



# Interventions for Reducing Violence and its Consequences for Young Black Males in America

**A CITIES UNITED REPORT**

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united**  
*Safe, healthy and hopeful*

## About this Report Series

This report is one of a two-part Cities United series focused on identifying the patterns, predictors, and interventions for reducing violence among black males in the United States.

### **“Violence Victimization Trends, Patterns, and Consequences for Black Males in America: A Call to Action”**

This first report in the series provides trend data on violent offending and victimization among black males in the U.S. The bulk of the report is devoted to exploring and better understanding homicide victimization trends, patterns, and consequences for black males.

### **“Interventions for Reducing Violence and its Consequences for Young Black Males in America”**

The second report in this series focuses on surveying known evidence of policy and programmatic interventions for reducing violence among young black males.

## About Cities United

Launched in 2011, Cities United is a national movement focused on eliminating the violence in American cities related to African American men and boys. The 100-plus (and counting) mayors participating in Cities United are committed to reducing homicides and shootings of African American men and boys by 50 percent by the year 2025. Moreover, they are committed to restoring hope to their communities and building pathways to justice, employment, education, and increased opportunities for residents.

As a resource, Cities United helps mayors assess their cities' current situations, increasing opportunities for alignment, awareness, action, advocacy, and accountability in communities across the country. The organization provides mayors with a roadmap to developing and implementing long-term action plans by sharing best practices, instituting innovative approaches, and understanding how and where to reconfigure resources. The members of Cities United hold each other accountable for achieving results, calling on federal support while asking members of the community to get involved as well.

From the outset, Cities United was based on the simple but fundamental premise that African American men and boys matter and are assets to our nation. Under the leadership of Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter and New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu, Cities United was founded at a time when every 24 hours in America, 14 young people were being gunned down on the streets of our cities.

Cities United has grown to support a national network of mayors committed to working with community leaders, families, youth, philanthropic organizations, government officials, and other stakeholders to reduce the epidemic of homicides and violence-related injuries plaguing African American men and boys. They receive support in their mission from the National League of Cities, Casey Family Programs, and the Campaign for Black Male Achievement. Additional support comes from the Ford Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and the Jacob and Valeria Langeloth Foundation.

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# Introduction

Violence in the United States inflicts a terrible toll on the lives of too many Americans. No population is more devastated by that toll than young African American males, who experience levels of violent victimization and offending without parallel in our society. Mounting evidence continues to demonstrate that growing up in communities wracked by violence undermines the mental health as well as the educational and economic outcomes of young people, whether they are directly involved in violence or not.

Confronting violence and its consequences was the clarion call of the first report issued by Cities United in 2016: “Violence Trends, Patterns and Consequences for Black Males in America: A Call to Action.” That report illustrated not only the startling costs of violence in terms of human suffering and loss, but also the profound consequences that violence exacts on entire communities in many other ways. In fact, a recent national study by Patrick Sharkey and Gerard Torrats-Espinosa shows that the amount of violence in a county significantly depresses the intergenerational mobility of the children who grow up in that county.<sup>1</sup> Violence, therefore, represents a crisis of opportunity as much as a crisis for public health.

This report builds on Cities United’s 2016 report, presenting the results of an extensive scan of the research literature relating to violence prevention interventions. It identifies programs and practices that have proven effective in reducing violence and violent deaths among African American males. It illustrates that evidence-based interventions exist that can be implemented in our families, schools, places of employment, hospitals, and communities and by law enforcement. These interventions can prevent violence rather than simply meting out punishment in its wake. In its conclusion, the report offers a summary of its findings and recommendations to help inform local violence prevention efforts across the nation.



II

# Methodology

## Methodology

This report is the result of an extensive survey of available research into identifying interventions that show strong evidence of the potential to reduce violence among African American males. This research scan employed the following methodology:

- 1 A search of several academic literature databases for “systematic reviews” and “meta-analyses” of experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations of interventions targeted at reducing violence. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses are highly structured and documented literature reviews that attempt to summarize the full extent of the academic and non-academic literature on a particular research question covering a specified time period. To identify such studies, several databases were searched, including Google, Google Scholar, the ABI/INFORM Collection, Academic Search Complete, JSTOR, the Campbell Collaboration, NBER working papers, PubMed, Science Direct, SpringerLink, Web of Science, and Wiley Online Library. Keywords and phrases searched included systematic review, review, meta-analysis, synthesis, violence prevention, violence, violent crime, community violence, race, ethnicity, African American, and black. The resulting systematic reviews and meta-analyses were reviewed, and the abstracts and full text of the underlying studies for the reviews were also reviewed.
- 2 The studies informing this review are a subset of all intervention studies identified that included African Americans in their treatment and control samples, or comparison groups, and that demonstrated a statistically significant positive treatment effect.
- 3 Only those intervention studies that reported “violence” as an outcome, whether measured through self-report or official records, are included in this report. Studies that only reported aggression as an outcome were excluded.
- 4 Lastly, because the primary audience for this report is city leaders aiming to reduce violence among African American males, the only interventions described are those that could be undertaken at a local or metropolitan level. State- and federal-level programs and policies have been excluded.



## Defining and Measuring Violence

In this report, the meaning of the term “violence” is consistent with the usage of the term “community violence” by Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship in their recent meta-review of the research literature on violence prevention. They explain:

*“Community violence, particularly homicide, occurs primarily in public settings. It is interpersonal, taking place between individuals and small groups that may or may not know one another. It is generally unplanned and impulsive in nature but its impact is nevertheless severe, often resulting in death or disabling injury. Its perpetrators and victims are generally, but not exclusively, young men from disadvantaged backgrounds and communities. It may result from disputes or from conventional forms of street crime, e.g. robberies. Community violence implicates both the public health and public safety fields and multi-disciplinary, multi-sector responses.”<sup>2</sup>*

A related issue to defining violence is ascertaining how to measure it in the assessment of whether an intervention can be considered effective. Violence typically is assessed through self-report or official records. For self-report, surveys are administered to participants in evaluation studies, and questions related to a number of violent acts are used as a measure of violence. Alternatively, some studies use official arrest or conviction records from the local police or state corrections authorities.

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Abt and Christopher Winship (2016) What Works in Reducing Community Violence: A Meta-Review and Field Study for the Northern Triangle, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)



### III

## The Causes of Violence: Structural, Developmental and Situational

Interventions to reduce violence can be targeted at an array of factors believed to cause violence. To create a context for the interventions that this report will cover, it is useful to distinguish sets of these factors, or posited causes of violence, based on how close to or far removed from violent acts they are. These groupings include structural, developmental, and situational causes of violence.

## Structural

Structural causes of violence are often referred to as the “root causes” of violence. These are commonly understood to be the social factors that produce varying levels of violence across communities. The research literature on the structural, or “macro-level,” causes of violence over the past two decades has identified a handful of these factors that best explain why certain neighborhoods or cities are more violent than others. Factors identified include poverty, racial residential segregation, household income inequality, and labor market conditions.<sup>3</sup> In cases where several of these factors are concentrated at a neighborhood level, a concept known as “concentrated disadvantage” comes into play.

Concentrated disadvantage, also often described as concentrated poverty, refers to the increasing concentration of disadvantaged populations at the neighborhood level in the United States, starting in the 1970s when industrial shifts in the American economy contributed to high joblessness among males with low levels of educational attainment.<sup>4</sup> Neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage typically feature high levels of poverty and joblessness and contain a disproportionate share of single-parent families and racial minorities, particularly African Americans.<sup>5</sup> Several studies over the past two decades have shown concentrated disadvantage to be one of the strongest and most stable predictors of violent crime.<sup>6</sup>

A purported reason why concentrated disadvantage has been so closely associated with higher levels of neighborhood violence is its negative effect on “informal social controls.” These are non-law-enforcement-related ways that communities and non-legal institutions reduce the likelihood that individuals will become involved in violence or crime.

One such informal social control within communities is “collective efficacy.”<sup>7</sup> Referring to the presence of strong personal ties among neighborhood residents, collective efficacy describes those residents’ willingness to monitor and intervene in the behavior of unsupervised teen peer groups in neighborhood public spaces. Multiple studies have shown collective efficacy to have a clear association with reduced levels of neighborhood violence, even in the presence of other neighborhood-level risk factors such as poverty and unemployment.<sup>8</sup> Efforts to enhance community cohesion and civic action may therefore be important pathways to reducing the structural sources of community violence.

Another important form of informal social control is “institutional attachment.” Research shows that participation in opportunity-enhancing institutions such as schools and jobs substantially reduces the likelihood that individuals will engage in crime and violence.<sup>9</sup> Concentrated disadvantage can isolate youth from these mainstream institutions and role models. Youth who are disengaged from institutional

attachments during late adolescence and early adulthood, so-called “floaters,” become key contributors to high levels of community violence and are highly likely to become attached to competing institutions such as gangs.<sup>10</sup> Youth in their late teens and early 20s who are not in school, employed or in the military thus deserve special attention in efforts to prevent community violence.

