Harker, John. "HIV-AIDS and the Security Sector in Africa: A Threat to Canada." *Commentary* 80 (2001). 14 June 2004 <[http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com80\\_e.html](http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com80_e.html)>; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "South Africa: HIV-Testing Row in the Military." *Integrated Regional Information Networks*. 29 October 2003. 14 June 2004 <[http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37541&SelectRegion=Southern\\_Africa](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37541&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa)>.

## INTRODUCTION

South Africa is one of the few countries in which women—as pacifists, militarists, feminists, and anti-apartheid activists—played, and continue to play, a key role within and outside of the political and military decision-making arenas. In the struggle to end apartheid, women were leaders and integral participants. By attaining full representation in the negotiations, and in subsequent parliamentary and government structures, women helped redefine and ensure implementation of the new security agenda. **This study documents the strategies women used to gain full participation in the negotiations and in the transition, as well as their influence in shaping security sector policies and institutions.**

Like many states in transition, the reform and transformation of the security sector was a major challenge for the new South Africa. In the early 1990s, as the transition process gained momentum, it was evident that the successful management and transformation of the security sector would be necessary to sustain the new state. It was a daunting task primarily because apartheid South Africa, while not an overt police state, was heavily militarized.<sup>1</sup> For two decades, the state had geared the white population towards fighting a “communist” threat, “terrorism,” and “revolution.” In reality, it was a convenient catch-all for any form of opposition or resistance to the state, particularly from the majority black population.

Faced with the challenge of taking control of the security sector, and wary of the military and police capacity to undermine the transition to democracy, South Africa, and particularly the African National Congress (ANC), took a step back to explore, assess, and define its vision of security for the new state. They questioned traditional precepts regarding the threats facing the nation and the needs of the people. Ultimately, they emerged with a new framework based on issues of “human security” rather than conventional militaristic notions of national security. The process of redefining the security agenda to serve the entire nation, and attempting to integrate developmental priorities (safety in the community and environment, access to clean water and food), has been an enormous endeavor.

A decade later, new security threats have emerged, relating to illegal immigration, drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS, and regional instability. Unresolved issues still exist regarding full racial and gender integration,

and demobilization of military and police forces, but no one doubts the changed role of the security sector, especially the diminished influence of the military on the political arena. Moreover, it is widely recognized that the process by which this new agenda was defined was highly consultative and participatory. The debate included divergent perspectives: a cross-section of civil society, including grassroots activists, academics, anti-militarist peace activists, and former security personnel heading think tanks were involved. This process was critical in building the credibility and legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of the public.

Part One of this study provides an overview of the participation of women of all races as non-military and military actors in the struggle against apartheid and during the negotiations. Part Two focuses on the conceptual and policy developments regarding security issues that were embraced and advanced during the transition years and in the aftermath of the 1994 elections. It also traces women’s involvement and influence in shaping these debates. Part Three addresses the shift from policy to operational developments, highlighting the contributions of women to key initiatives and mechanisms developed to promote gender sensitivity in the defense sector. Although the term “security sector” encompasses the military, police, and intelligence services, this study focuses on changes relating to the military in South Africa. Police and intelligence services have also been transformed dramatically since 1994 and are faced with a range of issues including high rates of violent crime. Women played an important role in the transformation of these sectors as well; although the issue of gun control (a primary concern in South Africa today) is briefly touched on in this report, a comprehensive assessment of all branches of the security sector is outside this study’s scope.

### Rationale for the Study

Despite many advances and the emergence of international policy frameworks such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), women’s participation in formal peace negotiation processes is still rare. In the 1990s, however, South African women successfully strategized to engage in every aspect of the transition to democracy and the Government of National Unity. In addition to addressing socioeconomic issues—the traditional domain for women—they were fully involved in debates and decision-making regarding the

security sector. While they were not the only voices calling for radical change, their presence and participation had a significant impact on the substance and the processes used to transform the security sector.

Second, during the 1990s the ANC leadership was committed to transforming all state institutions to reflect the diverse nature of the South African society and to end all forms of discrimination: this included discrimination based on race, class and sex. Given white male dominance of the security sector during apartheid, addressing the military, police, and intelligence institutions was a priority. The focus was not just racial integration. Among many in leadership and key positions there was explicit understanding, support, and call for gender mainstreaming, as well as promotion of non-sexism and gender equality in the movement's policies and programs for transformation. The motivations underlying this commitment have not been adequately assessed.

This paper seeks to fill these gaps and promote broader discussion of the actual and potential contributions of women to security sector reform policies and programs elsewhere.

Finally, the rationale for reforming the security sectors in developing countries is strong, but there is no single overarching framework that determines how such changes can be undertaken. Usually, other than ensuring civilian oversight of the military, attempts at reforming the security sector focus on technical elements, particularly issues relating to human resources and personnel restructuring, equipment, and conversion from a military- to a civilian-based industry. Clearly, without this practical work, reform is difficult to sustain, but, particularly in post-conflict societies, the transition also provides a critical window of opportunity during which traditional notions of national security and the role of the military, the police and other related sectors can be revisited. In effect, there is a chance to address the societal dimensions of security. In South Africa this effort was made.

### Research Methodology

This study is the result of primary research and an extensive literature survey on security sector reform and

women's involvement in this arena in general and in South Africa in particular. It incorporates analysis of relevant academic literature, reports, and government publications. In-depth interviews in Capetown, Pretoria, and Johannesburg were undertaken with scholars, national-level government officials, and representatives of civil society, women's organizations, and the international community.

### Assumptions

This study does not assume that women are more peaceful by nature than men or that their mere presence guarantees democratic governance. It argues that, because of their different life experiences, women often bring new perspectives to peace and security issues. Empirical evidence suggests that women experience conflict differently from men, as both casualties and caretakers.<sup>2</sup> Because of their experiences in times of

conflict, their increased responsibilities, and their vulnerability to insecurity within communities and in the private sphere, women have alternative views on security, i.e. often regarding security from the personal or human dimension. They are at the front lines in the battle against poverty, illness, environmental degradation, and

crime—issues that can ultimately undermine the state's security. In the context of peacemaking and peace building, women should therefore be recognized as active agents rather than passive victims. As mothers, wives, and sisters of combatants and as individuals with powerful community networks, women are essential to rebuilding society. To exclude their voices is not only undemocratic—it ultimately weakens the peace.

An underlying assumption in this study is that the human security paradigm is a positive model for the formation of state and national security frameworks. The rethinking of security paradigms is particularly important for states in transition and for regions where colonial, neocolonial, or autocratic rule has resulted in the oppression of people by a combination of external and internal forces. As Frene Ginwala—Speaker of the House in the South African Parliament, ANC leader, organizer of the Women's National Coalition, and

*In the 1990s, however, South African women successfully strategized to engage in every aspect of the transition to democracy and the Government of National Unity. . . . Their presence and participation had a significant impact on the substance and the processes used to transform the security sector.*

member of the UN Commission on Human Security—notes, in Africa “the enemy came from within the state and the conditions under which people lived every day placed them in chronic insecurity.”<sup>3</sup> She adds, the persistent marginalization of countries in Africa from processes of economic growth and development, however, reinforced perceptions of exclusion and vulnerability. For these reasons, development, poverty eradication and greater social equality are increasingly linked to conflict resolution, peace building and state building in Africa.

It further presupposes that peace and security are sustainable when all voices in society are included.

## Definitions

### *Security Sector Reform*

According to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the “security sector” refers to organizations and entities that have the authority to use or order the use or threat of force to protect the state and civilians. It also includes the civil structures that have responsibility for managing these organizations and providing oversight. In effect, it comprises three pillars:

1. Groups with a mandate and the instruments to use violence—militaries, police and paramilitaries, intelligence services;
2. Institutions that monitor and manage the sector—government ministries and parliament;
3. Structures responsible for maintaining the rule of law—for example the judiciary, penal system, human rights ombudsmen.

In states affected by armed conflict, the sector also encompasses sub-state actors, such as guerrilla forces, armed opposition movements, militias, and private security firms. Additionally, NGOs, the media, and academia can play an important role in monitoring activities and calling for accountability.

The reform of this sector is typically understood to have four dimensions:

1. The political, which is predicated on the principle of civilian control over military and security bodies;
2. The institutional, which refers to the physical and technical transformation of security entities;
3. The economic, which relates to the financing and budgets of forces; and

4. The societal, which relates to the role of civil society in monitoring security policies and programs.

*Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate*—a joint International Alert, Saferworld, and Netherlands Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael) publication—notes that the overall aim of security sector reform is “the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security to their citizens.”<sup>4</sup>

### *Human Security*

The phrase “human security” emerged from the 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report*. Human security was defined as the summation of seven distinct dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. The focus on people, rather than states, and the highlighting of non-traditional threats was a shift away from the security threats defined during the Cold War.

The Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, developed the concept further. In a Ministry paper published in 1999, human security is defined as:

safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives. . . . Like other security concepts—national security, economic security, food security—it is about protection. . . . The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived. . . . There are also human security dimensions to a broad range of challenges, such as gross violations of human rights, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational organized crime, gender-based violence, infectious diseases, and natural disasters. . . . The litmus test for determining if it is useful to frame an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk.<sup>5</sup>

The UN Commission on Human Security report refined the concept to connect it to types of “freedom,” notably “freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.”<sup>6</sup> It called for simultaneous strategies to empower and to protect individuals in their quest to develop their potential to participate in decision-making. The report also states that:

human security complements state security, furthers human development and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. . . . Respecting human rights are at the core of protecting human security.<sup>7</sup>

*Ethnicity*

Under apartheid, every South African was categorized according to race. The terms black, white, Indian, and colored were legally required. These laws have been abolished, but in reflecting on the history of the country, and even current events, reference to these terms provides clarity.

*Gender*

The term “gender” refers to the socially constructed—as opposed to biologically determined—identities of men and women. Gender is not the same as “sex” and gender differences are not the same as sex differences. For instance, the ability of women to bear children is a sex—or biologically determined—difference from men;

that women, in many societies, are responsible for food preparation and household chores is a gender—or socially constructed—difference.

Gender roles are assigned to men and women in early socialization. They cut across public and private spheres; are specific to a given culture at a given time; are affected by other forms of differentiation such as race, ethnicity, and class; and can change in different socio-political and economic contexts within a society. World Bank literature notes that in any given society, gender shapes the definitions of acceptable responsibilities and functions for men and women in terms of “social and economic activities, access to resources, and decision-making authority.”<sup>8</sup>

This study highlights the role of women in the South African transition process, particularly their involvement in security sector reform. It also assesses how acknowledged gender differences, including perspectives that men and women bring, can enhance policies, programs, and institutions affected by security sector reform.

## PART ONE: WOMEN'S ACTIVISM DURING AND AFTER APARTHEID

Even before apartheid's formal beginnings in 1948, South African women of all races played an important and often catalytic role in the struggle against racial policies.<sup>9</sup> From the early days, their efforts were two-pronged. First, they joined with men in the struggle for democracy and freedom from racial oppression. Second, they battled to ensure that their equal rights as women were recognized and upheld. While men have dominated the leadership and face of the struggle in South Africa throughout the twentieth century, women were often the protagonists in mobilizing mass support and sustaining the momentum of the movement.

### Organizing in the Early Years

In the 1930s, South Africa gained independence from Great Britain. The white minority government—itsself split between the Afrikaans (Dutch descendents) and the English—initiated policies to limit the power of non-whites. In 1948, the Afrikaans National Party, led by Dr. Daniel Malan, won the majority of votes. The party's ascension to power accelerated white domination of the country's political, social, and economic structures, and extended racial separation. *Apartheid*, the Afrikaans word for “apartness” or “separateness,” became the commonly used term to describe the institutionalization of racial discrimination. New laws were soon passed, including the Separate Representation of Voters Act and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. In response to mass strikes, boycotts, protests, and other forms of resistance, additional laws followed, including the Population and Registration Act and the Group Areas Act.

During the early- and mid-twentieth century, women were prominent in church groups and organizations, but their strength and numbers were in the trade unions. In response to new labor laws introducing the separation of races in unions, women leaders in the trade union movement opposed the ever-encroaching restrictions of apartheid; their position was that racial divisions should not split any union. The 1950 Suppression of Communism law banned all trade union activity. Even as striking was outlawed, women were reaching out to industrial workers to push back the tide of apartheid. As they fought for equal access to jobs and education for all races, women gained skills.

In effect, the trade unions were the training grounds for women's political activism.<sup>10</sup>

Throughout this period, various organizations emerged to oppose apartheid policies. The African National Congress (ANC), in particular, launched the Defiance Campaign in 1952, a nonviolent mass resistance movement led by ANC Secretary-General Walter Sisulu and soon-to-be ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela. Anti-apartheid organizations also united. The ANC, together with the Congress of Democrats, the South African Indian Congress, and the South African Colored People's Organization, formed the Congress Alliance.

Women were active leaders in the Defiance Campaign.<sup>11</sup> In the Eastern Cape, for example, nearly half of all volunteer “defiers” were women, who along with the men were tried and imprisoned for their resistance activities.<sup>12</sup> As a result of their leadership, the ANC Women's League (ANCWL), which had formed in 1948, was invited by the Congress Alliance to assist in organizing the Congress of the People. Women's organizations, which included whites and non-whites, participated in the conference and submitted demands for inclusion in the Freedom Charter.<sup>13</sup> In 1955, the Congress Alliance adopted the Freedom Charter, which demanded equal political, economic, and social rights for all races.<sup>14</sup>

### Women's Activism Gaining Public Visibility

Throughout the 1950s, with apartheid legislation becoming all-encompassing, women's organizations worked to mobilize support against the state. The ANCWL established branches in townships nationwide, and the women of the trade unions and the Congress Alliance formed the Federation of South African Women (FSAW), which represented close to 230,000 women.<sup>15</sup> It had two objectives: to end minority rule and apartheid and to build a multi-racial women's organization that would fight for the rights and freedoms of women.

The FSAW, together with the ANCWL, led boycotts and protests against government laws including the Group Areas Act (1950), which segregated communities, and the Population Registration Act (1950), which required South Africans to register their race

with the government. In 1952, the Native Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act was passed. Under this new law it was compulsory for industrial and domestic workers in urban areas to carry passes at all times. Passes determined their ability to travel, work, have homes, and register births and deaths.

Women gained national visibility during the anti-pass campaign through organizing protests. Black Sash, an organization of white women against apartheid founded in 1955, led a rally of 2000 women in Pretoria. The events sparked a series of protests across the country. In 1956 in Pretoria, 20,000 people rallied and sent a petition with more than 100,000 signatures to the Prime Minister.<sup>16</sup> The battle continued throughout 1957 with some 2000 women arrested during a week of protest.<sup>17</sup> Ultimately, more than 3 million women (up to 75 percent of adult black women) carried passes; the campaign to ban them continued for years.

Through these efforts, women influenced the ideology and thinking within the ANC's leadership structures. While the Communist Party had long embraced gender equality as a principle goal, the ANC and other liberation groups had been less forthcoming. The mobilization of women and their visibility in the public sphere had, however, bolstered their voices and perspectives in the political sphere. Among the ANC leadership there was gradual acknowledgement that liberation should address gender and class oppression issues in addition to race. As Jenny Schreiner, an ANC activist who is now Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services, says, "The mass activity and the mass campaigns of the women in the 1950s had a very, very sound impact on the way that the ANC developed during that period."<sup>18</sup> Years later, following the banning of the major anti-apartheid organizations and the arrest of major leaders, Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli noted:

Among us Africans, the weight of resistance has been greatly increased in the last few years by emergence of our women. It may even be true that, had the women hung back, resistance would still have been faltering and uncertain . . . Furthermore women of all races have had far less hesitation than

men in making common cause about things basic to them.<sup>19</sup>

### Severe Repression and Heightened Violence

On March 21, 1960, South Africans across the country gathered in preparation for a day of nonviolent protest against the pass laws. In Sharpeville, 20,000 unarmed people gathered around the police station and the police opened fire, marking the beginning of a more repressive era. The government declared a state of emergency and banned all opposition groups, including the ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). Nelson Mandela, already on trial for spreading "communist," anti-apartheid, messages was detained. Mass arrests and large-scale raids followed, crippling the resistance movement.

With the state's use of violence increasing, the ANC officially endorsed an "armed struggle" against government offices and symbols of apartheid, and many leaders went

*"Among us Africans, the weight of resistance has been greatly increased in the last few years by emergence of our women." – Albert Luthuli*

underground to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation), or MK.<sup>20</sup> The PAC also established an underground armed wing, Poqo (Blacks Only),<sup>21</sup> which condoned violence against government targets and civilians—even blacks—who believed to be collaborating with the apartheid regime.<sup>22</sup>

The 1960s also saw the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement, led by Steve Biko and others. At the time, it was a radical departure from the traditional movements, as it sought to raise awareness and pride among blacks about their roots, culture, and identity. In so doing, it promoted solidarity among blacks but created tensions with other racial groups. Nonetheless, it was a nonviolent movement. In the early 1970s, as its activities became more political, Biko and other Black Consciousness Movement leaders were banned and arrested.<sup>23</sup>

As changes in the overall resistance to apartheid occurred, women were forced to adjust their strategies as well. As a result of government repression, the activity of women's organizations declined severely. The Women's League, as part of the ANC, was officially banned and the FSAW suffered greatly as its leaders were arrested and forced into exile. Instead, black women, in particular, became active in their communi-



ties, mitigating the impact of apartheid on their families and becoming involved in the Black Consciousness Movement.<sup>24</sup> The Black Women's Federation (BWF), formed in 1975, drew heavily from the doctrines of earlier women's organizations, but allowed only black women as members. BWF reached out to black women in rural and urban areas, promoting education,

fair housing, and healthcare; providing small income-generation projects; and addressing the concerns of black women in trade unions. By 1977, however, the government recognized the potential impact of the BWF. Its leaders were arrested and the organization was banned.

### White Women in the Military

White South African women were present in the military, albeit primarily in non-combat roles, from the beginnings of World War I. In 1914, the army established a volunteer nursing unit and sent more than 300 nurses to serve troops in Europe and East Africa.<sup>1</sup> In 1916, the Women's Auxiliary Service was formed, enabling some 12,000 women to assume clerical and other duties so men could go to combat.<sup>2</sup> By World War II, the military had five service organizations for women, including the nursing unit and services attached to the army, navy, air force, and military police.<sup>3</sup>

On one level, the motivations of Afrikaans women for joining the South African Defence Forces (SADF) mirrored those of their black counterparts who joined the MK: patriotism. But the SADF also afforded women social mobility and career training. By 1970, the SADF was accepting women into its permanent forces, but they were still not trained for combat nor were they assigned to high-risk duties.

As South Africa grew increasingly militarized, laws were passed aimed at the activities (labeled "terrorism" and "sabotage") of the underground, armed wings of the ANC and PAC, giving broad powers to the government's security forces.<sup>4</sup> Women became more active in civil defense units and were trained at the Civil Defence College as part of a national strategy of mobilizing against terrorist attacks. They were trained in a variety of skills, including self-defense, weapons use, crowd control, first aid, and firefighting. Women also were trained in counter-insurgency and commando techniques, though the numbers involved are not clear.<sup>5</sup>

Yet, whereas the MK promoted change, the inherent ideology of the SADF was to maintain the status quo, not only of white supremacy but also of male dominance. Women always played a subservient role in the armed forces. There was sex segregation, and men and women never shared training. As with the MK, there were few women in leadership roles within the SADF.<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, the presence of women in both forces provided an important platform for women in later years when negotiations around national security policy took place.

<sup>1</sup> "South Africa: Homeland Militaries." *South Africa*. Washington, DC: US Library of Congress, 1996. 5 April 2004 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+za0133\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0133))>.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Schönfeich, Martin. "Laws as Weapons: Legislating Against Terrorism." *Monograph 63: Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa*. Eds. Henri Boschhoff, Anneli Botha, and Martin Schönfeich. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2001. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No63/Chap4.html>>.

<sup>5</sup> "South Africa: Homeland Militaries."

<sup>6</sup> *Cock Women and War in South Africa*.

### *Women as Actors in the Armed Resistance*

Women's anti-apartheid activism took on a new dimension as more joined the ANC's armed faction, the MK, after it began allowing women members in 1969.<sup>25</sup> By the end of the armed struggle, an estimated 20 percent of the MK cadre were women.<sup>26</sup> They trained alongside the men and, although they were not as involved in front line combat, they did play a key role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and even sabotage and arson missions.<sup>27</sup> While some women experienced sex discrimination and harassment in the MK, for many physical training alongside men earned them respect. As Jacqueline Molefe, a senior woman in the movement, says: "It's only in the army that I have seen equality practiced. In terms of endurance and discipline, women have been outstanding in the MK. Because of that, because of what we've been doing on the ground, we've been recognized as equals."<sup>28</sup>

The breakdown of traditional gender roles within the ranks of the MK gave women a great sense of empowerment and acknowledgement of their own capacities. Moreover, the MK operated as a liberation army, and the issue of women's liberation and demand for equality was explicitly on its agenda.<sup>29</sup> This proved important in subsequent years as women entered the national political arena. Many MK men did not take women's emancipation seriously nor did they publicly acknowledge the contributions of MK women.<sup>30</sup> There was, nonetheless, a deep understanding of gender issues among the liberation movement's leadership that is evident in South Africa today.

### **Mass Resistance and the Beginning of the End of Apartheid**

In the early 1980s, the apartheid government began to enact some political and labor reforms in an effort to stem the increasing violence of the resistance movement. This strengthened the trade union movement and increased the number of civil society organizations, including churches and local civic associations, that openly decried apartheid policies. Women continued to be active at the community level, "organizing around 'bread and butter' issues such as high rents, lack of services, and corrupt local councils."<sup>31</sup> New local-, regional-, and national-level women's organizations also emerged, including the Rural Women's Movement, the United Women's Organization, the Natal Organization of Women, and the Federation of Transvaal Women.

In 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was established as a national alliance of anti-apartheid organizations that encompassed men and women of all races and classes. Under its leadership, mass strikes and popular protests swelled within South Africa, but UDF focused on an international audience in addition to its own countrymen. Nevertheless, violence continued to increase as MK fighters began to attack farmers, policemen, and other accused apartheid collaborators.<sup>32</sup> The increased challenges to the government were met with a violent response, and a nationwide State of Emergency was declared in 1986.

### *End Conscription Campaign*

The involvement of white women in the fight against apartheid increased steadily in the latter part of the twentieth century. They joined protest marches in solidarity with non-whites. And in the late 1960s and 1970s, when organizations such as Black Sash escaped state restrictions, they provided support and advice to black communities. By the 1980s, when South Africa was at the height of its militarized state and women were increasingly joining guerrilla groups, white women also began to focus their activism on military issues through the End Conscription Campaign (ECC).

ECC emerged because of the growing number of young men refusing to enter the army, but the campaign was largely led and supported by women. It was a national coalition with 52 member organizations and extensive branches in local communities nationwide, which drew support from thousands of members. The ECC message was that conscription intensifies violent conflict in society and, in effect, denied South Africans their basic human rights.<sup>33</sup> It was led by key apartheid critics such as Jacklyn Cock and Adele Kirsten and resonated with the primarily white English-speaking middle class. In particular, white women—motivated by fear of their children being forced into the army—played a critical role in organizing and mobilizing the campaign. A change in the laws that defined "conscientious objector" was one of their key demands. In 1989, a group of 771 objectors refused to serve, and four young men were given lengthy prison sentences.<sup>34</sup> The ECC galvanized nationwide action and hundreds of women signed petitions demanding that the government "give their sons a choice." The appeal to support the campaign was made specifically to mothers. While it upset some fathers and women without children who felt excluded, the campaign succeeded in raising the

voice of white women against the tide of militarism in the country.

The ECC represented one of the greatest threats to the system of conscription in South Africa, which was the cornerstone of the SADF and of the state itself, wrote Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town in 1987.<sup>35</sup> Its members were persecuted and threatened. Disinformation about the organization, and assaults, fire bombs, and break-ins were common during the mid-1980s. In 1988, the ECC was banned, wrote Cock, “reflecting the extent to which the state felt threatened by its existence.”<sup>36</sup> Nonetheless, the ECC was the first step towards political and gender consciousness for many white women; for the first time, many were becoming aware of the depth of patriarchy in their society, as well as the subservient role of women vis-à-vis men, especially in the political and security domains. In challenging conscription, they were questioning the militaristic values of the government as well as the idea of white male supremacy at the roots of the apartheid state. This increased consciousness and direct engagement with military matters proved essential to women’s ability to engage in the subsequent debate on national security.

### **Gaining a Foothold: Women and the Negotiated Transition**

Despite the increasing violence, the 1980s were the beginning of the end for apartheid. Sanctions and international outcry had led to pariah status for South Africa by many countries. Civil society leaders, including representatives of the media, academia, and industry began to publicly meet with the ANC in locations outside South Africa in a series of “talks about talks.”<sup>37</sup>

#### *Preparing for the End of Apartheid*

Regionally, the Organization of African Unity endorsed the ANC’s Harare Declaration on August 21, 1989, which set the conditions for South African government negotiations with the ANC. They included the release of political prisoners, an end to the ban on anti-apartheid organizations, and an end to the State of Emergency.<sup>38</sup> In the same month, President Botha resigned due to deteriorating health and F.W. de Klerk was sworn in as president. De Klerk and Mandela met for the first time on December 13, 1989.

That same year, aware of the changing political environment, South African women from many varied organizations dedicated to democracy also met in

Harare, Zimbabwe. Attendees covered the racial spectrum and came together with experiences of violence from opposing sides. Some of the white women were related to high-ranking men in the SADF; many of the non-whites were, themselves, guerrillas in the MK. Their goal was to gain a better understanding of each other, to ensure a line of communication regardless of political affiliation, to commit to promoting women’s equality, to bring an end to the violence, and to influence the men in their lives.<sup>39</sup> A second major conference sponsored by the ANC was held in Amsterdam in early 1990, involving women from the ANC, PAC, and South African Communist Party (SACP)—both those in exile and those active inside the country. Called the Malibongwe Conference, it was later regarded as a “watershed” event, during which women addressed issues ranging from democracy and the constitution to women’s political participation, healthcare concerns, violence, and customary law.<sup>40</sup> As a 1999 study notes:

The shift from resistance to negotiation politics saw the consolidation of women as a political constituency within political parties and in civil society as they joined forces across racial, class, and political divides to fight for incorporation within the new democracy.<sup>41</sup>

On February 2, 1990, in a dramatic speech to parliament, President de Klerk announced his plans to release Mandela from prison, to lift the ban on the ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations, and to invite all parties to attend negotiations to end apartheid. Mandela was released from prison nine days later, and the ANC and de Klerk’s National Party began official talks in May 1990. In August 1990, Mandela announced an end to the ANC’s armed struggle.

#### *Negotiation Structures and Accords*

Civil society, meanwhile, continued to play a galvanizing role in negotiations to permanently end apartheid and dismantle its structures. In September 1991, the 33-page National Peace Accord was unveiled, signed by 27 political, trade union, and national and local government leaders.<sup>42</sup> “It set codes of conduct for all parties to the process, including the police. The accord also established a network of ‘peace committees’ to contain the violence that continued to plague the townships.”<sup>43</sup>

Concerned that women were being marginalized, the ANC Women’s League, having re-formed in August

1990 after the ban on the ANC was lifted, vigorously demanded women’s inclusion in leadership positions within their party’s own negotiating structures. The issue gained momentum in December 1991 during the ANC National Consultative Conference, where a quota for women was proposed for elections to the ANC Executive Committee. With the media present, the talks were deadlocked over this issue for five hours.<sup>44</sup> Although the ANCWL was ultimately unsuccessful in this effort, women’s participation in the transition had become a national issue.

Following the National Peace Accord, the ANC, the government, and other parties began negotiations with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process in 1991. They culminated in the Multi-Party Negotiations Process (MPNP), which set the stage for the 1994 elections. At each stage, women developed strategies to increase their participation in the processes.

*Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA)*

On December 20, 1991, 238 delegates from 19 participating political parties came together before 1,000 observers for the first plenary session of a constitutional conference, the CODESA I plenary.<sup>45</sup>

Five working groups on various themes were established, and all participants signed an official Declaration of Intent pledging support for the process. As the working groups got under way, there was extensive interaction and consultation with national NGOs and community-based civil society groups.