## Developmental/Life Course

As children develop, a convergence of individual characteristics and experiences in the social and physical environment makes violence more or less likely in their lives at different ages, particularly during adolescence and young adulthood.<sup>11</sup> These experiences are referred to as the developmental or life course causes of violence and are another set of what can be characterized as root causes of violence. They are embedded within structural contexts that contribute to violence, particularly neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage. In accordance with epidemiology, public health, and the emerging field of prevention science, these characteristics and experiences are referred to as “risk factors” and “protective factors” for the onset and continuity of violence.

Risk factors are those individual characteristics, contexts, or experiences that increase the likelihood of violent offending. Protective factors, on the other hand, are those that reduce that likelihood.<sup>12</sup> While risk and protective factors can help point to potential developmental causes of violence, they are not necessarily causes themselves.

## A Life Course Framework for Organizing Development Risk and Protective Factors

Risk and protective factors have been shown to be present in multiple aspects of young people’s lives, at the individual level as well as in peer, family, school, and community contexts. The importance of the factors in each of these domains, however, often varies over the life course of a developing young person. For example, family factors can matter strongly during early and middle childhood, while peers become much more important when a child reaches adolescence.<sup>13</sup> One useful way of grouping risk and protective factors is based on whether a predictor fits one of the following domains: the ecological or environmental context of a developing person such as families, schools, and neighborhoods; a behavioral or institutional “life course” outcome such as juvenile arrest or dropping out of high school; or an aspect of human development such as mental health or socioemotional skills.

**Ecological/Contextual factors** are the risk and protective factors present in people’s environment over their lives that influence their risk of becoming violent, such as their families, schools, peers, and neighborhoods. Ecological contexts can also encompass the city, metropolitan area, or state where an individual lives that may shape broader social risks for violence.

**Life course outcomes** refer to the behavioral outcomes and institutional milestones that young people achieve or fail to achieve across their life courses that influence their likelihood of engaging in violence later in their lives. These include things such as committing a crime as a juvenile, having a substance abuse problem, demonstrating early aggression toward others, or failing in school.

**Dimensions of human development** refers to people's physical, cognitive, socioemotional, mental health, attitudinal, or personality characteristics (among others) that may increase or decrease their developmental risk for violence.


## Risk Factors for Violence Across the Life Course

A comprehensive study that quantitatively synthesized the results from nearly three dozen longitudinal studies has identified what appear to be the strongest risk factors for violence. The effect size, or the level of correlation between a factor and violence committed between the ages of 15 and 25, is shown for several factors at different age spans in Figure 1. All factors have been grouped based on whether they fall into the ecological/contextual, life course outcome, or dimensions of human development domains.

As can be seen in Figure 1, for children ages 6 to 11, the behavioral outcomes of a juvenile offense or substance abuse problem are the strongest predictors at that age for violence committed after age 15. For adolescents ages 12 to 14, being rejected by peers ("unpopular") or having antisocial peers are the strongest predictors of later violence. It is important to recognize that risk factors for violence rarely occur in isolation and most often co-occur as part of a "cumulative risk" for violence that includes several overlapping factors simultaneously.

Figure 1: The correlation of different risk factors with the commission of violence between the ages of 15 and 25

### Developmental Risk Factors for Violence



SOURCE: Meta-analysis of 33 independent studies; effect sizes are mean bivariate correlation coefficients; Lipsey and Derzon (1998).<sup>14</sup> Low Family "SES" refers to Socioeconomic Status which combines both income and educational levels.


## Protective Factors for Violence Across the Life Course

While there are several risk factors for violence, there are far fewer protective factors for the onset of violence after age 17. Figure 2 displays the effect sizes for protective factors that reduce the likelihood of violence after 17 when measured in middle childhood (7-12) and adolescence (13-16). These effect sizes are taken from the Pittsburgh Youth Survey, a long-running prospective longitudinal survey conducted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Figure 2 shows that peer factors such as positive peer relationships and low peer delinquency are the strongest protective factors for later violence when measured at both middle childhood and adolescence.

Again, it is important to note that while risk and protective factors may show a strong and consistent ability to predict the onset or continuity of violent offending, they should not be interpreted as causal factors. They are, however, candidates for causal factors and have been used as the basis for developing interventions that have proved effective at reducing violence.

Figure 2. The correlation of different protective factors with the commission of violence between the ages 17 and 25

### Adolescent Developmental Protective Factors for Violence



\*Youngest PYS cohort

SOURCE: Pittsburgh Youth Study reported in Loeber et al. (2008).<sup>15</sup> Effect sizes are inverted odds ratios from bivariate regressions. High Family "SES" refers to Socioeconomic Status which combines both income and educational levels.



Across longitudinal studies, three important developmental patterns have gained wide acceptance in the research literature:<sup>16</sup>

- 1 There is a strong relationship between age and violent crime, with the peak onset of violent offending generally occurring after age 13, followed by the peak decline in violent offending in the mid-to-late 20s.
- 2 A small number of chronic violent offenders are responsible for the majority of violent crimes.
- 3 Most violent crime that is committed during adolescence is committed in group settings.

## Situational

Unlike structural or developmental causes of violence, situational factors are the immediate or near-immediate causes of violent events. In a situational framework, a violent event is a sequence of situated social “transactions” where a “spark” or “trigger” gives rise to a series of responses and counter-responses that may or may not result in violence.<sup>17</sup> The risk of such situations leading to violence is enhanced by:

- A spark involving perceived disrespect, competition for a sexual partner, or a drug business dispute.
- The involvement of weapons.
- The presence of onlookers to a conflict who encourage violence.
- The occurrence of a spark at a physical location or time of day in which pro-social adults or “capable guardians” are absent.<sup>18</sup>


In short, violent events can be understood to be the result of the convergence of a motivated offender, a physical location, a behavioral setting such as the presence or absence of third parties, and an interpersonal relationship between the actors involved.<sup>19</sup> These events typically occur during the routine activities of the individuals involved. While structural and developmental factors set the background context or root causes for violence, situational causes explain how events, people, and contexts interact to trigger violent events. For example, structural and developmental factors may explain why a certain neighborhood and the young people within it have higher levels of violence than other neighborhoods, but the recent flare-up of a gang war would be seen as the situational cause of a spike in shootings in that neighborhood.

An important insight from a review of the literature on the predictors and causes of violence is that violence is concentrated among<sup>20</sup>:

- “Hot spots,” which are narrowly delineated locations such as street segments, intersections, and street corners that are disproportionately the sites of violent crime.
- A relatively small number of chronically violent offenders who typically are involved in violent groups, such as gangs.

All three causal levels of violence — structural, developmental, and situational — are important for understanding where violence occurs and the factors underlying its occurrence. To respond effectively to violence in both the short and long term, policy decision-makers should seek and implement effective interventions targeting factors at all three of these causal levels.

*Figure 3. Examples of Structural, Developmental, and Situational Causes or Predictors of Violence*





## IV

# Using Evidence to Guide Local Violence Prevention: Understanding “What Works”

Interventions to reduce violence can come in different forms, including:

- **Policies**, such as public spending on violence reduction.
- **Programs**, such as school-based violence prevention curricula.
- **Practices**, such as cognitive behavioral therapy.

### *What Works for Whom Under What Conditions*

A key question policymakers and community leaders often ask when deciding which interventions should be initiated or terminated is a simple one: What works? The answer, however, is anything but simple. The notion of what works implies a far more complex response than decision-makers might be led to believe. Rather, a more appropriate question is: What works to prevent violence for whom and under what conditions?<sup>21</sup>

Interventions that work for some often do not work for others, a circumstance known as “effect heterogeneity.”<sup>22</sup> One program, for example, might work well for white youth but not for African Americans, while another may be effective for girls but not for boys, and one that works in an urban community might not work in a rural community. Additionally, an intervention might work well for young adolescents but not at all for older youth or young adults.

It is important to account for this variation in identifying and selecting evidence-based interventions for reducing violence. In the sections that follow, this report will highlight interventions that have demonstrated efficacy or effectiveness with African American youth at different ages and with African American male youth in particular.

### *The Difference Between “What Works” and “What Will Work”*

Beyond determining whom violence interventions work for and under what conditions, another critical question is how to define the term “works.” In other words, what constitutes evidence that an intervention is effective?

The commonly accepted gold standard is whether an intervention produces positive outcomes for a randomly selected treated population compared to a control population when evaluated using a randomized controlled trial (RCT). RCTs provide a strong basis for establishing that the intervention itself, rather than some other factor, is the cause of the change in outcomes for the treated population. This is what’s known as “internal validity.”