Women were distinctly underrepresented in the CODESA process. Only five percent of representatives were women, prompting veteran parliamentarian Helen Suzman to overtly criticize the parties, comparing gender discrimination to racism.<sup>46</sup> This pushed all sides to become more representative and culminated in the creation of the Gender Advisory Committee, which was formed to scrutinize documents emerging from the working groups, and to integrate gender perspectives and women’s experiences.<sup>47</sup>

The height of the ANC women’s national mobilization campaign coincided with the CODESA process. In 1992, Ginwala and Anne Letsepe convened the Women’s National Coalition (WNC), bringing

together a hundred national organizations. It was the first time that representatives from across the nation’s political spectrum met in public. The WNC launched a nationwide consultation program with women. Described as “one of the most participatory research campaigns ever to have been conducted in South Africa,” the WNC embarked on an effort to codify the needs and aspirations of women throughout the country in the new constitution. An estimated 3 million women across the country participated in focus groups and discussions.<sup>48</sup> Their demands culminated in a 12-point Women’s Bill of Rights that was not only used as a common agenda by women across the political spectrum, but also became a key source for the constitution.<sup>49</sup>

In April 1992, the CODESA II plenary was convened, but tensions among parties and the impasse in the negotiations of working groups led to the collapse of the entire process, as the ANC mobilized mass support and the government retaliated with violence. The international community became increasingly engaged. By July 1992, Cyrus Vance, the Special Representative

of the UN Secretary General, was told to investigate the violence and mediate the resumption of talks. In the months that followed, ANC and National Party leaders engaged in a

series of bilateral and multilateral discussions, resulting in an agreement to restart multi-party negotiations.

Throughout the CODESA period, in dialogue with civil society, the ANC was also constructing its platform on various policy issues. In May 1992, the movement released *Ready to Govern: Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa*—its campaign manifesto. The influence of the ANC women’s advocacy was evident throughout the document. The introduction itself stated clearly that

To develop a truly South African vision of our country, one which is not distorted by the prejudices and sectarianism that has guided viewpoints on race and *gender* [emphasis added] in the past . . . we have to rely on the wisdom, life experiences, talents, and know-how of all South Africans, *women and men* [emphasis added]. There can be no “apartheid” in finding solutions to the problems created by apartheid.<sup>50</sup>

*An estimated 3 million women across the country participated in focus groups and discussions.*

This echoed women's objectives documented in the 1990 *Malibongwe Programme of Action* to create "a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic South Africa."<sup>51</sup> In *Ready to Govern*, the ANC formally embraced the notion that race- and sex-based discrimination were equally unacceptable. Women had "argued that the liberation of women could not be separated from national liberation. . . ." <sup>52</sup> Non-sexism, the emancipation of women, and the need to create special agencies to ensure implementation of equal opportunity policies were adopted by the ANC in *Ready to Govern* as part of a broad set of principles necessary for the transition and new government.

#### *Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP)*

On April 1, 1993, following intense confidential talks, the formal Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) opened with 26 parties, including political groups and representatives of national and homeland governments, as well as traditional leaders. Six technical committees were formed to address violence, fundamental human rights, constitutional issues, discriminatory legislation, issues relating to a transitional council, and the media. Members were non-partisan experts with a mandate to reflect on the issues, taking into account divergent viewpoints and concerns, and to develop compromise solutions. Reports from the Technical Committee were passed to a ten-person Planning Committee with a mandate to draft resolutions. The Negotiating Council, comprised of two delegates per party, then considered these resolutions. Much of the critical work was done by this council, which ultimately fed its decisions to the highest-ranking structure—a 208-member, 26-party plenary.

A major difference between CODESA and the MPNP was the involvement of the WNC, which united women across the political parties in the MPNP. Through this coalition, women politicians from smaller parties encouraged their ANC counterparts to demand 50 percent female representation in the MPNP.<sup>53</sup> The ANC women took the issue to their male leaders and succeeded in having it passed. In turn, the ANC leadership pressured other negotiating parties to include 50 percent women. Eventually, as the MPNP began its work, one of the two representatives per party in the Negotiating Council was required to be a woman. If the parties did not have female members, the seat was left empty.<sup>54</sup> The same principle was adopted for the advisors to the teams, although there was some flexibility regarding expertise on particular issues.

Women representatives in the MPNP also formed a multi-party Women's Caucus. As the negotiations progressed, they used the caucus to strategize on issues ranging from dealing with condescending male colleagues and a hostile media to adopting common positions on issues under discussion.<sup>55</sup> The caucus drew on the expertise and research generated by women's groups and the WNC to put forward their proposals.<sup>56</sup>

By November 1993 a framework for governing emerged that included an Interim Constitution (IC), an Electoral Act calling for elections in 1994, and a list of transitional institutions, including a Transitional Executive Council (TEC), which was given a mandate to share power with the government until elections were held.

According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Judith Sefi Attah, the TEC's role was to work in conjunction with local and national governing authorities to facilitate the transition to democracy by eliminating impediments to legitimate political activities and by promoting conditions conducive to free and fair elections.<sup>57</sup> Seven sub-councils were established to address regional and local governments, law and order, stability and security, defense, finance, foreign affairs, and the status of women. The sensitivity and awareness regarding women is noteworthy in the TEC Parliamentary Act of 1993, which mandated that the Sub-Council on the Status of Women review and ensure gender sensitivity in the reports of the other sub-councils.

The IC provided rules for the two-year, constitution-making process, including mandatory principles to be included in the final constitution and mechanisms to break deadlock. The IC was widely recognized to constitute a positive framework "whose contents represented significant gains for women in South Africa."<sup>58</sup> It called for the creation of a Commission for Gender Equality, which now makes up the National Machinery on Women. Two of the mandatory principles prohibited gender discrimination and promoted gender equality.

#### *Elections and a New Constitution*

By the end of the negotiations, women had ensured that gender equality was one of the key principles of the new democracy.<sup>59</sup> But the battle for representation within the political parties was not yet over. With significant pressure from the ANC women, the party finally instituted a 30 percent quota on its list for representatives to parliament.<sup>60</sup> In April 1994, multi-

### **Sub-Council on the Status of Women in the Transitional Executive Council (TEC)**

The TEC Parliamentary Act of 1993, states explicitly that the Council shall, for the purpose of attaining its objects, with a view to the full and equal participation of women in the preparation for, the implementation of and the transition to a free and democratic order in South Africa . . . have the following powers to be exercised through its Sub-Council on the Status of Women:

- To liaise with and advise all participants in the Council, all sub-councils, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, Governments, relevant departments of State, local governments, traditional authorities and policy-making forums;
- To propose amendments to existing or proposed legislation and facilitate the implementation of such legislation;
- To request information and make formal and substantive representations regarding any decision or action referred to in section 13 (2) (a);
- To liaise with all employee and employer organizations, all groups of women (in particular rural women and women under customary unions) and any other relevant organizations and structures;
- To investigate any matter affecting the status of women and relating to the objects of the Council, for which purpose it shall have the authority to interview any officer or employee of any participant in the Council or of any regional or local government;
- To commission research;
- To promote and monitor educational programmes regarding the participation of women in the electoral process;
- To ensure that positive, practical steps are taken to enable all women to exercise fully their right to—
  - vote in all elections and public referendums, be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies and freely participate in the political, public and electoral processes at all levels in South Africa;
  - participate in the formulation and implementation of policy at all levels of government and in the Council;
  - equal opportunity in the appointment to, participation in, election to and promotion within all structures at all levels of government;
  - and be free from intimidation and harassment;
- To make recommendations to all participants in the Council, the other sub-councils, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, the National Peace Secretariat, policymaking forums, all statutory commissions and all electoral educational programmes on steps to promote the free and equal participation of women in the electoral process; and
- To submit proposals to the Sub-Council on Finance and the relevant departments of State in regard to the 1994/95 budget on the allocation of resources for the promotion of the equality of women and their participation at all levels of government, including appropriate programmes and mechanisms.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Attah.

racial, democratic elections were held for the first time in South Africa. The National Assembly unanimously elected Nelson Mandela as president on May 9, 1994.<sup>61</sup> The ANC won 64 percent of parliamentary seats, the NP 20 percent, the IFP 10 percent, and the remaining parties 6 percent.<sup>62</sup> Across the political spectrum, women won 28 percent of parliamentary seats; of the 252 ANC representatives, 90 were women (36 percent).<sup>63</sup>

The Constitutional Assembly, made up of the National Assembly and the Senate, was charged with drafting the final constitution. The drafting process was exceptional as it was formulated around overarching principles of inclusivity, accessibility, and transparency.<sup>64</sup> To meet each of these requirements, the Constitutional Assembly distributed more than 4 million copies of the working draft constitution, integrated the proposals of individuals and civil society, and made all deliberations open to the public and the media. In sum, “the public participation initiatives helped to create a strong sense of ownership of the constitution among the public. . . .”<sup>65</sup> On October 11, 1996, the constitution was overwhelmingly accepted by the Constitutional Assembly.

As 28 percent of parliamentarians were women, there were many more women involved in the Constitutional Assembly than had been involved in the pre-election negotiations process. In addition, non-parliamentarian women were included as gender technical experts brought in to assist in the constitutional drafting process. As described by Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, a member of South Africa’s National Assembly,

women played a remarkable role in the drafting of the new South African Constitution. . . . [It] protects many critical rights for women, including the right to equality; the right to freedom and security of the person (including the right to freedom from

violence); the right to make decisions concerning reproduction, and the right to security and control over one’s own body.<sup>66</sup>

Building on the foundations of the constitution, South Africa continued to strengthen the role of women through various structures, including:

1. An Office on the Status of Women to coordinate the implementation of gender policies and programs throughout the government;
2. Gender units (or focal points) within government departments and in some provinces;
3. A Commission on Gender Equality, first mandated by the Interim Constitution, to act as a “watchdog” on government and private sector policies;<sup>67</sup> and
4. Within the legislature, a multi-party caucus and parliamentary committee on gender equality, as well as a Women’s Empowerment Unit to train and support women parliamentarians.

In 1994, when the first cabinet of the Government of National Unity convened, 4 of the 27 ministers (15 percent) and 8 of the 14 deputy ministers (57 percent) were women.<sup>68</sup> In the legislative branch, Dr. Frene Ginwala was appointed speaker of the National Assembly. Baleka Kgositsile, another ANC woman leader, was later appointed deputy speaker. Of the 35 chairpersons of portfolio committees in 1994, 10 were women.<sup>69</sup> Although women parliamentarians were primarily assigned social welfare portfolios (health, welfare, housing), they were present in every key committee. Many of the ANC’s leading women, who had engaged on security issues during the negotiations, became members of the defense and intelligence committees. They took on the challenge of bringing new perspectives to issues that had been overwhelmingly dominated by men.

## PART TWO: FROM TOTAL STRATEGY TO HUMAN SECURITY

Apartheid South Africa, while not an overt police state, was heavily militarized. By the time of the transition, the policy of “total strategy,” formulated in the 1970s, permeated every aspect of the social, political, and economic landscape.<sup>70</sup> For two decades, the South African state was geared towards fighting a “communist” threat, “terrorism,” and “revolution.” These assumptions were accepted without question throughout the government, military, intelligence services, police, and affiliated bodies such as think tanks. In effect, it was a convenient catch-all for any form of opposition or resistance to the state.

The security establishment was oriented to address the perceived threat. White communities were mobilized for counterrevolutionary war. Attempts were made to co-opt urban and middle class black and colored communities. Destabilization of neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe was a pillar of apartheid’s regional policies. As “total strategy” took hold, military influence over the political arena, the media, and the economy increased.

By the late 1980s, defense spending represented approximately 25 percent of the national budget and 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).<sup>71</sup> White adult men faced two compulsory years in the military and an additional 14 years of intermittent service.<sup>72</sup> The defense industry constituted the largest manufacturing sector. The state had nuclear capabilities and, while the government in power was civilian in appearance, the military dominated policy functions. Defense forces had “first-call” on the state budget, and development objectives were linked directly to state security.<sup>73</sup>

The move toward demilitarization began only in 1989 when de Klerk assumed the presidency. Defense spending was cut by 40 percent, conscription was reduced, the state disarmed its nuclear capabilities, and greater civilian control was asserted over the military.<sup>74</sup> While significant, these steps were only a start and did not address the foundations of the security sector.

### Conceptualizing a New Security Paradigm

As the possibility of victory became more real, the ANC began to prepare for South Africa’s internal transformation. While the movement had a clear political stance in terms of its demands for a plural democracy, it had not articulated its policies on national defense and security. Nonetheless, given the history

and role of the security sector in maintaining the apartheid regime, it was clear that the management of this sector would be key to a successful and sustainable transition.

With the “white only” SADF dominating the political arena and gaining control over the leadership of the National Party, the challenges facing the ANC were conceptual and practical. In creating the MK in 1961, the ANC’s leadership was explicit that the forces would be subordinate to the ANC’s political leadership, regard the enemy in “non-racial” terms, and draw support from all quarters. The political dimensions of the struggle were also emphasized in the training given to all recruits. As James Ngculu, a former MK officer, now a parliamentarian, writes:

The commissars were responsible for the political, social, and cultural life of the soldier. He or she had to be an ideologue of the organization who fully understood the policies of the ANC and was capable of communicating them to the soldiers. The commissar also had to be fully informed about and conversant with the international political situation. Some said a commissar was like a mother of the soldiers. . . . The political education emphasized that the enemy should not be defined simply in racial terms. The ANC educated its cadres in the four pillars of revolution. That is: the underground; armed struggle; mass mobilization; international mobilization.<sup>75</sup>

As the talks developed in 1989, the ANC highlighted its three key principles regarding the role and function of any future army in South Africa: civilian control of military forces, non-racism, and loyalty to the constitution rather than to any political party.<sup>76</sup> In May 1990, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa facilitated the first meeting between ANC (and MK) members and representatives of the South African military establishment, including retired and current officers, researchers, and analysts. SADF representatives were particularly concerned that in the event of a transition to a new government, there be no “Nuremberg-style” trials for military personnel.

Despite differences, progress was made. Most importantly, for the first time the South African military delegation realized that the MK was an army dedicated to supporting a non-racial democratic government, not a “ragtag” uneducated guerrilla force. There was agree-



ment that South Africa would eventually need a small, integrated defense force with allegiance to the constitution. Parties also agreed that rather than trials, new structures were needed to address atrocities and crimes against humanity committed in the name of the apartheid regime.<sup>77</sup> These agreements facilitated the path towards the formal negotiations and the National Peace Accord.

As the formal negotiations got under way, the ANC worked closely with academics and anti-apartheid activists—many of whom were women and participants in the anti-conscription movement—on security issues. They were drawn to the new discourse on “human security” that was emerging from Canada and Europe, and began to promote the notion of developing a “new security paradigm.” The Military Research Group (MRG), founded by Cock and Nathan, was perhaps the most influential entity in developing and testing ideas for the ANC. Other influential NGOs included the Ceasefire Campaign (an offshoot of the anti-conscription movement), again largely led by women that promoted demilitarization, and the Institute for Defence Policy later renamed the Institute for Security Studies, which had a more traditional view of security issues.

Throughout the CODESA process, these think tanks were at the forefront, promoting public debates and forums for dialogue on a range of issues pertaining to the development of policies for the former liberation movement. During this period, NGOs and even community-based organizations had the opportunity to engage and influence national policy positions. Though security discussions were often closed, there were opportunities for civil society groups to engage and help shape the positions of the ANC and other organizations.<sup>78</sup>

*“Ready to Govern: Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa”*

Publication of the ANC’s *Ready to Govern* manifesto in 1992 marked the beginning of successful efforts to alter the thinking on national security and defense issues. The document proposed embracing four core interrelated values: democracy and civilian authority, human security, anti-militarism, and gender equality. While there was little detail regarding implementation, the principles outlined in the manifesto created a new framework for future discussions on security.

*1. Democracy and Civilian Authority*

The introduction of *Ready to Govern* articulated the transformation of the closed, dominant security system as fundamental to a new government. “The South African security institutions themselves developed a racist, closed, secretive, undemocratic structure, lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The process of democratization under way in our country will not be complete without addressing this problem.”<sup>79</sup> The document outlined steps that must be taken to change the security system overall, the police, the intelligence services, and the military. In particular, requirements for a “democratic” security system included civilian authority and oversight, public scrutiny, open debate, accountability to the public, community support and participation, and the right to information.

*2. Human Security*

*Ready to Govern* notes that the challenge is “not only [to address] the security institutions and their composition, but also to go deeper and address the very nature of security policy itself.”<sup>80</sup> Security, it posits, should not be limited to military, police, and intelligence services alone, but should have political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions. While skeptics argued that this approach was similar to that of “total strategy” that had led to the militarization of society in the first place, the ANC’s position was radically different. In its interpretation, not only was a militarized society rejected, but the very concept of security was “demilitarized” by embracing the paradigm of human security, noting:

[u]nderdevelopment, poverty, lack of democratic participation and the abuse of human rights are regarded as grave threats to the security of the people. Since they invariably give rise to conflict between individuals, communities and countries, they threaten the security of states as well.<sup>81</sup>

*3. Anti-Militarism*

In the opening paragraphs on peace and security, *Ready to Govern* explicitly presents the ANC’s views on the nature of defense and security policies in the apartheid state.

As a result of its total strategy, the whole of the South African state and society became militarized. National security was pursued primarily through military and paramilitary means. The effect of this approach to security is evident: high levels of violence and crime, economic decline, regional arms

ances, destabilization and perpetual insecurity throughout the sub-continent.<sup>82</sup>

To counter this, the movement presented itself as overtly anti-militaristic. With statements such as “South Africa shall be committed to resolving internal and external conflict, primarily through nonviolent means,”<sup>83</sup> it situated principles of nonviolent conflict resolution and anti-militarism at the nucleus of its defense and security policy. These ideals are also reflected in its position vis-à-vis the regional and international context, whereby the ANC pledged to break with the apartheid regime’s foreign policy and maintain a defensive force without nuclear capabilities.

#### *4. Gender Equality and Non-Sexism*

Finally, the reference to gender equality in the context of peace and security is quite exceptional, echoing the vision for a new government based on “non-racism” and “non-sexism” set forth by women in the 1990 Malibongwe Programme of Action. In detailing the nature and role of the defense, police, and intelligence forces, *Ready to Govern* reiterates that these bodies “shall respect the ideals of democracy, non-racialism, [and] non-sexism.” To assist in achieving these goals, the ANC concludes, “security institutions shall reflect the national and gender composition of South African society.”<sup>84</sup> Recognizing the challenges facing non-whites and women in relation to gaining a foothold in the new security institutions, the document repeatedly states, “a programme of affirmative action shall be implemented.”<sup>85</sup>

### **Negotiating Security Transformation**

Although *Ready to Govern* was the ANC’s key position paper, the views expressed on military and security issues indicate that various segments of society and interest groups contributed to its development. In the complex process of negotiation prior to and after the 1994 elections, more traditionalist perspectives emerging from the military overshadowed some of the more idealistic components of the manifesto. Nonetheless, subsequent documents and policies remain largely rooted in these core values.

#### *1. The Interim Constitution*

The foundation for negotiations on security was outlined in the IC in November 2003. Article 227 of the IC included provisions regarding civilian control of the military. The IC mandated the creation of a single national defense force. It also delegated new authorities over security issues to the parliament with the establish-

ment of a combined Joint Standing Committee on Defence in the Senate and National Assembly.

#### *2. Negotiations at the TEC Sub-Council on Defence and the JMCC*


The details pertaining to the new structures were negotiated in the Sub-Council on Defence and the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC) within the TEC. Negotiations focused largely on the integration of the SADF with other armed groups including the MK, four homeland defense forces, and, eventually, the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). In these discussions, decisions were also made regarding the demobilization and rationalization of forces, and the formation of the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), which formally replaced the SADF on the eve of the national elections in April 1994.

Looking forward to the next decade, the JMCC conducted a defense situation analysis, formulated strategies, and planned for implementation through multi-party working groups organized around functional themes.<sup>86</sup>

The JMCC also solicited input from academics and policymaking institutions throughout their negotiations process, but particularly around the creation of the new defense ministry. A Ministry of Defence Working Group was established that included non-partisan civilian and defense experts whose proposals facilitated the eventual agreement; the working group was “a good mechanism for avoiding tensions that could have developed among the military negotiators.”<sup>87</sup>

After much debate, a “balanced model” was accepted<sup>88</sup> wherein it was agreed that the Defense Secretary would head the Defence Secretariat (the civilian component of the defense ministry), while the Chief of the SANDF would head the military component. It was also agreed that the Defense Secretary, not the SANDF Chief, would be the accounting office for the department. This was an important departure from the past. Both would report to the Minister of Defence, who would be responsible for political aspects of defense. It was also agreed that the Ministry of Defence would formulate policy. This shift, too, stemmed from the IC’s demand for parliamentary oversight. “[The parliamentary] committee was empowered to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organization, armaments, policy, morale, and state of preparedness of the defense force.”<sup>89</sup>

## Department of Defence Organizational Chart Annual Report 2001/2002



Source: South Africa Department of Defence. *Annual Report 2001/2002*. Pretoria: DoD, 2002.  
30 June 2004 <<http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Frame/Frame.htm>>.

Following the April 1994 elections, ANC member Joe Modise was appointed Minister of Defence. Soon after taking office, Modise advanced the proposals for the “balanced model” for cabinet’s approval, including other offices and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence in consultations.

### 3. The Final Constitution

The Government of National Unity, as noted by Gavin Cawthra, “adopted a far more robust and hands-on approach to security than anything seen in South Africa for several decades.”<sup>90</sup> This involvement became enshrined in the final constitution, which was signed in October 1996. In particular, the governing principle of Chapter 11 on Security Services concludes that “national security is subject to the authority of parliament and the national executive.”<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, it notes: “to give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees must have oversight of all security services. . . .” The constitution clearly established accountability and

civilian control of the defense bodies, the police, and the intelligence units. In addition, “At the ANC’s insistence virtually all committee meetings are held in public and non-parliamentarians are invited to make inputs.”<sup>92</sup>

### 4. Normative Change: The White Paper on Defence

Simultaneous with negotiation of the constitution was the Government of National Unity’s development of policy frameworks through the drafting of white papers by ministries. The new secretariat within the Ministry of Defence outsourced the drafting of a white paper on defense to Laurie Nathan of the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Capetown. Given Nathan’s prior involvement in shaping the ANC’s human security paradigm during the transition period, his involvement in the drafting of a formal governmental policy paper was significant. He worked closely with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence to produce a first draft, which was widely distributed and commented on by civil society and the defense indus-

try. A second draft was finalized by the Minister of Defence, presented to the cabinet on May 8, 1996, and approved by parliament shortly thereafter.

In Nathan's own words, *The White Paper on Defence for the Republic of South Africa* "marks a fundamental break with the aggressive and repressive strategies of the National Party government during several decades. It seeks to bring defense policy into line with the new democratic dispensation. . . ."93 Chapters within the White Paper address the challenge of transformation; civil-military relations; the strategic environment; the role and functions of defense; human resources, including affirmative action; budgetary considerations; arms control and the defense industry; and environmental issues.<sup>94</sup> The overarching theme, he notes "is the transformation of defence policy and the SANDF."<sup>95</sup>

Drawing extensively on the principles outlined in *Ready to Govern* and those in the IC, the White Paper reaffirms "a framework for democratic civil-military relations" and the "control and oversight" by the elected parliament, and pledges transparency in defense policies and military activities.<sup>96</sup> National security is framed around the political, social, economic, and cultural rights of South African people, and through peaceful coexistence and cooperation with regional states. The SANDF is explicitly mandated to have a "defensive posture." The White Paper also commits South Africa to the 'goals of arms control and disarmament,' including efforts to prevent the spread of small arms, conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. It also states that force levels and military budgets would be determined after taking into account social and economic priorities. Adherence to international humanitarian and human rights laws are also explicit goals, and South Africa's willingness to participate in international peacekeeping and support operations is noted.

Nathan notes, "Many of the principles are explicitly anti-militarist. The only suggestion of a contrary tendency is the reference to the SANDF being "a technologically advanced military force."<sup>97</sup> As commentator David Black wrote, the White Paper was "quite revisionist, if not radical, in its insistence on the centrality of the security of the *people* as the country's first priority. . . ."98

Ideals such as a "non-racial, non-sexist, and non-discriminatory institutional culture" for the new armed forces are also listed as a "principle of defence in a democracy" as derived from the constitution.<sup>99</sup> It calls

for affirmative action and equal opportunity programs. Indeed, the White Paper also contains significant provisions related to women's rights and gender equality. It states that "the [defence ministry] acknowledges the right of women to serve in all ranks and positions, including combat roles."<sup>100</sup> According to Nathan, the old military leadership staunchly opposed the provision to allow women in combat roles. Nonetheless the provision stood; unless women were able to serve in combat roles, they would not be able to occupy the most senior positions in the military. Similarly, the White Paper asserts the obligation of the ministry to identify and eliminate discriminatory practices and attitudes in the SANDF, paving the way for the subsequent Defence Act to classify sexual harassment and discrimination as criminal offences.

### **Women's Voices, Women's Actions: Shaping Concepts of National Security**

Just as they ensured their voices were heard on other issues, women made significant contributions to the conceptual and practical development of security sector transformation. Their influence in developing and articulating a new security paradigm are evident on three levels: as academics and activists, as members of the MK and ANC leadership, and as voices from the grassroots.

#### *Academics and Activists*

A relatively small group of anti-apartheid, anti-militarist white women were influential in promoting demilitarization as a basic tenet of a viable democracy. As leaders of groups such as Black Sash and the Ceasefire Campaign—an offshoot of the anti-conscription movement—they called for a reduction in military expenditures, a transfer of resources to development, disarmament, and the elimination of the arms industry in South Africa.<sup>101</sup> As a co-founder of the ANC-aligned MRG group, the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), and member of the NGOs Ceasefire and Gun-Free South Africa, Jacklyn Cock played a central role in this process. While military strategists focused primarily on quantitative factors such as the size of the military, budgets, and weaponry, Cock was among the first South Africans to reveal and criticize the extensive militarized nature of the apartheid state. "We have to dismantle the ideology of militarism—the notion that violence is a legitimate solution to the conflict," she wrote in 1989. In her academic and advocacy work, Cock stressed the links between demilitarization and democ-

racy, emphasizing that militarized states siphon power and resources away from development, cause ecological damage, and destroy social structures. Interviewed in 1999, Cock notes that there was a convergence of interests between a powerful military establishment and the relatively small demilitarization movement in South Africa.

It's an interesting convergence of interests which, I think, is what gives us our potential. . . . The impetus to rationalization means that there is a convergence of interests between the military establishment, which needs to rationalize in terms of defence budget cuts, and the demilitarization movement.<sup>102</sup>

Although the SADF exerted pressure and controlled implementation, the emphasis on disarmament and demilitarization is present in the 1996 White Paper. Reflecting on the influence of the small think tanks in 1999 Gavin Cawthra, who was a member of MRG, noted,

The collapse of Total Strategy and the discrediting of the existing security establishment allowed a small group of visionary activist academics based in NGOs or in the ANC to make a considerable impact on policy. . . . the White Paper did represent a remarkable compromise, essentially between those promoting demilitarization and disarmament (and the institutional interests which naturally supported a strong defence force . . . ).<sup>103</sup>

In the discourse on demilitarization, Cock and Penny McKenzie were also the leading voices on the links between military use of land and environmental damage. GEM and the Center for Conflict Resolution, Cock wrote in 2001, "played a crucial role in placing [military land and environmental issues] on the policy agenda."<sup>104</sup> She further credits both groups for their capacity-building work in communities to address contamination issues resulting from land mines.<sup>105</sup>

A question that does arise is whether or not Cock's and other women leaders' views on demilitarization can be attributed to their being women. In reviewing their

work, gender consciousness is clearly an important motivator. In her 1993 book, *Women and War in South Africa*, Cock reflects on the gender dimensions of the South African conflict. "I have come to believe that understanding war involves examining the military and its power in society."<sup>106</sup> She writes, "understanding the military involves examining gender relations. . . . The military mobilizes gender identities."<sup>107</sup> She further notes that "of course people's experiences were also colored by a variety of other social factors such as ideology, race, class and ethnic identity. But gender is a crucial and neglected dimension."<sup>108</sup> Analyzing the nature of Black Sash, one of the oldest women's human rights organizations in South Africa, Cock states that the founders were not motivated by political ideology, but a concern for their relatives in detention. "It is this sense that 'motherhood' was a mobilizing role. It was the connection between motherhood and

powerlessness that seems to have led to support for radical political change and sometimes to support for revolutionary violence."<sup>109</sup>

Adele Kirsten, a founding member of the apartheid-era End Conscription Campaign (ECC), notes that while the immediate focus of the campaign was to end

conscription, its vision was to ban conscription altogether. They were among the key advocates for this and influenced the ANC agenda. Kirsten also highlights the relationship between gender, race, and class in South Africa. Reflecting on the Campaign's work, she says:

We were ordinary privileged white youth, who wanted to play our part in ridding our society of the injustice of apartheid. Our campaign essentially challenged the very identity of the white male at the time . . . its primary aim was to resist the idea of white men defending the indefensible—the injustice of apartheid and in this way it undermined the efforts of the military. Conscription was the one thing that reminded whites that they were living in a war situation. It was the price they paid for continuing to support apartheid.<sup>110</sup>

*"Our campaign essentially challenged the very identity of the white male at the time . . . its primary aim was to resist the idea of white men defending the indefensible—the injustice of apartheid and in this way it undermined the efforts of the military." – Adele Kirsten*

*Feminist Influences*

In addition to being conscious about gender dimensions of militarization, adherence to feminist ideology also motivated some of these activists. In her research and writing, Cock traces feminist influences in South Africa. While acknowledging that equal access and opportunity for women was an important first step, she notes that pacifist feminists, such as Virginia Woolf, “sought equality between the sexes not through admitting women to combat, but rather through liberating men from militarism.”<sup>111</sup> Cock extends this argument to the case of South Africa and South African women: “We need to go further and extend debates about the position of women within institutions such as the military to debates about the position of the military within society. . . . This involves reclaiming the transformational potential of feminism.”<sup>112</sup>

Moreover, Cock makes the link between the values espoused by “transformational” feminism and those embraced by advocates of human security.