But as Robert Sampson has rightly noted, what has been proved to work in one instance is not guaranteed to work in another instance.<sup>23</sup> The idea that an intervention conducted for a particular population under a particular set of conditions will work when transported to another population under another set of conditions is what’s known as “external validity.” This is an important distinction because, for many policy

and program decision-makers, the question of “what works” is really a question about whether an intervention that has worked elsewhere or at a smaller scale “will work” in their locale or at a larger scale.

A pattern to look for in evaluation findings that suggest that an intervention can be transported successfully to a different locale is whether it has been shown to be effective through experiments or quasi-experiments in different places, for different populations, and under different conditions. Many of the situational interventions described later in this report have been replicated in different locales. However, no replication studies for the developmental interventions that are described below were found for multiple city contexts. In most instances, program replications in multiple cities varied in important ways. Nevertheless, studies showing large-scale local replication in the same city or the successful implementation of similar interventions across multiple cities help support the potential transportability of these interventions to new city contexts.

### *How Do Interventions Work?*

A third and critical aspect to the question of “what works” is “how it works.” Knowing that an intervention causes a change in outcomes for a treated population does not tell us what mechanisms or pathways produced the desired effect. Even effective interventions can have the appearance of a “black box” in which we are unable to determine what components or “active ingredients” of the intervention are critical to producing the desired results and what changes they trigger in the affected populations to produce those results. Understanding the mechanisms that explain why an intervention is effective better supports the ability to transport and adapt that intervention to new contexts.

As Sampson again explains, understanding mechanisms is critical for decision-makers for three reasons: “First, mechanisms are necessary for interpretation of what is a cause and what is merely a risk factor... Second, policy is generally concerned with achieving a particular causal process, not simply a causal effect... Third, policy efficacy requires considering alternative, cost-effective processes for bringing about the desired outcome; mechanisms can identify these processes.”<sup>24</sup> The pathways responsible for the effect of an intervention, Sampson continues, “matter for policy because the political attractiveness of a certain intervention may depend on the mechanisms being used to change behavior.”<sup>25</sup>

Most interventions described in this report have not been evaluated to identify the essential mechanisms that drive their results. However, where potential mechanisms or, at the very least, critical program ingredients, have been identified in the evaluation literature, that information will be highlighted in the report.

## A. Structural Violence Prevention

Structural violence prevention refers generally to policy or program interventions that alter the structural underpinnings of violence to produce a reduction in violence over time. Interventions targeted at reducing neighborhood concentrated disadvantage or increasing the cohesion and informal control of neighborhoods by their residents are examples of structural violence prevention efforts. However, in the systematic reviews and meta-analyses that formed the basis for identifying evidence-based interventions in this report, no structural violence prevention interventions were identified.

A separate research scan was conducted to identify any community investment, neighborhood development, or housing-related intervention that has been shown in a research study to have the apparent effect of reducing violence in a community. One program in Seattle, the Neighborhood Matching Fund (NMF), was the only intervention identified in this scan. While the design of the study that assessed the impact of the NMF on violence in Seattle was neither experimental nor quasi-experimental, it has been included in this report to provide a potentially informative example of a possible structural violence prevention intervention.

### Neighborhood Matching Fund, Seattle

*Neighborhood Matching Fund is a neighborhood improvement funding program launched in Seattle, Washington in the 1980s that is targeted to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.*

**Description:** Founded in the late 1980s, the NMF, administered by the Seattle Department of Neighborhoods, provides resources to neighborhood-based community organizations to implement neighborhood improvement projects. The program provides funds to match either financial or in-kind (in the form of volunteer time) contributions from local residents, with the majority of funds targeted to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.

**Impact:** Although not specifically a crime- or violence-reduction initiative, by facilitating community activism and strengthening ties among residents, the NMF is believed to strengthen informal social control within neighborhoods, contributing to a violence reduction effect. A regression-controlled panel study examined the association of changes in violent crime rates with neighborhood investments from 1993 to 2007, while taking into account overall declining violent crime rates during this period. Neighborhoods in the program receive, on average, \$11,000 a year and during the study period received an average of more than \$110,000 in total. By correlating NMF investments with changes in violent crime rates, the researchers found that “as neighborhood disadvantage increases, the association between annual funding and violent crime becomes significantly stronger and negative, so that higher levels of annual funding are associated with substantially lower violent crime rates.”<sup>26</sup> Specifically, the study found that gaining around \$150,000 in cumulative funding over 14 years was associated with a 50 percent reduction in crime rates over comparable neighborhoods that did not receive funding.

While neighborhood investments may be a promising avenue for reducing neighborhood violence, this study is limited in that it did not use an experimental or quasi-experimental design and that Seattle is a relatively advantaged city with low levels of segregation and concentrated disadvantage. Further research on neighborhood investment programs is needed to validate them as a potential violence reduction approach.

## B. Developmental/Life Course Violence Prevention

Developmental violence prevention relies on evidence and theories that see violence as the result of a behavioral progression in which earlier life course precursors signal an increasing risk for later violence.<sup>27</sup> Developmental interventions target the most salient risk and protective factors, such as those depicted in Figures 1 and 2, at different ages to shift the developmental trajectory of a young person away from a path toward violence. As noted before, an “intervention” as described in this report is as much about the policies, programs, and practices that decision-makers should terminate as it is about the ones they should launch or expand.

### Recommended Developmental Interventions

Based on an extensive review of the literature, the following seven developmental interventions targeted at different ages have demonstrated efficacy in reducing violence among African American males.

Age Targeted	Intervention
3-4	<i>High Scope Perry Preschool (HSPP)</i>
3-4	<i>Chicago Child Parent Centers (CCPC)</i>
10-13	<i>Aban Aya Youth Project (AAYP)</i>
10-18	<i>End Investment in Scared Straight</i>
12-16	<i>Becoming a Man (BAM)</i>
13-18	<i>One Summer Plus (OSP)</i>
18-30+	<i>Violence Intervention Program (VIP)</i>

## High Scope Perry Preschool (HSPP)

*High Scope Perry Preschool is an early child education and parenting support program that helps develop academic and socioemotional skills among preschool-age children.*

**Description:** HSPP was begun in the 1960s in Ypsilanti, Michigan, as part of an RCT with 123 mostly male (59 percent), poor, African American children ages 3 to 4 with low IQ test scores.<sup>28</sup> The intensive preschool program is fully documented in a program manual and includes 2.5 hours of daily center-based instruction that involves active learning to develop both socioemotional and cognitive skills. The HSPP program is highly individualized to children's needs and has a low teacher-to-child ratio. It also features substantial parent involvement, including weekly home visits and monthly meetings to help parents better support their children's learning.

**Impact:** In a 37-year follow-up to the HSPP program as implemented in the early 1960s, substantial differences in violence were apparent between the HSPP participants and the control group. **By their early 40s, members of the control group were six times (12 percent versus 2 percent) more likely to have been arrested for a violent felony and 1.5 times (48 percent versus 32 percent) more likely to have been arrested for any violent crime than those who participated in the HSPP program.**<sup>29</sup> At 40, HSPP participants were also more likely to be employed (70 percent versus 50 percent for males) and have higher earnings (\$20,800 versus \$15,300) than the control group.<sup>30</sup>

**Cost:** The estimated cost per participant, including operating costs such as teacher salaries and administrative costs, and capital costs such as classrooms and facilities, is \$17,759 in 2006 dollars.<sup>31</sup>

**Replication:** HSPP has not been replicated in another long-running longitudinal study. However, it is the subject of a federally funded, four-year, large-scale efficacy trial begun in 2015 that includes the randomization of 100 preschool centers in South Carolina to treatment or control conditions. The study will involve 400 preschool teachers and 1,600 children.<sup>32</sup>

*For technical information on the Perry Preschool model and curriculum and its implementation, contact High Scope ([www.highscope.org](http://www.highscope.org)).*

## Chicago Child Parent Centers (CCPC)

*Chicago Child Parent Centers is an early child education and family support program serving preschool age (ages 3-4) and early school aged children (5-9) that improves parent-child relationship and builds early math and language skills.*

**Description:** CCPC, established in 1967, serves children ages 3 to 9 (preschool to third grade). A study using a quasi-experimental design evaluated the impact of CCP Centers on an array of life outcomes for a gender-balanced sample of 1,539 (505 in a matched comparison group) primarily poor African American



children (93 percent) ages 3 to 4 who were served at 25 CCP Centers in 1980. For the study, children were drawn from what at the time were the poorest neighborhoods in Chicago.<sup>33</sup> CCP Centers are located in or near public elementary schools and provide one to two years of half-day preschool language and math instruction, individualized activities, and health and nutrition services. The program also included weekly parental participation consisting of parenting education, classroom volunteering, and field trips. One certified teacher and one aide were provided on average for every 17 participants.