We need to reclaim the notion that feminism involves a comprehensive agenda – demilitarization, including disarmament, a clean environment, sustainable development, the affirmation and appreciation of “difference”, the elimination of material disadvantage. . . . Feminism . . . is a transformational politics, a struggle against all forms of violence and domination.<sup>113</sup>

Although women were not the majority of ANC advisers on issues of security, there are clear indications that the women who were involved brought with them distinct consciousness about the gender, race, and class dimensions of militarism, and were influenced by feminist and pacifist ideologies. It is also evident that they significantly influenced the conceptualization of security.

*Women as Members and Leaders of the ANC and MK*

Women members of the ANC and those who served in the MK were critical to the development and transformation of the security agenda. They were extremely supportive of using human security as the normative

framework for national security. This was primarily due to their political training within the movement, where they had developed a solid grounding in the broad political understanding of the movement, including the interrelationship between gender, class, and race oppression. For many, their exposure to developments in neighboring countries, including Zambia and Tanzania, also shaped their political thinking and gender consciousness. Jenny Schreiner, ANC member and Chair of the Constitutional Committee on Security Services, says they were able to exert influence because they were “coming through the mainstream political party. They [could] hold their own in the leadership structures of those parties.” She adds,

We have been extremely fortunate in having a contingent of women in South Africa who have a fun-

*“We have been extremely fortunate in having a contingent of women in South Africa who have a fundamentally deep understanding of the interactions between gender, race and class oppression” . . . . – Jenny Schreiner*

damentally deep understanding of the interactions between gender, race and class oppression . . . and the manner in which they reinforce each other in South Africa . . . and [they] have been able to . . . assert a gender perspective on foreign and security policies.

Schreiner reflects that in the ANC delegation men also added gender perspective to the talks; women were not the sole champions of the human security framework. But she notes the women “wouldn’t allow anyone to budge off the issues.”

For example, Thenjiwe Mtintso<sup>114</sup> played an important political role in the TEC process . . . she has been able to [negotiate] on security issues with a political credibility that actually gets issues very seriously understood. . . . It is also very significant that she is somebody, who has been right, right, right at the forefront of South Africa’s gender issues. . . . I think she is responsible for why women have been able to play such a key role.

Deputy Minister of Defence Nozwise Madlala-Routledge, the first woman and Quaker to hold a senior defense post, concurs: “the [approach] that women brought into the discussions was that security is a broad issue. It is not simply about state security, but it is about human security where the security of the

person, of the individual, is part of the whole equation.”

Although the ANC and MK women found common ground and values with the academic activist groups, there were key areas of divergence. Many of them, particularly those with a military background, were not entirely supportive of the radical pacifist agenda. For them, armed action was a necessary part of the struggle for liberation. As in other liberation struggles, women’s motivations for joining the war against apartheid were largely framed by their gender role in working to improve the lives of future generations. Interestingly, both pacifists and MK women drew on their identities as mothers. Pacifists used it to advocate for the end to violence. Former MK women were known to say, “I’m a guerrilla because I’m a mother,”<sup>115</sup> in effect justifying their actions in the military as a means of ensuring a future free from oppression for their children.

Despite the rhetoric of gender equality within the ANC, many had experienced overt harassment and discrimination during their time in the MK, so they fought specifically for the inclusion of affirmative action policies to address sexism. Moreover, ANC and MK women were proud to have survived and succeeded in the forces. Thus, in the negotiations, they were particularly concerned with ensuring that the principle of equal opportunity for women in all spheres was respected and upheld. Madlala-Routledge links this demand for equal opportunity with the wider notion of human security, noting, “[the] issues of equal participation and representation are important components of this new security. You couldn’t have security that does not involve the population . . . that does not include women. . . .”

The same realism that led women to take part in the struggle shapes their attitudes towards the military. Says Modise, for example, “When other women realize that I chair this [Defence] committee, they assume I am a war monger. But I say, you can’t stand outside and say things without getting involved and being realistic about your demands for peace and security.”

She is also both conscious and proud of her links with and understanding of women’s concerns.

Sometimes when I talk, people hear an ex-soldier. But I want to believe that most of the time when I speak, it is a reflection of what other women say, because I have deliberately kept my roots within the ANC Women’s League . . . to lose it, would be to lose the support, the advice, and sometimes the shoulders of other women to cry to.

Modise notes that within the ANC there was a profound understanding of the difference between being a mass-based opposition movement and being responsible for governing the state. They considered the divergent views on the military, she says, and “whether or not we needed a national defense force.” For her, the

realistic approach, based on popular consensus, was that a national defense force was needed, “not only to defend the country, but also so that other parts of Africa could look to us for help.”<sup>116</sup>

Madlala-Routledge takes a somewhat different approach by framing the

promotion and preservation of peace as an integral function of defense and security structures. In this context she indicates that women’s participation matters. “The whole idea is that women have a positive contribution to make to the understanding of peace, [and] the process of making peace. So the women are helping shape policy . . . within the Department of Defence.”

#### *Grassroots Perspectives*

Women at the grassroots level and in rural areas comprise the third broad category of women who contributed to shaping aspects of the security policy. Their influence was not as explicit as those noted above. They were indirectly involved in the intellectual and conceptual processes, primarily through the consultations and workshops that MRG and other think tanks organized during the CODESA processes, and they were also present in the pre-election negotiations and post-1994 parliamentary activities. Interestingly, the issue of defense and security was not even an explicit point of reference for the WNC’s national

*“The [approach] that women brought into the discussions was that security is a broad issue. It is not simply about state security, but it is about human security where the security of the person, of the individual, is part of the whole equation.”*  
— Nozwise Madlala—Routledge

consultation process. Nonetheless, in reflecting on their own experiences and articulating their demands for greater freedom, equality in the eyes of law and society, the right to property ownership, access to safe housing, employment, education, and protection from violence, women embodied the spirit of “human security” as the basis for national security. Reflecting on the evolution of the human security paradigm, Frene Ginwala gives particular credit to women’s movements in Africa, for “[linking] the struggle for national independence and security to the struggle for equality and social equity.”<sup>117</sup>

As Modise suggests, South African women have drawn on their own experiences to define peace and security, and to identify priorities for moving forward. On one

hand she says women understand that “we can no longer think of peace without considering what constitutes security.” This comment refers to women’s sense of safety and security in their communities. The question for many women, says Modise is “am I secure when I cannot walk in the streets of Johannesburg at midnight? Definitely not. Therefore can I say that I am at peace?”<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, she credits women with having “acted as the conscience of the nation” in terms of military issues as well, and having embraced the principles of defense and conflict prevention, rather than armed action. “[They have] demanded that the defense force should not be a machine used against the people, but that its function should be broadened to include preventive and rescue work.”<sup>119</sup>



### PART 3: FROM POLICY TO OPERATION—WOMEN'S ROLES IN KEY INITIATIVES

With the 1996 White Paper as a normative framework for defense policies, operational changes began to take place. However, competing military and economic interests, coupled with social realities and political tensions have affected progress and the substance of the transformation. Conventional notions of militarized national security have, to some extent, subsumed the anti-militarist principles and the emphasis on human security outlined in the White Paper. The commitment to gender equality has continued under President Mbeki with high-level female appointments in the intelligence service and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. There has, however, been a noticeable move away from the participatory and open processes that defined the earlier years of the ANC's rule. There also has been a shift towards more conservative approaches to defense.

Despite these trends, women have led efforts to uphold the substantive priorities and procedural principles of the White Paper. Women parliamentarians have been at the front lines, challenging the executive, seeking to maintain an open and transparent system, engaging civil society, and demanding accountability from government and military institutions.

The discussions below highlight a number of initiatives to which women have contributed significantly and for which institutional mechanisms have been developed to promote gender perspectives and gender equality.

#### The Defence Review

Mandated by the White Paper, with participation by the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence and civilian experts, the Defence Review's goal was to outline operational details such as doctrine, force design and levels, logistics, armaments, equipment, human resources, and funding.<sup>120</sup> In 1995, with the White Paper still in draft form, the Minister of Defence established a Defence Review Working Group to identify strategies and assess the resources necessary to accomplish the White Paper's goals. It was also charged with developing a medium- to long-term planning framework. There was, wrote Rocky Williams (Director of Operations and Defence Policy in the Ministry of Defence at that time), particular concern that the process be "conducted in a transparent and accountable manner and should include a wide range of actors from the state, political society, and

civil society at both national and regional levels."<sup>121</sup> But at the outset, the group comprised only representatives from the Department of Defence.

Within the newly created defense structures, there were tensions between former apartheid-era civil servants and military personnel, and their ANC, former MK, and activist counterparts. Differences arose regarding the principles of transparency and public consultation, military policy and planning, procurement, and process. In an interview, Williams noted:

the moment the officers heard we were running this [Defence Review] process, . . . they immediately thought, "Oh, great. Here is our opportunity for a business plan." . . . They wanted to bring in consultants to help oversee matters. [There was] this managerial obsession—over-managed, under-lived process.

Thandi Modise (no relation to Joe Modise) recalls, "the Minister of Defence came in [to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence] and said, 'committee, please accept this [review plan]. We want to buy these ships.' We said, 'No. Go to the people.'" Committed to promoting transparency and inclusivity, Modise drew on the influence of the parliamentary committee and led the call for a national consultation as part of the Defence Review. "[Thandi] and I ran the review process together. It was incredibly consultative," affirms Williams.

In the months that followed, the Defence Secretariat went to great lengths to ensure public participation. Military planes and buses were used to transport religious and community leaders, NGO activists, and other civil society representatives to regional meetings and workshops. Using local facilities such as schools, the secretariat held dialogues and heard concerns from white farmers and mixed race communities. In the process, new issues emerged, such as the plight of dispossessed communities whose land had been seized for military use. "The land issue was a big issue," says Williams. "It [had] just slipped [by] us." Women representing rural NGOs were integral in highlighting a range of issues. "[They] would say, 'hey, you have to look at the question of how different communities in the different provinces are responding,'" recalls Williams.

By drawing attention to the impact of the military on rural communities, activists such as Penny McKenzie provided new perspectives on issues as diverse as the environmental impact of military use to problems of women's sexual harassment by military personnel. This altered the ways in which the secretariat addressed issues; they formed sub-committees to address land and environmental issues and addressed sexual harassment in discussions on human resources. "It would not have been highlighted as much if we had not had that level of consultation," notes Williams.

The outcomes of the Defence Review were disappointing to some anti-militaristic groups, particularly its

spending recommendations for the new SANDF. The review noted the decline in defense spending and recommended four models for new force design, each of which included re-equipping the SANDF.<sup>122</sup> Reflecting on the process, and noting that the security threats to South Africa were largely based on underdevelopment and crime, scholar David Black asks, "what sort of . . . military equipment did South Africa need?"<sup>123</sup> Despite these contradictions, the review was widely acknowledged to be a success. A primary goal of the consultation had been to build national consensus around defense issues and generate public legitimacy for the new security structures. By broadening the

### Key Outcomes of the Defence Review Process<sup>1</sup>

**Defensive posture:** The Review endorsed a doctrine based on a "strategic defensive posture," with the capacity to reverse offensive actions operationally.

**SANDF role:** The SANDF's primary function would be defense. The review stated that while the SANDF should have the capacity to fight a war against a similar power, it would retain this capacity only in "nucleus form" during peace time.

**Force design:** Given the budgetary restrictions, the services would include 22,000 full-time and 70,000 part-time personnel.

**Regional and international security cooperation:** The review reaffirmed South Africa's commitment to regional security and the SANDF's willingness to participate in international peace support operations, including peacemaking, peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement.

**Secondary functions:** The review outlined situations in which the SANDF would engage in supporting police and essential services, emphasizing that while, in general, these operations are "inefficient and politically unwise, they may be necessary under extreme situations".

**Organization:** The review detailed the structure of the Department of Defence (DoD) and secretariat.

**Personnel:** Beyond the numbers mentioned, the review emphasized the need for the DoD to be more representative of South African society. The review explicitly commits to the constitutional principles of non-discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation.

**Land and environment:** The review acknowledged the military's extensive use of land and outlined a strategy to link downsizing with involvement by local NGOs.

**Acquisitions:** The review radically departed from the apartheid-era policy of self-sufficiency in arms production. It stated that domestically only "strategically essential capabilities" were needed.

<sup>1</sup> Discussed in Cawthra "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security' . . ."

consultation to include South African citizens, this goal was achieved. “It took two years,” says Modise. “Everybody who had anything came forward. Women, pacifists, the right wing, communists—everybody had a say.”

### Promoting Gender Equality: Initiatives and Institutional Mechanisms

“The main assumption that formed the basis of the new SANDF policy,” wrote Lt. Col. Ellen Molekane, “was that the changes that were taking place in the country were profound, and were to develop into a general social change in the way society understood the role of women. It was impossible for the SANDF to escape this change.”<sup>124</sup>

Williams goes further, arguing that the defense sector’s ability to embrace gender equity is a critical indicator of the success of the sector’s transformation. Organizational, political, and institutional transformation are essential, he says, but “the fourth—[that] is cultural transformation—is the most difficult.” In terms of women, ultimately the environment has to be more conducive to accepting and respecting women, appreciating the value they add, and supporting their progress. Says Williams, “if people are not going to feel at home in that institution, you really have not succeeded.”

In facing these challenges, and in compliance with the constitution and the 1996 White Paper, the defense establishment—with women in key positions—has used various approaches to combat gender discrimination and promote women’s inclusion.