**Impact:** Participants in the CCPC intervention have been tracked longitudinally since 1980, with the most recent follow-up data available for when the participants were 27. Those receiving two years of preschool programming at a CCP Center were significantly less likely to be arrested for a violent crime as a juvenile (9 percent versus 15.3 percent) than those in the comparison group.<sup>34</sup> There were no significant differences in violent crime arrests between the two groups when they were assessed at ages 24 and 27.<sup>35</sup> The violence-reducing benefits of receiving CCPC services, therefore, appear primarily to affect children and adolescents.

**Cost:** The per-participant cost of the CCPC program is \$8,512 in 2007 dollars for roughly 1.5 years of preschool program participation, the average participation length for the 1980 sample. Two-thirds of program costs are accounted for by instructional staff, the parent program, and administration.<sup>36</sup>

**Replication:** No replication or long-term follow up studies for the CCPC could be identified in the literature scan. However, the program has been expanded to school districts in Illinois, Milwaukee Public Schools, and three Minnesota districts, including St. Paul Public Schools.<sup>37</sup>

*For technical information on the CCPC model and curriculum contact the CCPC Office  
(<http://cps.edu/Schools/EarlyChildhood/Pages/Childparentcenter.aspx>)*

## **Aban Aya Youth Project (AAYP)**

*Aban Aya Youth Project is a school-based social development curriculum based on Afrocentric principles that is designed to reduce high-risk behaviors among African American youth.*

**Description:** The AAYP is a social development curriculum developed in the 1990s. It is usually delivered in social studies classes by school teachers and includes 16 to 21 lessons per year focused on enhancing social competencies for managing risky situations. The program teaches “cognitive-behavioral skills to build self-esteem and empathy, manage stress and anxiety, develop interpersonal relationships, resist peer pressure, and develop decision-making, problem-solving, conflict resolution, and goal-setting skills. It was structured to teach application of these skills to avoid violence, provocative behavior, school delinquency, drug use, and unsafe sexual behaviors.”<sup>38</sup> The AAYP has been evaluated using a cluster RCT involving a sample of African American children, including 552 boys, attending high-poverty schools in and

around Chicago that participated in the program from the fifth through the eighth grade between 1994 and 1998.<sup>39</sup>

**Impact:** Because children in the fifth grade show very low levels of violence and other problem behaviors compared with children at later ages, particularly adolescents, the impact of the AAYP was assessed in terms of individuals' growth in violence over the four years of program participation. Using self-report data that tracked violence on a yearly basis, the evaluation found that the program showed significant effects for boys but not for girls. **The growth in violent behavior for AAYP participants was 35 percent lower than for controls, and the effect was three times as large for the most violent male participants at baseline.**<sup>40</sup> Findings from an additional study suggest that the mechanism that explains the AAYP's effect on violent behavior may be its influence on empathy among program participants.<sup>41</sup> In addition to a reduction in violence, African American boys saw less growth in provoking behaviors, school delinquency, substance use, and risky sexual behaviors.

**Cost:** The AAYP program is documented in a program manual and is available for purchase online. As of July 2017, a hard copy costs \$820, and an electronic copy costs \$425. A one-day implementation training session with materials costs approximately \$5,000 with travel expenses included. Additional technical support is provided at \$150 per hour.<sup>42</sup>

**Replication:** No replication studies for the AAYP were identified in the literature scan.

*For technical information on the Aban Aya model and its implementation, contact Sociometrics (<http://www.socio.com/passt24.php>).*

## End Investments in Scared Straight

*Scared Straight is a "shock" program that exposes at-risk or delinquent children to inmates serving life sentences in order to deter them from future delinquency or behavior problems. In RCTs, Scared Straight has been more likely to make children worse than better off.*

**Description:** Scared Straight is a popular delinquency prevention program intended to deter delinquent youth from offending again. The program gave rise to "Beyond Scared Straight," a popular, nine-season television series that aired on the A&E network. The delinquency program's popularity rests on the straightforward notion that providing delinquent youth with firsthand observations of prison life through organized prison visits will deter them from future misbehavior. However, a recent meta-analysis of nine RCTs concluded that Scared Straight-type programs "are likely to have a harmful effect and increase delinquency relative to doing nothing at all to the same youths."<sup>43</sup> In other words, Scared Straight-type programs may cause further delinquency.

The mounting evidence suggesting that Scared Straight does more harm than good led California and

Maryland to suspend the programs statewide in 2011.<sup>44</sup> A meta-analysis of 548 studies on juvenile delinquency interventions spanning 1958 to 2002 found that programs that are effective in reducing juvenile delinquency take a therapeutic rather than a control or deterrence approach and match programs to the needs of delinquent youth, targeting the “most effective programs possible to the highest risk cases.” Moreover, programs most likely to yield positive outcomes for preventing delinquency and violence for youth are those that incorporate a cognitive behavioral component.<sup>45</sup>

*For more information on effective programs and practices in juvenile justice settings, see [Improving the Effectiveness of Juvenile Justice Programs: A New Perspective On Evidence-Based Practice](#) (Lipsey et al 2010) and [“A Practical Approach to Evidence-Based Juvenile Justice Systems”](#) (Howell et al, 2014).*

### **Becoming a Man (BAM)**

*Becoming a Man is a non-academic high school program that helps improve behavioral and academic outcomes for mainly African American and Latino males through mentoring by pro-social adults, formal rites of passage, and skills development through group-based cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).*

**Description:** BAM is a school-based program administered by Youth Guidance, a Chicago nonprofit. It combines authentic youth engagement, which entails respecting and earning respect from youth, with CBT and “men’s work,” or “manhood development” work, which applies formal rites of passage and other culturally based practices that support the transition to adulthood for urban adolescent males.<sup>46</sup> As described by BAM’s creator Anthony DiVittorio, “Young men tap into their resiliency skills to survive in communities wracked by violence. They learn to shut off parts of themselves like showing feelings, empathy and compassion. The skills they develop to navigate their environments do not always adapt well in contexts like schools. BAM helps these young men feel liberated. To relax the front and connect with a different sense of manhood. Rites of passage into manhood are ancient in their origins but don’t really exist in America today.”<sup>47</sup> Ideally BAM’s approach should begin with young boys around age 12 and extend up through age 16.

The program is documented in a program manual and is delivered over one to two academic years (but ideally 3 or 4) by staff who have received more than 300 hours of training as well as ongoing coaching and support.

Central program features include<sup>48</sup>:

- Weekly group meetings lasting an hour that incorporate CBT principles and involve group-based learning challenges or “missions”. Participants are allowed to skip an academic class in order to participate in BAM meetings. Group sessions include no more than 15 youth at a time and typically have a group-to-adult ratio of 8:1.<sup>49</sup>

- Mentorship provided by BAM counselors in the form of one-on-one counseling, often in episodic “brief encounters” that occur before, during and after school. BAM counselors serve an average of 55 youth at a time, roughly 20 percent of whom may seek individual counseling.
- Afterschool and out-of-school activities including visits to sporting events or other field trips

BAM was evaluated in 2009-10 with an RCT and a sample of 2,740 very high-risk males in grades seven through ten at 18 very low-performing public schools in high-violence neighborhoods of Chicago. Because of its size, the sample included 75 percent of all male youth in those grades in the study schools. The sample consisted of “very high risk,” mostly African American males (70 percent), who were selected based on high scores on a risk index that comprised: whether a student was at least one year older than his assigned grade level; the number of classes for which a student had received an “F” during the prior academic year; the number of unexcused absences during the prior academic year; and the number of in-school suspensions during the prior academic year. The vast majority of the sample (86 percent) were low-income, more than a third (36 percent) had a history of arrest, and about half (53 percent) were old for their grade. Males who had missed more than 60 percent of school days in the prior year or who failed at least 75 percent of their courses were excluded from participation in the study because of the low probability that they would successfully complete the program.<sup>50</sup> In addition to all of the regular components of BAM, the program implementation evaluated in 2009-10 included a one- to two-hour session of after-school sports programming that incorporated BAM principles.

**Impact:** BAM has been shown to have a substantial impact on violence among a large cohort of high-risk African American males. The RCT results showed that during the 2009-10 program year, participants in BAM had 45 percent fewer violent crime arrests than the control group. Although the large impact on violent crime arrests did not persist after the program year, academic gains that were significant in the program year persisted into the following school year. Based on these findings, BAM is a very promising program for achieving large reductions in violence among high-risk males. BAM does not engage adolescent youth at the highest risk for violence, most of whom have dropped out of school or are far along the path to dropping out. However, BAM is designed to intervene with youth as early as late elementary school to help prevent school disengagement and dropping out and the development of a pathway toward violence.<sup>51</sup> A qualitative study of BAM conducted by Chapin Hall finds that the components of BAM and related mechanisms that appear most connected the program’s impacts are:<sup>52</sup>

- 1 The provision of a safe space characterized by a physical space that features respect through confidentiality and nonjudgement. Important as well is the consistent availability of the space, fun activities conducted there and the sense of security the space provides.
- 2 The cultivation of a set of core values that involves much more than teaching a set

of values through a curriculum. It is critical to help youth “value the value” and reflect on how it shows up in their lives. Youth in effect must “practice the value” before becoming practitioners of it.<sup>53</sup> In BAM groups, youth learn to understand, contribute to and enact social norms and values, particularly those related to safety, respect and a willingness to grow.

- 3 The **development of socioemotional skill** through group and individual “check-ins” that encourage self-reflection, the acknowledgement of feelings and guidance in communicating about feelings. Youth’s improved socioemotional skills involve developing a stronger understanding of their own and other’s emotional states and using language to express who they are, how they feel and what they want.
- 4 **Developmental relationships with counselors** that are built on principles of trust, vulnerability, and openness. These relationships are cultivated by counselors through several authentic relationship-building strategies.
- 5 **An enhanced sense of agency over one’s future** particularly as it relates to planning, decision-making and asking for help, particularly from counselors.
- 6 **A sense of belonging to BAM** as a community and to the values it promotes.

**Cost:** BAM costs about \$2,000 per participant in 2015 dollars.<sup>54</sup>

**Replication:** In addition to the evaluation reported above, BAM has been evaluated in another large RCT involving 2,064 ninth- and 10th-graders in nine Chicago public high schools during the 2013-14 academic year. That study found that violent crime arrests for BAM participants in the expanded two-year program were 50 percent lower than for the control group and that high school graduation rates for participants were 19 percent higher.<sup>55</sup> Given the scale of the trials used to evaluate BAM, the program offers tremendous promise as a violence prevention strategy that can be transported to other locales.

*For technical information on the BAM model and its  
Implementation, contact Youth Guidance ([www.youth-guidance.org/bam](http://www.youth-guidance.org/bam)).*

## One Summer Plus (OSP): Summer Youth Employment

*One Summer Plus is a youth violence-prevention program in Chicago that provides eight weeks of paid summer employment at the Illinois minimum wage (\$8.25) and a job mentor.*

**Description:** OSP is administered by Chicago’s Department of Family and Support Services (DFSS) and implemented by five local nonprofit organizations. It provides eight weeks of part-time (25 hours per week) summer employment at the Illinois minimum wage of \$8.25 per hour. The five DFSS nonprofit partners worked to match youth with jobs in the nonprofit and government sectors (e.g., summer camp counselors, YMCA staff, working with elected officials) that supported their exploration of career interests and the development of relevant skills. Youth were also assigned an adult job mentor at a ratio of 10 youth per mentor. Job mentors regularly visited the workplace, taught basic job skills, and helped youth navigate work challenges such as transportation, supervisor conflicts, and family responsibilities. Roughly 90 percent of participants completed the full eight weeks in 2012.<sup>56</sup>

Because OSP was specifically focused on reducing violence, the program was targeted at high-risk youth. Chapin Hall, a research organization and data warehouse in Chicago, partnered with the DFSS to identify 5,000 Chicago youth at the highest risk for violence based on indicators such as gang or justice system involvement, truancy, and school engagement. Thirteen high schools with the highest number of these youth were targeted for participation in OSP. All students between 14 and 21 who were enrolled in those schools were eligible and were recruited to participate in a lottery for a summer employment slot. Nearly all of the 1,634 youth recruited to participate in the OSP trial were African American, with a mean age of 16 and a 90 percent eligibility rate for free or reduced price lunch. Twenty percent also had a history of arrest at baseline.

**Impact:** Youth assigned to participate in OSP had 43 percent fewer violent crime arrests over the summer and for 13 months afterward. Most of the difference in violent crime arrests occurred after the youth completed the summer employment program. This indicates that a mechanism driving the program’s effects is not simply “incapacitation,” meaning occupying youth’s time with activities that help prevent them from getting involved in violence. Rather, the program appears to have had a developmental effect, shifting youth away from a path toward violence for several months after they participated. In addition, the program appeared to have had its greatest effect on youth with a history of violent offending. The number of crimes prevented was four times as large for youth who had a prior violent crime arrest at baseline. Prior violent crime arrests could thus serve as an effective way to target summer employment programs to maximize their violence reduction potential.

**Cost:** The cost to administer OSP for the City of Chicago was roughly \$3,000 per participant, including an average of \$1,400 in wages.<sup>57</sup>

**Replication:** An RCT-evaluated summer employment program that targets very high-risk youth in the way

that OSP does was not identified in the literature scan. However, an RCT evaluation of New York City's Summer Youth Employment Program shows that that program has large and long-lasting effects on incarceration and mortality rates for those who participate, compared with the control group. For a program that is far less targeted than OSP, the evaluation of the New York program found that participants who received up to seven weeks of minimum-wage summer employment between 2005 and 2008 reduced their subsequent incarceration compared with the control group by 10 percent and reduced mortality by 20 percent when measured as much as nine years later.<sup>58</sup> Remarkably, youth who participated in the program at age 19 were 54 percent less likely than those in the control group to be incarcerated during that year.<sup>59</sup> The evaluation of OSP together with the findings from the evaluation of the New York program provide compelling evidence that summer youth employment programs can be adopted in other jurisdictions and produce potentially large impacts on violent crime among youth participants.

*For more information on the One Summer Plus model and its Implementation, visit: <http://www.onesummerchicago.org/>*

### **Violence Intervention Program (VIP)**

*The Violence Intervention Program is a violence prevention program centered in the R. Adams Cowley Shock Trauma Center in Baltimore, Maryland. The program includes up to 2.5 years of intensive psychosocial services and case management for patients admitted to the trauma center who are repeat victims of violence and on parole or probation.*

**Description:** The VIP operates on the theory that a near-death experience provides a powerful motivation for behavior change. The program targets repeat victims of violence who are 18 or older and on parole or probation. Through a social worker who partners with participants' parole or probation officers, program clients receive up to 2.5 years of intensive follow-up services that may include substance abuse treatment, employment training, educational services, and family or group therapy. Social workers and members of a VIP team composed of "two social workers; two case workers; a program manager; a parole and probation agent; and representatives from psychiatry, epidemiology, and preventive medicine, as well as trauma and critical care" conduct home visits and weekly "group encounter sessions" with clients.<sup>60</sup>

**Impact:** A randomized controlled trial of the VIP was conducted between 1999 and 2003 with a sample of 100 cases eligible for the study. Fifty-six participants received VIP services while 44 controls received standard medical treatment and follow-up. Eighty-seven percent of the sample cases were African American, and 95 percent were male. More than half in the sample were older than 30, and roughly 60 percent were high school dropouts. Nearly three-quarters (71 percent) of participants were tracked for a period of one year to more than two years. At the conclusion of the study, control group participants were found to be three times as likely to have been arrested for a violent crime (57 percent versus 18 percent) and four times as likely to have been convicted of a violent crime (55 percent versus 13

percent). The VIP also positively affected employment. Program participants were four times as likely as controls (82 percent versus 20 percent) to be employed during the follow-up period. While hospital violence-prevention programs have been touted as a means to reduce retaliation by violently victimized individuals, this study doesn't provide evidence that such an impact occurred. Future RCT studies are needed to empirically validate this potential impact.<sup>61</sup>

**Cost:** Cost data for VIP could not be identified from the literature scan.

**Replication:** A systematic review of the literature yielded four other RCT-evaluated, hospital-based violence prevention programs in Chicago; Baltimore; Flint, Michigan; and Richmond, Virginia. While similar, these four programs differ in important respects from the VIP:

- **Target populations:** All four of the other programs target populations younger than 18, and three target only children and adolescents. None of them explicitly targets people on probation or parole or repeat victims.
- **Duration of services:** *All four programs provide services for less than six months. The Flint and Richmond programs provide only brief interventions to children and youth while they're in the hospital.*

*For more information on implementing hospital-based violence prevention programs, contact Shock Trauma at the University of Maryland Medical Center:*

*<http://umm.edu/programs/shock-trauma/services/injury-prevention/violence/vip>*

## C. Situational Violence Prevention

Gun violence, particularly homicide, is often group- or gang-related and concentrated within social networks of a relatively small number of individuals.<sup>63</sup> This pattern has been demonstrated across multiple cities over the past two decades:

- Research on gun violence in Boston in the early 1990s found that 60 violent groups with membership comprising just 0.3 percent of the city's population were responsible for 60 percent of the city's homicides for those under age 21.<sup>64</sup>
- In Cincinnati, researchers found that 74 percent of the city's homicides committed during 2006-07 involved a victim and/or offender whom the police knew to be associated with violent street groups that together comprised less than 0.3 percent of the city's population.<sup>65</sup>



- Chicago shows a similar pattern. Seventy-five percent of the roughly 11,000 gun violence episodes in the city between 2006 and 2014 took place within a single large social network of co-offenders, or people who were arrested together in connection with the commission of the same crime.<sup>66</sup>

Just as gun violence is concentrated among certain individuals, it is also highly concentrated in certain “micro-places” consisting largely of addresses, street segments, and intersections known as “hot spots.”<sup>67</sup> Research from Minneapolis; Jersey City, New Jersey; Boston; Seattle; and New York shows that often half of the crime and violence is concentrated at less than 5 percent of street segments and intersections.<sup>68</sup>

The concentration of gun violence among violent groups, within the social networks of violent individuals, and in violent crime hot spots is the core premise underlying the theory and practice of prominent approaches to situational violence prevention. Situational violence prevention interventions are policies and programs that seek to deter or interrupt violence by focusing attention on the people and places that are chronically violent or at highest risk for near-term violence. This form of prevention involves law enforcement suppression tactics as well as community outreach and supportive services.