#### 1. Promoting Women’s Participation and Creating Role Models

The appointment of a female Quaker, Nowzizwe Madlala-Routledge, to the post of Deputy Defence Minister, along with other high-level female appointees in the Defence Secretariat, was a statement of commitment and intent on the part of the Mbeki government in 1999. Says Madlala-Routledge, “it is a

very positive message that we send to the department, the women are there and they are not just tokens . . . they are there to make a contribution.”

In 1999, approximately 20 percent of the Department of Defence (DoD) staff were women.<sup>125</sup> By 2002, 14.5 percent of SANDF uniformed personnel were women, the majority of whom were non-white.<sup>126</sup> Women can serve in combat and women crews exist in the army, navy, and air force, including as trainee fighter pilots and submarine commanders. Women have been deployed on operational duties as part of an infantry division in KwaZulu-Natal. Vice Admiral Johan Retief, Chief of the South African Navy, notes that the presence of women in the navy alongside men has

improved the general environment and spirit on ships. “It seems to work better, because it is a more balanced environment. The women bring another aspect of their lives to the ship. The general behavior of women is more civilized.” This is important on a daily level, he notes. “If a sailor has lost family and is grieving, women pick up on it.” Even in terms of health and well-being,

*“The main assumption that formed the basis of the new SANDF policy was that the changes that were taking place in the country were profound, and were to develop into a general social change in the way society understood the role of women. It was impossible for the SANDF to escape this change.”*  
— Lt. Col. Ellen Molekane

Retief argues that women add value. “I was watching a young lady who was in a ship . . . preparing a meal. And she went to great lengths to make good wholesome food. You have the concept that the people are happier.” Retief also asserts that women in the navy tend to have higher standards, and as a result, are more effective role models. “There are fewer women going to sleep down on the job. If you have a person who acts well-disciplined on a ship, that person has a habit of having people around him who are also acting well. So they become important role models.”

For Madlala-Routledge, the presence of women in the forces—as border guards, soldiers, pilots, or commanders—is another means of fostering and promoting human security. It impacts public perception regarding women. “It changes the images of women as being weak,” she says. Instead, women are seen as protectors and providers of security. This “changes the whole population and their understanding of security.”

## 2. Training

In addition to being given the same benefits and career choices as men, women are offered the same academic and physical training as men. They are separated only by rank for their formative leadership training. Reflecting on the joint training, Retief notes its broader role in helping to address some of the deep-rooted sexism that prevails in South African society.

The fact that we do our basic training with men and women together in the same group in the same ports is of godly importance. In the process, sailors also learn that women are members of the population, the community to be respected. They are to be treated as equals, which is not [always the] norm.

## 3. Policies for Promoting Gender Equality and Addressing Discrimination

To promote gender equality and address discrimination issues, Col. Molekane highlights a number of specific policies that have been established within the SANDF.<sup>127</sup>

- Policies regarding the promotion of women include:
  - Ensuring that women are involved in every structure, at every level, including strategic planning, command, and decision making in order to gradually break down male-dominated structures and tendencies within the SANDF;
  - Advancing women through training and equal opportunity provisions;
  - Introducing gender education and training for all personnel and civic education that incorporates discussion of sexual discrimination and harassment, as well as assessment of gender sensitivity in procedures relating to recruitment and promotion.
- Policies addressing past discrimination include:
  - Standardizing shoulder insignias worn by men and women (in the past women wore smaller insignias).

- Eliminating pregnancy as grounds for dismissal.
- Allowing promotions for women who are on maternity leave for up to one year (in the past this was forbidden).

## 4. Mechanisms

Within the DoD, a range of different mechanisms and initiatives foster the implementation of the policies noted above. They include:

- **A Gender Focal Point:** To monitor and support the implementation of affirmative action and gender-equality policies, a “Gender Focal Point” (GFP) or “Gender Sub-Directorate” position was created under the auspices of the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD). As stated by the Department of Defence, the GFP liaises with all structures within the department. Depending upon the issue, the GFP can report to the Council on Defence (comprised of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the SANDF, and the Secretary of Defence), the Secretary of Defence (through the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate), the SANDF Chief, or the Office on the Status of Women (part of the Office of the Presidency of South Africa). Its objectives are to:<sup>128</sup>
  - Ensure that all services and divisions implement the national policies on women’s empowerment and gender equality;
  - Promote gender awareness in the DoD (e.g. relating to sexual harassment, gender-based violence, gender equity, and law);
  - Conduct and coordinate gender training;
  - Monitor DoD programs and policies to ensure consistency with gender policies;
  - Monitor DoD statistics for gender representation;
  - Liaise with civil society.
- **The Gender Forum:** To implement gender policies at the lower levels of the DoD, the GFP established

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 – Vice Admiral J.F. Retief

a Gender Forum in 1998. Among the forum's objectives are implementation of gender policies, creating the budget for the services and divisions, and provision of gender training to personnel at all levels.

- **Hotline:** The GFP created a telephone hotline so that cases of sexual harassment and gender-based violence within the defense forces can be reported.
- **Gender Sensitization Programs:** The GFP also has developed a traveling presentation to raise awareness and understanding of gender policies among all members of the Ministry of Defence. The programs target managers at all levels.
- **The African Women's Peace Table Initiative:** Since 2001, the Deputy Defence Minister has hosted an annual Peace Table Forum. The forum brings together more than 100 women from across the defense services and from civil society to discuss and define a common peace agenda. It is a proactive attempt to create ties and partnerships between civil society and the military. It is also a place in which white and black women within the military can identify experiences and issues that affect them all as women, rather than those that still divide them based on race.

"We have hosted organizations from civil society, from the peace movement, who have requested information about [arms] procurement," says Madlala-Routledge. "They [civil society] are free to come and interrogate us on issues, but also to contribute to the program and definition of security." Issues addressed at the forum have included peacekeeping and reconstruction, as well as the conduct of soldiers. In 2003, the forum offered women an opportunity to articulate their views on defense and security within the newly formed African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) peace agenda.<sup>129</sup> Madlala-Routledge acknowledges that initially within the Ministry of Defence there was resistance to the notion of a women's peace table. "Men in senior positions found it a bit threatening." But with the support of the minister and the participation of the military leadership, including the chiefs of the army and navy, support for the forum increased. In fact, says Madlala-

Routledge, "the peace table has been integrated as part of the program of the DoD . . . it has actually simplified the situation of women soldiers coming from their bases to participate . . . because there is now instruction from the DoD, which enables them to attend."

Not surprisingly, many of the initiatives lack the resources needed to work to their full potential. Significant practical issues still need to be addressed to enable women to enter, stay, and progress in the defense and security field. For example, women soldiers with families and children need support structures such as child care to enable them to fulfill their dual roles as mothers and soldiers. Resources are

needed to institutionalize and extend the mechanisms noted above and to ensure that gender training is systematic and continuous. Reviewing developments in 1999, Col. N. Motumi stated, "the key challenge [is] to motivate male colleagues to become equal partners

*"The key challenge [is] to motivate male colleagues to become equal partners in the process of defining the visions and strategies for a more equal society."*

*— Col. N. Motumi*

in the process of defining the visions and strategies for a more equal society."<sup>130</sup> But she noted, "DoD has the necessary policy framework." Moving forward, the challenge is to develop and strengthen these policies and practices, which even now could be models for other countries in the region.

### The Arms Trade

Women in the political, military, and civil society arena were important voices in the debate and subsequent unfolding of a major arms deal that struck at the heart of the post-apartheid democratic era. "No dimension of South Africa's foreign and security policy," writes scholar David Black, "generated more sustained controversy than the political economy of arms, both in terms of exports and, more recently, purchases."<sup>131</sup> Following the Defence Review, in 1998 the Sub-committee on the Procurement Program of the SANDF recommended six core defense procurement programs and suppliers to the cabinet. By December 1999, at a cost of approximately \$4.5 billion, the government had contracted five major arms purchases. Despite initial outcries from civil society "on grounds that the package made no sense in the absence of a credible military threat" and internal government questioning of the details, it was several months before

the ANC began to aggressively question the plan approved by parliament.

In the midst of a growing scandal, allegations of misconduct and fraud by parliamentarians, and arrests for corruption, a joint investigating team issued a report in November 2001 exonerating senior party leadership from wrongdoing, which only furthered the controversy. Black noted three overarching aspects of the arms deal of particular concern to the public:

1. The suspicion and, indeed, reality of instances of conflict of interest and corruption;
2. The question of whether various inside maneuvers associated with the deal had resulted in the artificial inflation of the cost . . . to the direct benefit of certain well-connected interests.
3. Attention was focused on the ANC's clumsy and somewhat paranoid attempts to manage the affair and limit dissent. . . .<sup>132</sup>

In analyzing this episode overall, Black asserted, "the arms deal illustrates some of the substantial problems and limitations associated with the aspiration toward

democratizing foreign policy . . ." This is exemplified, for example, by the fact that the Cabinet negotiated the arms transactions without the specific approval of parliament, which did not insert itself into the process. Parliament's oversight and involvement began only after the deal had been negotiated, not as part of the decision-making process. Furthermore, partisan politics played a major role in the debate, weakening parliamentary action and the semblance of fairness and impartiality.

***Women Parliamentarians Speak Out***

As the arms deal was moving forward, women parliamentarians from across political parties spoke out. IFP Member of Parliament Suzanne Vos says, "when they spoke out it wasn't about helicopters and dealing with obsolete equipment, it was about the amount of money being spent on the military when the country needed it so much more for development."

Patricia de Lille, at the time a member of the Pan-African Congress Party, was the first to raise claims of corruption in the arms deal.<sup>133</sup> ANC veteran Barbara Hogan resigned from her position as Chair of the

**Women, Crime, and Gun Control**

Violent crime is among the most prevalent and destructive challenges facing South Africa today. Many social and economic factors have fueled the increase in crime, including unemployment, weak law enforcement during the early years following the transition, and a prevalence of gun ownership. Although statistics show that crime has dramatically increased, it is the brutality of the crimes that capture nationwide headlines, fuel public insecurity and fear, and garner international attention.

In 2002, Mark Shaw noted one particular factor in the current crisis: "There is little doubt that the availability and use of firearms has a direct impact upon the nature and extent of crime."<sup>1</sup> Approximately 4 million guns are legally owned and registered in South Africa and another estimated 4 million have been illegally obtained, either left from the apartheid era, lost or stolen from the government, or brought through neighboring countries.<sup>2</sup>

It is widely noted that men are the majority of owners and victims of small arms, but the differential impact of gun violence on women remains important. In a 2001 United Nations article, the gender dimensions of gun ownership and violence were illustrated:

While gun manufacturers argue that small arms are ideal self-defence weapons for women—equalizers in a fight with larger and more powerful men—males continue to exercise a near-monopoly on the ownership and control of weapons. Far from liberating women from the fear of violence, the ready availability of guns makes matters worse. "Women feel threatened by it," Ms. Van de Wiel [UNICEF official] said, "men feel empowered by it."<sup>3</sup>

As Adele Kirsten, an anti-militarization activist and founder of Gun Free South Africa (GFSA), notes: “it would appear in violent crime that men are often random targets, with the perpetrator a stranger, yet women are targeted because they are women, often in their home and by someone they know.”<sup>4</sup> Small arms often exacerbate the situation. One woman notes, “you can run away from physical abuse . . . but you can’t run away from bullets.”<sup>5</sup>

South Africa has taken some steps to eliminate surplus small arms and to legislate gun control. Much of this action was taken at the prodding of civil society groups—in many cases, led by women and founded on the notions of human security. In particular, GFSA, a women-led initiative, raises awareness of the issue, enhances public debate, and lobbies for change in the country’s policies. According to Jacklyn Cock, by networking and coalition building, partnering with the government, mobilizing various interest groups at the grassroots level (women or the health community, for example), and linking to a global campaign, GFSA has impacted the culture of violence in South Africa in four ways:<sup>6</sup>

1. *Changing gun control policy:* The constitution does not include the right to bear arms. In addition, parliament passed the Firearms Control Act in 2000 with stricter controls and regulation in response to GFSA campaigns.
2. *Influencing opinion makers and decision makers:* GFSA has issued aggressive editorial pieces, participated in public forums, and made submission to the white papers on defense and safety and security.
3. *Destroying surplus weapons:* In response to pressure, the SANDF has engaged in various operations, including Operation Rachel (in cooperation with Mozambique), which destroyed more than 400 tons of light weapons and 40 million rounds of ammunition, and Operation Mouflon (a domestic program), which destroyed 63,000 assault rifles, pistols, and machine guns and scheduled 263,000 additional small arms for destruction.<sup>7</sup>
4. *Stigmatizing firearms in general:* Through awareness-raising campaigns, GFSA has promoted the idea of “gun-free zones,” which have become increasingly popular and include public and private buildings throughout the country.

The leadership of GFSA is often targeted for their outspokenness. Kirsten notes that, although they have male members and leaders, women are most often targeted “with the abusive phone calls, the name-calling . . . often with an implicit violence . . . .”<sup>8</sup> They are seen as taking away something very important to the white and black men of South Africa. Undaunted, their efforts to demilitarize the country continue, and are cited as a model for the continent and in international advocacy efforts.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Shaw, Mark. *Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transforming Under Fire*. Cape Town: David Phillip Publishers, 2002. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Fleshman, Michael. “Small Arms in Africa: Counting the Cost of Gun Violence.” *Africa Recovery* 15, 4, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2001. 28 April 2004 <<http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol15no4/154arms.htm>>. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Fleshman.

<sup>4</sup> Kirsten.

<sup>5</sup> Qtd. in Fleshman.

<sup>6</sup> Cock “Butterfly Wings and Green Shoots . . . .”

<sup>7</sup> Fleshman.

<sup>8</sup> Kirsten.

<sup>9</sup> Batchelor, Peter. Email to the author. 4 June 2004.



Finance Committee in protest of the lack of transparency around the arms deal. Pregs Govender, a life-long ANC member and parliamentarian from 1994, voted parliamentarian of the year by a South African national newspaper, resigned from parliament in 2002 in large part as a protest against the arms deal. In refusing to support her party's position on the deal, Govender consistently argued that "South Africa cannot afford such high expenditure on arms while four million people living with HIV/AIDS have no access to treatment and care."<sup>134</sup> In her official farewell speech Govender revisited these issues:

Today the global world order is one in which the global arms industry grows daily stronger, consuming in greedy gulps over R50 billion of our country's resources. In this globalised world 24,000 people die every day from poverty and women and children continue to bear the brunt of this together with HIV/AIDS and violence. . . . In this globalised world, war makes the profit margins that peace does not. We have to say loudly NO! NO! NO! We will not accept that human life is so easily devalued and dispensable.<sup>135</sup>

Modise was also praised by other parliamentarians for her willingness to speak out. Vos says that, "as Chair of the Committee, Thandi [did] what good parliamentarians do . . . exercised oversight of her own party with regard to the arms sales. . . . She is a woman of great substance and integrity. Across party lines we admire her very much." Black also draws attention to Modise's Joint Standing Committee on Defence, noting that it was the one committee that "vigorously defended the principle of full parliamentary oversight of arms sales and twice turned back weaker legislation to institutionalize the National Conventional Arms Control process."<sup>136</sup> He confirms that such assertive committees generally interact most with civil society, but "the leadership of these committees is highly vulnerable if they become too critical of their party leaders' initiatives."<sup>137</sup> Modise, says another politician, "has a lot of integrity, and she put herself at risk."