## Recommended Situational Interventions

Based on an extensive review of the literature, the following five situational interventions are associated with a reduction of violence among African American males.

Primary Site/Lead	Intervention
Community/Neighborhood	<i>Cure Violence: a public health approach to violence prevention</i>
Law Enforcement	<i>Focused deterrence</i>
Law Enforcement	<i>Hot spots policing</i>
Law Enforcement	<i>Reduce aggressive drug law enforcement</i>
Law Enforcement	<i>End the use of juvenile curfews</i>

## Cure Violence

*Cure Violence is a community-based violence prevention approach informed by public health frameworks that uses street outreach, supportive services, and community-level norm change through public education and community mobilization to prevent the emergence and spread of violence.*

**Description:** Launched in Chicago in 1995, Cure Violence – formerly the Chicago Ceasefire program – is a community-centered violence prevention approach that views violence in communities as spreading in a way similar to the contagion of infectious diseases. The approach relies on disease control and public health methods similar to those used by the World Health Organization to prevent the spread of diseases like AIDS and cholera.<sup>69</sup> There are three core components to the Cure Violence prevention framework:

- Interrupting transmission.
- Identifying and changing the thinking and behaviors of the highest-risk transmitters.
- Changing social norms that support violence.

### Interrupting Transmission

Central to the Cure Violence approach is the work of “violence interrupters,” who are tasked with stopping the transmission of violence within a community by preventing violent acts before they occur. These individuals, because of their background in the community, often as former high-level or popular gang members, are able to build relationships with young people at high risk of committing violence. Described as “credible messengers,” these individuals are tasked with detecting potential violent events, particularly acts of retaliation as part of ongoing conflicts, and engaging in tactics to prevent those events from occurring. Interrupters track potential “trigger situations” for violence, including “territorial disputes, interpersonal and gang conflicts, the emergence of new factions or cliques,” robberies, and the admission of shooting victims to emergency rooms.<sup>70</sup> Because interrupting violent events depends on timely information about trigger situations, interrupters typically rely on information about brewing conflicts from community members, law enforcement, parties to the conflict, or hospital emergency room staff. To intervene before a conflict escalates to violence, interrupters are trained in mediation methods to connect with relevant parties and defuse violent situations. They may meet one-on-one with parties to the conflict, host small group peace-keeping sessions, or bring in respected third parties to help broker a nonviolent resolution.<sup>71</sup>

### Identify and Change the Thinking and Behaviors of the Highest-Risk Transmitters

The second major component of Cure Violence is the work of outreach workers who, like interrupters, may have prior involvement with gangs or a prison background. Outreach workers are not as focused on monitoring threats and intervening to prevent violence. Rather, they seek to build relationships with a targeted group of those at the highest risk for violence to shift their risk for violence over the long term. According to the Cure Violence model, individuals targeted for outreach services should meet at least four of the following seven risk criteria for engaging in violence<sup>72</sup>:

- Carries or has ready access to a gun.
- Is involved with a gang.
- Has a criminal history.
- Is involved in high-risk street activity such as drug dealing.
- Is a recent shooting victim (past 90 days).
- Is between 16 and 25.
- Has recently been incarcerated for a crime against a person.

Outreach workers are similar to case managers and work as “behavior change agents, connectors, and mentors” on both short- and long-term risk factors for violence. They typically carry a caseload of up to 15 individuals with whom they stay in constant contact and help connect with services and opportunities related to employment, housing, education, substance abuse treatment, anger management counseling, and support for leaving gangs. Outreach workers often work in teams with violence interrupters, supervisors, and program directors of violence prevention organizations.

### Change Social Norms That Support Violence

For Cure Violence, efforts to change community norms revolve around two main strategies: community mobilization and public education campaigns. Community mobilization efforts engage multiple stakeholders to stand against violence, including residents, faith leaders, local service providers, neighborhood associations, community organizations, law enforcement, and high-risk individuals themselves. Events, marches, and rallies typically are important activities in this process. Public education campaigns usually involve the creation of materials such as billboards, signs, posters, fliers, T-shirts, and bumper stickers that reinforce an anti-violence message.

**Impact:** A 2004 to 2007 evaluation of Chicago Ceasefire launched in 1995 (now called Cure Violence) was conducted using an interrupted time series quasi-experimental design. The evaluation compared the seven program sites that Ceasefire served with seven comparable areas of the city that did not receive program services. **Using 17 years of data, the study found that four of the seven program sites receiving Cure Violence intervention experienced an average decline in shootings of between 16 and 28 percent.**<sup>73</sup> The evaluation study noted implementation challenges that included difficulties setting up new programs in severely disadvantaged neighborhoods due to a lack of community leaders willing to host the program; inadequate staffing and high turnover, particularly for violence interrupters; limited resident buy-in; funding gaps; and problems recruiting high-risk individuals to work as violence interrupters and outreach workers.<sup>74</sup>

**Replication:** Three replications of the Cure Violence model have been evaluated using regression-controlled and quasi-experimental study designs in Baltimore, MD, Brooklyn, NY.

### *Baltimore Safe Streets*

**Description:** The Baltimore City Health Department launched BSS in the summer of 2007 in four high-

violence neighborhoods, in east and south Baltimore targeting high-risk youth ages 14 to 25. The program focused on community coalition-building against violence, including a public health campaign to change norms about violence, as well as street outreach activities modeled on the Chicago CeaseFire approach. Importantly, BSS combined the roles of violence interrupters and outreach workers into the same position, a potentially important deviation from the Chicago model.<sup>75</sup> The effort included the involvement of clergy and collaboration with law enforcement.

**Impact:** An evaluation of the program, using a regression controlled design focused on the period from 2007 to 2010, found that **monthly homicides and non-fatal shootings declined substantially in one neighborhood, Cherry Hill, down 56 percent and 24 percent, respectively. Homicides also declined by 26 percent in a second neighborhood, McElderry Park.** Of the two remaining neighborhoods, one did not experience a statistically significant decrease in homicides, while the other saw a 270 percent increase in homicides during the study period. Nonfatal shootings, however, did decline in both of these neighborhoods.<sup>76</sup> Overall, the evaluators concluded that across the four sites, BSS prevented five homicides and thirty-five nonfatal shootings.

#### *Brooklyn Save Our Streets (BSOS)*

**Description:** BSOS was launched by the Crown Heights Community Mediation Center and the Center for Court Innovation in the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York in the summer of 2010. Like the Chicago and Baltimore programs, BSOS implemented street outreach and conflict mediation, community mobilization, and public education. As in Baltimore, the Brooklyn replication deviated from the Chicago model by combining the roles of violence interrupters and outreach workers.<sup>77</sup>

**Impact:** Using an interrupted time series quasi-experimental design, researchers compared monthly shootings in Crown Heights with those in three similar Brooklyn neighborhoods between June 2010 and May 2012. Comparing 18 months prior to the implementation of BSOS and 21 months following implementation, the study found that **average monthly shootings fell by 6 percent in Crown Heights while increasing by 18 percent to 28 percent in comparison neighborhoods.** Gun violence in Crown Heights was found to be “20 percent lower than what it would have been had gun violence trends mirrored those of similar, adjacent precincts.”<sup>78</sup>

#### *Phoenix’s Truce Project (PTP)*

**Description:** PTP was launched in 2010 and was modeled on Chicago Ceasefire. While the implementation adhered to much of the Chicago model, it did not involve faith leaders, nor was it centered in the community.

**Impact:** A time series analysis evaluation of the program for June 2010 through December 2011 found that it was associated with a decrease in monthly assaults but an increase in shootings.<sup>79</sup>

**Replication Summary:** Altogether, the evaluation evidence in support of the Cure Violence model is mixed, with inconsistent findings across the original Chicago site as well as the three replication sites. Implementations in the three replication sites deviated in important ways from the Chicago model. However, implementation challenges appear to have been present across all four sites.<sup>80</sup>

**Program Mechanisms:** To the extent that the model is effective in reducing violence, it is not clear what about the program causes such results. Existing evaluation studies were not designed to ascertain the causal mechanisms or the key program components responsible for the program outcomes. Future evaluation studies will be necessary to understand what aspects of the Cure Violence model might be most effective for reducing violence.

*For more information on Cure Violence and the violence interruption approach, contact Cure Violence (<http://cureviolence.org>).*

## Focused Deterrence

*Focused deterrence is a police-led problem-solving strategy that has been extensively focused on reducing group-involved gun violence. It incorporates aggressive law enforcement, service provision, and the mobilization of community stakeholders to take a public stand against*

**Description:** Boston Operation Ceasefire was a problem-oriented strategy launched in 1996 by the Boston Police Department's Youth Violence Strike Force. Central to that strategy was "focused deterrence," or "pulling levers," which involves the focused application of resources and the communication of deterrence messages to people involved in group- or gang-related gun violence. In partnership with researchers at Harvard University, a working group composed of law enforcement agencies, social service providers, and community-based organizations developed a comprehensive approach to reducing gun violence that has been refined over the ensuing two decades and across multiple replications. In addition to an explicit focus on group- or gang-involved violence, the focused deterrence approach consists of the following core components<sup>81</sup>:

- Use of data and intelligence
- Formation of a diverse working group
- Face-to-face communication with targeted groups and offenders
- Sustained follow-through

### Use of Data and Intelligence

Data and intelligence are used to identify specific violent offending groups and violent individuals at a citywide or neighborhood level. Methods to support the gathering and synthesis of data and intelligence on offenders include group audits, incident reviews, group violence scorecards, and social network analysis.<sup>82</sup>

The field experience of frontline police officers and the knowledge of street outreach workers are crucial for the success of this component.

### Formation of a Diverse Working Group

A diverse working group is composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including probation and parole, as well as social service providers, street outreach workers, and community leaders.

### Face-to-Face Communication With Targeted Groups and Offenders

In face-to-face gatherings typically known as forums, notifications, or call-ins, offending groups and individuals receive three core messages from members of the working group or their designees:

- A **deterrence message** notifying participating groups that their actions are under intense scrutiny and that continued violence will trigger an aggressive and comprehensive law enforcement response using all means legally available.
- A **moral message**, often delivered by a faith member or parent of a homicide victim, emphasizing that participants are valuable to the community and urging them to avoid further gun violence.
- **Offers of assistance** that encompass an array of social services to help participants steer their lives away from violence.

### Sustained Follow-Through

Sustained follow-through on promises made in face-to-face communications includes the provision of promised social services as well as the close monitoring of groups for signs of possible violence, followed by special enforcement operations should groups continue to engage in violence. Such operations could entail efforts to “disrupt street drug activity, focus police attention on low-level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities, deliver strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug proceeds and other assets, ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and bring potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity.”<sup>83</sup>

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental evaluation of Boston Operation Ceasefire, using interrupted time series analysis, was conducted in 2001 and covered the evaluation period of 1991 to 1998. The study looked at the changes in monthly counts of homicides among people 24 or younger. The researchers reported a 63 percent reduction in youth homicides, a 32 percent decrease in gunshot-related calls for service, a 25 percent decline in monthly gun assault incidents across Boston, and a 44 percent decline in youth gun assaults in a targeted police district.<sup>84</sup>

**Replication:** The Operation Ceasefire, or focused deterrence, model has been replicated across several cities over the past two decades with varying degrees of fidelity to the original Boston model. These implementations have been evaluated using quasi-experimental approaches (e.g. interrupted time series, propensity score matching) and found in most instances to significantly reduce violent events in targeted neighborhoods or across entire cities.

Below is a list of nine evaluated focused deterrence replications that were found to have had a significant impact on violence:

#### *Stockton Operation Peacekeeper (SOP)*

**Description:** Operation Peacekeeper was implemented in Stockton, California, between 1998 and 2002 in response to gang-related violence in the city. It was modeled after Boston Ceasefire and applied all of its core components to targeted gang offenders after a violent incident by members of an offending group.

**Impact:** An evaluation study using an interrupted time series design found that **monthly homicides fell citywide by 42 percent after the program was implemented, and reductions in homicide persisted through 2005.** Importantly, however, the effect of focused deterrence on monthly homicides “decayed,” with the effect decreasing in strength over time.<sup>85</sup>

#### *Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP)*

**Description:** The IVRP was launched in Indianapolis, Indiana in 1999 and maintained until 2004. It targeted youth ages 15 to 24 at high risk for committing a homicide in neighborhoods with high levels of community violence. It incorporated all of the core elements of the focused deterrence model, including a strong community outreach effort that included law enforcement, community leaders, faith leaders, service providers, ex-offenders, and local educators.<sup>86</sup>

**Impact:** A time series evaluation of the IVRP showed a **34 percent decline in citywide monthly homicides between 1999 and 2001.**<sup>87</sup> In addition, **gang-involved homicides decreased by 38 percent and black male homicide rates, specifically, decreased from 145.2 to 54.1 per 10,000 of those at risk.**<sup>88</sup>

#### *Philadelphia Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP)*

**Description:** The Philadelphia YVRP was launched in 1999 to help reduce homicides among mostly young males ages 14 to 24. The program varies from the Boston Ceasefire model in several important ways:

- Its target population is youth on active probation who are determined to be at high risk for being a perpetrator or victim of homicide.<sup>89</sup> Relevant risk factors include a history of gun charges, a conviction for a violent crime, an arrest in a drug offense, a history of incarceration, age of first arrest, family history of abuse or neglect, and sibling involvement in the juvenile or criminal justice system.

- Each youth participant in the YVRP is assigned a probation officer and a street worker who work as a team to keep youth out of trouble and on track to a positive outcome.
- There is no face-to-face forum or call-in with targeted offenders, and enhanced law enforcement efforts with persistently violent offenders occur within the context of greater probation supervision.

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental evaluation of the YVRP examined potential impacts on youth homicides at both the neighborhood and individual level. The neighborhood-level assessment found that only one of five YVRP neighborhoods had a statistically significant decrease in quarterly homicides as a result of the program. For the individual-level evaluation, on the other hand, **youth who participated in the YVRP program were 38 percent less likely to be arrested for a violent crime and 44 percent less likely to be convicted of a violent crime** than a similar group of youth that was assessed through propensity score matching.<sup>90</sup>

#### *Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)*

**Description:** Chicago PSN was initiated in 2002 with funding from the U.S. Department of Justice. The program targeted young gun offenders and weapons traffickers. It incorporated two key focused deterrence components among several other strategies, including offender notification forums and enhanced law enforcement. Enforcement efforts included increased federal prosecution for felons who carried and used guns as well as lengthier prison sentences. An additional strategy employed in the Chicago PSN that falls outside of the focused deterrence model was firearm policing that increased the rate of gun seizures.

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental evaluation using propensity score matching found that **police beats receiving these four PSN strategies experienced a 37 percent decline in quarterly homicides**. Furthermore, homicide declines were greatest in beats that held an offender notification forum.<sup>91</sup>

#### *Lowell, Massachusetts, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)*

**Description:** PSN was launched in 2002 and incorporated all of the main components of the Boston Ceasefire model.

**Impact:** A time series evaluation that examined gun violence incidents occurring from 1996 to 2005 found that the implementation of Lowell PSN led to a **44 percent decline in monthly gun violence assaults**.<sup>92</sup>

#### *Boston Operation Ceasefire II (reconstituted program)*

**Description:** Boston Operation Ceasefire II is an effort to reconstitute the original Boston Operation Ceasefire, which became defunct in 2000 when the city's police department discontinued the strategy as



its primary response to outbreaks of gang violence.<sup>93</sup> In 2007, Ceasefire was reinstated as a citywide interagency approach to reduce gang violence.

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental evaluation of this new program using propensity score matching examined the effects of Ceasefire on violence among 19 Boston gangs subjected to the renewed program between January 2007 and December 2010. The evaluation found that **gangs participating in Ceasefire showed a 31 percent reduction in total shootings compared with matched comparison gangs.**<sup>94</sup>

#### *Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV)*

**Description:** The CIRV was launched in 2007 and implemented all of the core components of the Ceasefire model. It also featured a comprehensive organizational structure that included systems stakeholders such as law enforcement, social service providers, and community engagement agencies. This institutionalized organizational infrastructure has been credited with promoting the long-term sustainability of the focused deterrence approach in Cincinnati.<sup>95</sup>

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental interrupted time series evaluation of the CIRV examined homicide incidents from 2007 to 2010. The study found that **gang-involved homicides declined by 41 percent over 3.5 years** while non-gang homicides increased. Moreover, the CIRV was associated with a **22 percent decrease in violent firearm incidents.**<sup>96</sup> Importantly, the evaluators found no relationship between the level of services received by targeted gang members and their levels of violence.