*"In this globalised world, war makes the profit margins that peace does not. We have to say loudly NO! NO! NO! We will not accept that human life is so easily devalued and dispensable."  
— Former Member of Parliament  
Pregs Govender*

## Women and Gender Issues in Peace Support Operations

Regional security, the interdependence of states, and the need for political and military cooperation are touched on in the ANC's early position papers, but gain prominence in the White Paper. In particular, the role and responsibility of South Africa in regional peacekeeping and peace support operations is noted. Different factors drove the decision, notes Theo Neethling of the Center for Military Studies at the

University of Stellenbosch.

"Participation in peacekeeping is seen as a way of repaying the debt that the new rulers feel they owe to the international community." But he adds, "morality aside, it is clearly in its [South Africa's] interest to stabilize the region."<sup>138</sup> The White Paper states, "the

effects of political conflict . . . impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of . . . non-military threats: environmental destruction; the spread of disease; the burden of refugees; cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods, and small arms."<sup>139</sup>

Williams further emphasized women's importance in realizing the new vision of peacekeeping: "In a functional sense, there is conflict and suddenly you would need doctors, engineers, lawyers, road specialists . . . post-trauma counselors." Highlighting the gendered dimension of this work, Williams said, "There are certain areas where it is preferable to use men and others when it is preferable to use women. . . . You have to balance according to what you are addressing." On process and planning, for example, Williams observes that women often have a different approach: "They are much more inclined to discuss issues broadly and in detail over a longer period of time." Today, South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that has recognized the need to integrate gender-based training into peacekeeping operations and has drawn on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide expertise for them.

Despite these practical and ethical justifications, entry into regional military operations was a sensitive issue for the ANC given the apartheid regime's policies of aggression and regional destabilization. In the consul-



tations that took place around the drafting of the White Paper and the Defence Review, the concept of peace operations was expanded beyond the deployment of troops to incorporate “logistical support, engineering services, communication systems, and medical personnel and facilities.<sup>140</sup> From the outset, says Williams, there was a desire within the ANC to move away from traditional peacekeeping. There was also recognition that if “the root causes of human insecurity are what are deeply ingrained . . . you can’t simply have a military approach . . . It requires a broad range of efforts . . . you really need to speak about the civilian component of peace missions.” Deputy Minister of Defence Madlala-Routledge draws attention to the contributions of women policymakers. “This policy is more holistic and comprehensive,” she notes. “Women have contributed to the fact you have to assist with reconstruction . . . with the rebuilding of communities where there has been violence. In order to have lasting peace, you have to get involved in the development of that country.”

This broader view of peacekeeping can also be attributed in part to South Africans’ experience with the UN Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) and the home-grown, local peace committees (LPCs) that came into existence between 1991 and 1994. Neither the UN mission nor the LPCs were military in nature. Rather, they were structures aimed at diffusing tensions using non-violent conflict resolution methods (see text box).

#### *Why Gender Matters*

In interviews conducted by the South African NGO Gender Links, locals noted that the UN mission was a role model on a number of levels. The mission was mixed-race and mixed-gender, but by virtue of their “blue jackets” they were seen as the UN. This was of critical importance to a South Africa that was (and still is) color conscious. Second, that the mission was led by a black woman and included 46 percent female observers was noticeable, particularly for black women.<sup>141</sup> Thenjiwe Mtintso, who was a prominent woman leader herself, noted, “women in the townships frequently saw [Angela] King on television and she

became a talking point. They were confident that Queen King could do something.”<sup>142</sup> Beyond acting as a role model, the presence of women in the mission was at times critical to local women, reflects Hannah Yilma, a member of the mission. “A woman is not likely to tell a man that she has been gang-raped by 15 men. Sometimes local women were more able to talk to UNOMSA women about certain things.”<sup>143</sup>

Drawing on her experiences in Rwanda and South Africa, Thandi Modise reiterates this: “By the time the peacekeeping forces arrive, often the only people left are the women, who are very scared and bitter. . . . The forces that come are inclined to take over and order people around. Not enough effort is made to ask women what they would like.”

For peace support operations to be effective, the range of expertise that is required expands. According to Williams, while it is important not to generalize, as there are women who “outmale the men,” in general they tend to bring a different perspective. He adds:

If you are doing a deployment in a particular area to seize the military barracks—what will men say? They will look at the map and the barracks and ways of seizing it. Women are more inclined to say to get there, you have to go through a high civilian area, there is a church there, a school here, you are proposing to fire down from the top of the military base—but can you guarantee that the shells will land in the barracks and not in the community?

Marjorie Jobson of the NGO All Africa Women for Peace (AAWP) exemplifies this. As a representative of AAWP, Jobson and her colleagues were invited to participate as a civil society “observer” during a simulation peacekeeping training program run by the South African military for high-level personnel from militaries across southern Africa. “They conducted the military exercise and we watched from behind a panel,” recalls Jobson. “At the end they would ask us in to comment.” Inevitably, the observers would draw attention to the issues related to the safety of civilians says Jobson. “We’d ask, what about the water tower? How are you guaranteeing food supplies to the community?”

The role of women in the local peace committees also informs many of the views. Williams emphasizes that

*“[If] the root causes of human insecurity are what are deeply ingrained . . . you can’t simply have a military approach. . . . It requires a broad range of efforts. . . .” – Rocky Williams*

### Setting Examples: The UN Observer Mission and Local Peace Committees

The National Peace Accord of 1991 set out the principles for establishing a National Peace Secretariat, and regional and local conflict resolution committees. The nationwide outreach and governmental support given to the peace committees was exceptional. These structures were critical in diffusing tensions at all levels throughout the transition years. The committees were comprised of local people with representatives from police and defense forces. To a large extent their role was to monitor local gatherings and mediate when disputes arose. Nationwide, women were underrepresented in the peace committees, but South Africans and UN observers recognized that the participation of local women in the committees was important because they helped gain access and build trust within communities and because they were often more effective at diffusing tensions and stopping violence. The Thokoza Committee in East Rand decided that at least one in four monitors at large gatherings had to be a woman. According to the committee chairperson, women were seen as better at “bringing down the temperature.”<sup>1</sup>

One of the most successful Local Peace Committees (LPCs) to emerge during 1993 and 1994 was Women for Peace, the LPC of Alexandra township, which neighbors Johannesburg. In 1992, Alexandra had been the site of violence between ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters, with each group controlling parts of the community. When Women for Peace emerged, the group successfully resolved disputes nonviolently and calmed the environment. Angela Masithela, a team leader in the UN Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) in the area, recalls:

women are what made the committee effective. With men it was war all the time . . . . The women were really keen to have a peaceful resolution. [Their] presence also helped to get men to buy in. . . . Sometimes I would hear them [the men] talking among themselves...saying “we need to show respect for our mothers”.<sup>2</sup>

UNOMSA was deployed in August 1992 under Security Council Resolution 772, comprised of 50 civilian observers, 46 percent of whom were women.<sup>3</sup> According to Angela King, chief of the mission, it was the “first true example of preventive diplomacy.”<sup>4</sup> The mission’s only mandate was to “observe violence”.<sup>5</sup> In practice it had two dimensions: to work with local structures to keep peace and to provide behind-the-scenes support to the political negotiations. This required certain skills and approaches not often associated with peacekeeping missions. For example, it was important that the mission have strong ties with local communities so that they could be trusted and respected. Similarly, it was essential for UN staff to be non-threatening at all times, particularly when tensions were high. Former mission staff noted other qualities such as being informal, listening, sharing information, and using a hands-on approach as features that enabled the mission’s success.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Qtd. in Gender Links 32.

<sup>2</sup> Qtd. in Gender Links 34.

<sup>3</sup> Gender Links 18.

<sup>4</sup> Qtd. in Gender Links 13.

<sup>5</sup> Gender Links 24.

<sup>6</sup> Gender Links.

women are better communicators in situations of tension and potential or actual violence. To a large extent this acknowledgement is based on experiences of violent interaction between ANC and Inkatha supporters in Natal during the transition years. Thandi Modise notes that when tensions rose, women would be sent to “deal with it.” Williams affirms this, stating, “the local women [ANC] leaguers were doing the mediation. They were seen as better interlocuters.” He further notes that even in military peacekeeping operations, when women command units, they engage and communicate better with local populations and have a greater capacity to mitigate violence than men.

The shift from rhetoric to policy and from training to action has been slow. South Africa’s participation in regional peacekeeping has been limited and military in nature. In 2004, its peacekeepers were criticized for their abuse of local women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nonetheless, South Africa remains among the few countries in the world that has recognized the need for the integration of gender-based training into peacekeeping operations. The challenge now is for the government to undertake the training and create accountability mechanisms for those who violate its code of conduct.

## CONCLUSION

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Today, South Africa has been transformed into a non-nuclear, democratic state, where civilian structures fully control military sectors, and defense spending is below two percent of GDP.<sup>144</sup> The guiding vision and understanding of security threats articulated in the *White Paper on Defence in South Africa* has proven increasingly accurate and relevant. In widening the scope and definition of security to embrace human security, South Africans also “democratized” the debate, enabling large segments of their population to contribute to the national dialogue. This has strengthened the security services’ credibility and legitimacy. The multi-racial and mixed-gender face of the South African military is further indication that the forces are for the defense of all South Africans, not just an elite few.

Unlike many other places, and despite their differing views and values, women were integral to shaping and articulating the vision that the security of people must be a priority for the state. Through their cross-party alliances, they injected new perspectives into and influenced the debate. During the multi-party negotiations, in every committee they fought for gender equality, an end to sex-based discrimination, and an inclusion of gendered perspectives in security and defense matters. Not only do women relate to the principles of human security; as decision makers they have stood by the values and struggled to realize the vision.

Following the 1994 election in parliament and government, women upheld the principles of participation and inclusivity. In the last decade, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence has systematically ensured that public opinion was sought in decision making, and that NGOs and external experts have been invited to participate and submit proposals at parliamentary committee meetings. Institutional changes are also visible and extensive. The government and the newly formed South African National Defence Force initiated efforts to build trust and integrate black, colored, Indian, and white citizens. This changed institutional cultures, bringing increasing awareness and acknowledgement that diversity of people means acceptance of different cultural practices and norms. South African women in the political and civil society arenas also have been

leading voices on peace, security, and disarmament on the international stage. In particular, South Africa’s gun control NGOs are not only leaders in Africa, they have also become role models for NGOs globally.

Today there is recognition that gender equality and women’s participation in the armed forces is essential, not only as an indicator of the depth of transformation South Africa has experienced, but also because women make a qualitative difference. It is not easy. The tendency of the male-dominated military and political establishment to revert to traditional practices is ever present. The new generation of women politicians, many without military experience themselves, are less inclined to enter the defense and security fray. But the recent initiatives to promote gender perspectives and women into military programs and peace operations are gradually taking root.

The reform of the security sector is ongoing, even as new challenges emerge. Tensions between the political leadership, the needs of the traditional military and defense establishment, and the interests of the arms industry have left the original architects of reform frustrated by the slow pace of change. There has been a gradual shift toward increased executive power, which has diminished parliamentary control and the opportunity for public participation. Additionally, external challenges and new security threats—including the spread of HIV/AIDS, regional immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism—mean that many of the more utopian ideals presented in the White Paper have not been implemented. But there is little doubt that the more traditional military framework of security would have been even less prepared to address such threats.

Despite these challenges, South Africa’s vision and its transformation of the security sector are groundbreaking. Women’s participation in the decision-making process and implementation of this reform was and remains a key component of its success. Whether security sector reform is undertaken as a means of conflict prevention or as a means of establishing security in post-conflict societies, South Africa’s process is a model from which lessons should be drawn.

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**ENDNOTES**


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- <sup>1</sup>South Africa also had a nuclear weapons program during the apartheid years.
- <sup>2</sup>Machel, Graça. *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund, 1996.
- <sup>3</sup>Qtd. in United Nations Commission on Human Security. *Human Security Now*. New York: UN, 2003. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/FinalReport.pdf>>.
- <sup>4</sup>Groenewald, Hesta and Michael von Tangen Page. Eds. *Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate*. Occasional SSR Paper No. 1. The Hague and London: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", International Alert, and Saferworld, 2002. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/occssr1.pdf>>.
- <sup>5</sup>Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Human Security: Safety For People In A Changing World*. Ottawa: DFAIT, 1999. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm>>.
- <sup>6</sup>United Nations Commission on Human Security.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup>"Measuring the Quality of Governance," *The World Bank* 14 July 2003. 18 August 2003 <<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20119698~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>>.
- <sup>9</sup>For a description of women's activism pre-apartheid, see "Early Resistance to Passes" by Imbokodo, online at <<http://sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/womens-struggle/early-resistance-passes.htm>>.
- <sup>10</sup>"The Role of Women in the Struggle Against Apartheid." Cape Town, South Africa: African National Congress, 1980. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.anc.org.za/un/womenrole.html>>.
- <sup>11</sup>"The ANC Women's League." Imbokodo. 6 April 2004 <<http://sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/womens-struggle/frameset.htm>>.
- <sup>12</sup>"The ANC Women's League."
- <sup>13</sup>Women's demands had previously been compiled in the "Women's Charter," written at the first conference of the Federation of South African Women. See women's demands as presented at the Congress of the People at <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/women/demand.html>>.
- <sup>14</sup>"Congress of the People, 1955." Cape Town, South Africa: African National Congress. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/campaigns/cop/>>.
- <sup>15</sup>Albertyn, Cathi, et al. *Engendering the Political Agenda: A South African Case Study*. Wits, South Africa: University of the Witwatersrand, 1999. 5-7.
- <sup>16</sup>"The Role of Women in the Struggle Against Apartheid."
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup>Unless otherwise stated, all quotes are drawn from interviews conducted by the author between November 2002 and February 2004.
- <sup>19</sup>Qtd. in "The Role of Women in the Struggle Against Apartheid."
- <sup>20</sup>*The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela: An Intimate Portrait of One of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century's Greatest Leaders*. Alexandria, Virginia: Public Broadcasting Service, 1999. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mandela/>>.
- <sup>21</sup>The PAC's armed wing was later called Azanian People's Liberation Army or APLA.
- <sup>22</sup>"South Africa: Consolidating Apartheid." *South Africa*. Washington, DC: United States Library of Congress, 1996. 5 April 2004 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+za0037\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0037))>.

<sup>23</sup>“South Africa: The Rise of Black Consciousness.” *South Africa*. Washington, DC: United States Library of Congress, 1996. 5 April 2004 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+za0038\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0038))>.

<sup>24</sup>“The Role of Women in the Struggle Against Apartheid.”

<sup>25</sup>“Women’s Chronology.” Imbokodo. 6 April 2004 <[http://sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/special-chronology/chronology\\_women%27s.html#](http://sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/special-chronology/chronology_women%27s.html#)>.

<sup>26</sup>Cock, Jacklyn. *Women and War in South Africa*. Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 1993. 160.

<sup>27</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 164.

<sup>28</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 160.

<sup>29</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 167.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Albertyn et al. 6.

<sup>32</sup>*The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela* . . .

<sup>33</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 87.

<sup>34</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 174.

<sup>35</sup>Qtd. in Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 87.

<sup>36</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 88.

<sup>37</sup>Villa-Vicencio, Charles and S’fiso Ngesi. “South Africa: Beyond the ‘Miracle’.” *Through Fire with Water: The Roots of Division and the Potential for Reconciliation in Africa*. Eds. Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2003. 267–304.

<sup>38</sup>*Harare Declaration*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Organization of African Unit Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa, 21 August 1989. 5 April 2004 <[http://www.africawithin.com/mandela/harare\\_declaration.htm](http://www.africawithin.com/mandela/harare_declaration.htm)>.

<sup>39</sup>Mbete, Baleka. “Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring Participation of Women – A Framework of Model Provisions: The South African Case Study.” *UNDAW Expert Group Meeting 10–13 November 2003, Ottawa, Canada*. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/peace2003/reports/EP6Mbete.PDF>>.

<sup>40</sup>*Malibongwe Conference Programme of Action*. 1990. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/women/pr900118.html>>.

<sup>41</sup>Albertyn et al. 9.

<sup>42</sup>For a detailed analysis of the NPA, see Spies, Chris. “South Africa’s National Peace Accord: Its Structures and Functions.” *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking*. Ed. Catherine Barnes. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002. 5 April 2004 <<http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/index.shtml>>.

<sup>43</sup>Villa-Vicencio and Ngesi 289.

<sup>44</sup>Mbete.

<sup>45</sup>For more detailed discussions of the negotiations process see Barnes, Catherine and Eldred De Klerk. “South Africa’s Multi-Party Constitutional Negotiation Process.” *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking*. Ed. Catherine Barnes. London: Conciliation Resources, 2002. 5 April 2004 <<http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/index.shtml>>.

<sup>46</sup>Barnes and De Klerk.

<sup>47</sup>Mbete.

<sup>48</sup>“Women’s National Coalition of South Africa.” 28 June 2004 <<http://www.iisd.org/50comm/commdb/desc/d18.htm>>.

<sup>49</sup>Gender Links. *Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: South Africa Case Study*. Johannesburg: Gender Links, n.d. 14 May 2004 <<http://www.genderlinks.org.za/docs/2001/sa-gender-peacekeeping.pdf>>. 35.

<sup>50</sup>*Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa Adopted at the National Conference, 28–31 May 1992*. 30 June 2004 <<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html>>.

<sup>51</sup>*Malibongwe Conference Programme of Action*.

<sup>52</sup>Albertyn et al. 8.

<sup>53</sup>Mbete.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Attah, Judith Sefi. *Monitoring The Transition To Democracy In South Africa, Report on the Mission to South Africa by the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Judith Sefi Attah, from 24 November to 2 December 1993*. New York: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 18 January 1994. 6 April 2004 <<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/70b887a7fab7a0c0802567630035e251?Opendocument>>.

<sup>58</sup>Albertyn et al. 14.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Baden, Sally, Shireen Hasim, and Sheila Meintjes. *Country Gender Profile: South Africa*. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 1998.

<sup>61</sup>“Irreversible Progress’ Toward Democracy.” *South Africa*. Washington, DC: United States Library of Congress, 1996. 5 April 2004 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+za0043\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+za0043))>.

<sup>62</sup>Barnes and De Klerk.

<sup>63</sup>Baden, Hasim, and Meintjes.

<sup>64</sup>Barnes and De Klerk.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Myakayaka-Manzini, Mavivi. “Women Empowered – Women in Parliament in South Africa.” *Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers*. Ed. Azza Karam. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998. 176.

<sup>67</sup>Albertyn et al. 27.

<sup>68</sup>Albertyn et al.; The 1999 cabinet had 8 out of 29 ministers and 8 out of 13 deputy ministers, with women at the head of foreign affairs and mineral and energy affairs and as deputy ministers of defense and trade.

<sup>69</sup>Myakayaka-Manzini.

<sup>70</sup>Cawthra, Gavin, “Guns or Butter? Growth, Development and Security.” *From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*. Ed. Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie. Cape Town, South Africa: David Philips Publishers Ltd., 1998. 24–26.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Cawthra “Guns or Butter? . . .” 25.

<sup>75</sup>Ngculu, James, “The Role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the Creation of a Democratic Civil-Military Relations Tradition.” *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*. Eds. Rocky

Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, n.d. 244. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Ngculu.pdf>>.

<sup>76</sup>Qtd. in Ngculu.

<sup>77</sup>Ngculu.

<sup>78</sup>Cawthra, Gavin. "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security': The Making of South Africa's Defence Policy 1990–98." Fredericiagade, Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.copri.dk/publications/WP/WP%201999/8-1999.doc>>.

<sup>79</sup>*Ready to Govern* . . .

<sup>80</sup>Qtd. in Cawthra, Gavin. *Securing South Africa's Democracy: Defense, Development, and Security in Transition*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. 54–56.

<sup>81</sup>*Ready to Govern* . . .

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup>Cawthra, Gavin. "Reconceptualising Security for the Twenty-First Century: South Africa's Experience in Remaking Defence." *Working Paper No. 9*. Buenos Aires: Universidad Torcuato di Tella, 2000. 28 June 2004 <[http://www.utdt.edu/cei/papers/papers\\_seguridad/cawthra.pdf](http://www.utdt.edu/cei/papers/papers_seguridad/cawthra.pdf)>.

<sup>87</sup>Mollo, Leko Solomon. "Negotiating for Civilian Control: Strategy and Tactics of Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) in the Democratic Transition of South Africa." Monterey, CA: Naval PostGraduate School, 2000. 21 April 2004 <<http://www.ccmr.org/public/images/download/mollo.pdf>>. 56.

<sup>88</sup>Cawthra *Securing South Africa's Democracy*; Mollo.

<sup>89</sup>Mollo 35.

<sup>90</sup>Cawthra *Securing South Africa's Democracy* . . . 62.

<sup>91</sup>*Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996*. 30 June 2004 <<http://www.info.gov.za/constitution/1996/96cons.htm>>.

<sup>92</sup>Cawthra *Securing South Africa's Democracy* 64.

<sup>93</sup>Nathan, Laurie. "The 1996 Defence White Paper: An Agenda for State Demilitarisation?" Eds. Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie. *From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*. Claremont, South Africa: David Philip Publishers, 1998. 41.

<sup>94</sup>*Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*. South Africa: Department of Defence, 1996. 23 April 2004 <[www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white\\_papers/defencewp.html?rebookmark=1](http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/white_papers/defencewp.html?rebookmark=1)>.

<sup>95</sup>Nathan.

<sup>96</sup>*Defence in a Democracy* . . .

<sup>97</sup>Nathan.

<sup>98</sup>Black, David R. "Democracy, Development, Security, and South Africa's 'Arms Deal'." *Democratizing Foreign Policy? Lessons from South Africa*. Eds. Philip Nel and Janis van der Westhuizen. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004. 137–152.

<sup>99</sup>*Defence in a Democracy* . . .

<sup>100</sup>*Defence in a Democracy* . . . 39.



- <sup>101</sup>See Beri, Ruchita, "South Africa: An Overview of the Defence Industry." *Strategic Analysis*, XXV.4 (2001): 569–584.
- <sup>102</sup>"In Conversation: Jackyn Cock." *IDRC Reports* 7 August 1999. 30 June 2004 <[http://www.cepsea.org/en/ev-5181-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.cepsea.org/en/ev-5181-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)>.
- <sup>103</sup>Cawthra "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security' . . ." 6–7.
- <sup>104</sup>Cock, Jacklyn. "Butterfly Wings and Green Shoots: The Impact of Peace Organizations in Southern Africa." *Track Two* 10.1 (2001). 28 June 2004 <[http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/10\\_1/p04\\_butterfly\\_wings.html](http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/10_1/p04_butterfly_wings.html)>.
- <sup>105</sup>For more information on the military and the environment, see *From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*. Eds. Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie. Capetown, South Africa: David Philip, and Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Center, 1998.
- <sup>106</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa*, viii.
- <sup>107</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>108</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>109</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 180–181.
- <sup>110</sup>Kirsten, Adele. "Women Making the Links: Women, Peace and Justice." *In the Line of Fire: Gender Perspective on Small Arms Proliferation, Peace Building and Conflict Resolution: Proceedings of a Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Conference, Geneva, 7–8 March 2001*. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/genderdisarm/WILPFSMALLARMS.html>>.
- <sup>111</sup>Cock *Women and War in South Africa* 188–189.
- <sup>112</sup>Cock, Jacklyn. "A Gender Perspective on Demilitarization." World Summit on Sustainable Development. Johannesburg, South Africa. September 2002. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.wilpf.int.ch/peace/jcock.htm>>.
- <sup>113</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>114</sup>Mtintso briefly served on the Gender Commission after the 1994 elections.
- <sup>115</sup>Qtd. in Cock "A Gender Perspective on Demilitarization."
- <sup>116</sup>Qtd. in Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi, Rita Manchanda, and Shereen Karmali. Eds. *Women, Violent Conflict, and Peacebuilding: Global Perspectives*. London: International Alert, 1999. 15 May 2004 <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/confrep.pdf>>. 23–24.
- <sup>117</sup>United Nations Commission on Human Security 3.
- <sup>118</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>119</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>120</sup>*Defence in a Democracy* . . .
- <sup>121</sup>Williams, Rocky. "Defence in a Democracy: The South African Defence Review and the Redefinition of the Parameters of the National Defence Debate." *Ourselves to Know: Civil–Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*. Eds. Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, n.d. 244. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Williams.pdf>>.
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- <sup>124</sup>Molekane, Ellen. "The Role of Women in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)." *African Security Review* 5.5, 1996. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/5no5/molekane.html>>.
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<sup>126</sup>“Table 2.1. Analysis by Rank, Race, and Gender as of 31 March 2002: Regulars.” *Department of Defence Annual Report 2001/2002*. Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Defence, 2002. 7 June 2004 <<http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Frame/Frame.htm>>.

<sup>127</sup>Molekane

<sup>128</sup>Langa, E. “Clarification on the Gender Focal Point to the Joint Monitoring Committee on the Status of Women.” 28 June 2004 <<http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/031121defence.htm>>.

<sup>129</sup>*The Role and Responsibility of South African Women in the Furtherance of the AU/NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda in the African Continent and Internationally: Proceedings of the Third African Women's Peace Table Seminar, 28 October 2003*. Pretoria, South Africa: Ministry of Defence, 2003. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.saferfrica.org/DocumentsCentre/Seminars/ThirdAfricanPeaceTable/Speeches/OutcomeDocument/OutcomeDocument.asp>>.

<sup>130</sup>Motumi.

<sup>131</sup>Black 139.

<sup>132</sup>Black 141–142.

<sup>133</sup>Crawford-Browne, Terry. “South Africa’s R30 Billion Weapons Procurement Programme: OFFSETS, an Invitation to Corruption in a Country Desperate for Socio-Economic Development.” Mowbray, South Africa: Coalition for Defence Alternatives, 2000. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.quaker.org/capetown/cda/cda0500.htm>>. Merten, Marianne and Mungo Soggot. “Questionable Motives Behind Arms ‘Expos’.” *Daily Mail and Guardian* 10 September 1999. 28 June 2004 <<http://archive.mg.co.za/NXT/gateway.dll/PrintEdition/MGP1999/31v00743/4lv00874/5lv00920.htm>>.

<sup>134</sup>“Gender and Elections—Profile: Pregs Govender.” Johannesburg: Gender Links, n.d. 15 May 2004 <<http://www.genderlinks.org.za/gelections/profile.asp?pid=11>>.

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<sup>137</sup>Ibid.

<sup>138</sup>Neethling, Theo. “The South African Military Peace Support Operations.” *Indicator South Africa: Crime and Conflict* 10 (1997): 15–17. 28 June 2004 <<http://www.und.ac.za/und/indic/archives/crime/issue10/neeth2.html>>.

<sup>139</sup>*Defence in a Democracy* . . .

<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>Gender Links 18.

<sup>142</sup>Qtd. in Gender Links 30.

<sup>143</sup>Qtd. in Gender Links 31.

<sup>144</sup>Black 151.



## APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ACRONYMS

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AAWP	All Africa Women for Peace
ANC	African National Congress
ANCWL	African National Congress Women's League
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
BWF	Black Women's Federation
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
DoD	Department of Defense
ECC	End Conscription Campaign
EOCD	Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate
FSAW	Federation of South African Women
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEM	Group for Environmental Monitoring
GFP	Gender focal point
GFSA	Gun Free South Africa
IC	Interim Constitution
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
JMCC	Joint Military Coordinating Committee
LPC	Local peace committees
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation)
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiations Process
MRG	Military Research Group
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NP	National Party
NPA	National Peace Accord
PAC	Pan-African Congress
Poqo	Blacks Only (underground wing of the Pan-African Congress)
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOMSA	United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa
WNC	Women's National Coalition

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The Policy Commission is conducting a series of case studies to document women’s contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide. The studies focus on women’s activities in conflict prevention, pre-negotiation and negotiations, and post-conflict reconstruction—including governance; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and, transitional justice and reconciliation. This body of work is pragmatic and operational, offering suggestions, guidelines, and models to encourage policymakers to include women and gender perspectives in their program designs.

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