#### *Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy (VRS)*

**Description:** The Chicago VRS was implemented in 2010 and targets members of violent gang factions, particularly their leaders. The program is intensively data-driven, relying on all available data to identify individuals and groups who are actively involved in gun violence. The VRS approach incorporates the core components of the Ceasefire model, including data and intelligence, a diverse working group, face-to-face offender communication (“call-ins”), the provision of services, and enhanced enforcement in the event of continued violence among targeted groups and individuals.

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental evaluation of the Chicago VRS using propensity score matching assessed the impact of 18 call-in meetings with 149 gang factions between August 2010 and December 2013. The study found that **attendance at a call-in meeting by at least one member of a gang faction resulted in 23 percent fewer shootings by that gang faction in the year after the call-in compared with factions that had no members who attended a call-in.** In addition, **call-in attendance reduced the likelihood of fatal or nonfatal victimization for that gang attendee by 32 percent in the year after the call-in date.**<sup>97</sup>

#### *New Orleans Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS)*

**Description:** The New Orleans GVRS was launched in 2012 and targets offenders who are associated with problem gangs and who have been incarcerated and are on probation or parole. The program featured the core components of the Boston model and conducted five offender notifications with 158 individuals between October 2012 and March 2014 that were evaluated for impact.

**Impact:** A quasi-experimental interrupted time series evaluation that examined the GVRs strategy over the two-year period found that the program reduced homicides by 17 percent, gang-involved homicides by 32 percent, homicides of young black males by 26 percent, and both lethal and nonlethal firearms violence by 16 percent.<sup>98</sup>

**Replication Summary:** Across the nine focused deterrence replications based on the Boston Ceasefire model, there is fairly consistent evidence of effectiveness, with homicide reductions ranging from 17 percent to 42 percent, gang-involved homicide declines ranging from 32 percent to 41 percent, and decreases in shootings ranging from 22 percent to 44 percent. Although not subject to an RCT in any of the replications described above, increasingly rigorous quasi-experimental evaluations (particularly propensity score matching) have yielded convincing evidence that the focused deterrence approach is a robust violence reduction tool across jurisdictions of different sizes and compositions. However, despite their success, focused deterrence programs appear difficult to sustain, with many programs now defunct or declining in effectiveness over time.<sup>99</sup> In fact, the original Boston Ceasefire model was abandoned in 2000 only to be reconstituted by a new administration and police chief in 2007. Cities like Cincinnati stand out for creating an organizational infrastructure for their focused deterrence program that has helped enhance institutional sustainability.<sup>100</sup> Determining how to sustain the impacts from focused deterrence programs remains the critical next challenge for this violence prevention approach.

**Program Mechanisms:** Due to the nature of the evaluation designs used to assess the original Boston Ceasefire model and its replications, as well as variation in the implementation of the Ceasefire approach, it is not possible to determine persuasively what aspects of the model give rise to its effectiveness. The deterrent effect of face-to-face offender notification forums is considered important, but how important remains an open question. The importance of social services offered and used, the influence of moral messengers, and the value added by outreach street workers are also outstanding questions. A leading evaluator of focused deterrence initiatives has noted that “the sole focus on deterrent effects may be misleading as these programs may also affect opportunity structures, improve police legitimacy, and possibly improve community collective efficacy, all factors which have been found to be associated with violent crime rates in other lines of research.” He continues, “Little is currently known about the effectiveness of individual ‘pulling levers’ program components and their unique contribution to crime reductions.”<sup>101</sup> More research on focused deterrence replications will be necessary to help narrow down what might be the key aspects of this approach that help drive its effectiveness.

*For more information on Cure Violence and the violence interruption approach, contact Cure Violence (<http://cureviolence.org>).*

**Table 1. Key Components of Multi-Pronged Situational Violence Prevention Interventions (launch year in parentheses)**

<b>Intervention</b>	<b>Enhanced Law Enforcement</b>	<b>Community Notification to Targeted Offenders</b>	<b>Street Outreach Workers</b>	<b>Service Provision</b>	<b>Community Mobilization</b>
<b>Cure Violence Model</b>					
<i>Chicago Ceasefire (1995)</i>			✓	✓	✓
<i>Baltimore Safe Streets (2007)</i>			✓	✓	✓
<i>Brooklyn Save Our Streets (2010)</i>			✓	✓	✓
<b>Focused Deterrence Model</b>					
<i>Boston Operation Ceasefire (1996)</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Stockton Operation Peacekeeper (1998)</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (1998)</i>	✓	✓		✓	
<i>Philadelphia Violence Reduction Partnership (1999)</i>	✓		✓	✓	
<i>Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (2002)</i>	✓	✓		✓	
<i>Lowell, Massachusetts, Project Safe Neighborhoods</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (2007)</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy (2010)</i>	✓	✓		✓	
<i>New Orleans Group Violence Reduction Strategy (2012)</i>	✓	✓		✓	

## Hot Spots Policing

*Hot spots policing strategies focus enforcement efforts on small geographic areas where violent crime is concentrated and recurrent.*

**Description:** As noted above, violent crime is highly concentrated at street segments and intersections known as hot spots. That has given rise to “hot spots policing,” which concentrates police presence in such places as a tactic to increase the certainty of crime detection and apprehension. Such efforts are meant to raise the perception among offenders that law enforcement will detect their actions, thus providing a deterrence to continued offending. The available evidence on hot spots policing is extensive and has demonstrated that it is an effective approach to violence reduction that does not lead to the displacement of violence to other areas of a city.<sup>102</sup> Five hot spot interventions targeting violent crime have been rigorously evaluated over the past 25 years and are described in more detail below:

### *Kansas City, Missouri, Gun Project*

**Description:** The Kansas City Gun Project was an intensive enforcement of laws against illegally carrying concealed firearms via safety frisks during traffic stops, plain view searches, and searches upon arrest on other charges. The intervention was conducted over 7.5 months in 1992 and 1993 and was evaluated using a quasi-experimental time series analysis that matched treatment police beats with similar control beats.

**Impact:** The treatment beats showed a 65 percent increase in guns seized and a 49 percent decrease in gun crimes. Control beats, on the other hand, showed a 15 percent decrease in guns seized by the police and a 4 percent increase in gun crimes.<sup>103</sup>

### *Philadelphia Drug Corners Crackdown*

**Description:** The Philadelphia Drug Corners Crackdown involved stationing police officers at high-activity drug locations over 4.5 months in 2002. The intervention was evaluated using a quasi-experimental time series analysis of treatment areas matched with similar comparison areas.

**Impact:** There were statistically significant reductions in violent crimes and drug crimes in treatment areas but no statistically significant changes in violent crimes and drug crimes in comparison areas.<sup>104</sup>

### *Boston Safe Street Teams Program*

**Description:** The Boston Safe Street Teams Program is a problem-oriented policing intervention composed of disorder reduction initiatives and limited situational responses that was conducted over three years starting in 2007. The intervention was evaluated using a quasi-experimental design in which 478 street units receiving the intervention were matched with 564 comparison street units using propensity score matching. Growth curve regression models were used to estimate the treatment effects.

**Impact:** Street units receiving the intervention showed a 17 percent reduction in violent crime

### *Jacksonville, Florida, Policing Violent Crime Hot Spots Program*

**Description:** The Jacksonville Policing Violent Crime Hot Spots intervention tested the effectiveness of two types of policing approaches for their impact on violent crime: problem-oriented policing and direct-saturation patrol policing. The intervention took place over three months in 2009. An RCT was used to evaluate the intervention. Eighty-three places were randomly allocated: 22 to problem-oriented policing, 21 to saturation patrols, and 40 to a control group that conducted business as usual. A difference-in-difference post-test comparison was conducted for the treatment and control groups.

**Impact:** The problem-oriented policing activities generated a 33 percent reduction in street violence. Direct-saturation patrols, however, did not generate any statistically significant reductions in violence.<sup>106</sup>

### *Philadelphia Foot Patrol Program*

**Description:** The Philadelphia Foot Patrol intervention in violent crime hot spots was conducted during the summer of 2009 and was evaluated using an RCT. The program matched 120 places in pairs based on violent crime rates. Control or treatment conditions were randomly allocated to 60 places within the matched pairs. Difference-in-difference post-test comparison was conducted on treatment and control conditions.

**Impact:** Places that received the foot patrol intervention showed a 23 percent reduction in street violent crime incidents.<sup>107</sup>

**Replication Summary:** The interventions described above provide strong evidence that hot spots policing can be a viable strategy for reducing violence at the micro-places where violence is concentrated. Notably, problem-oriented policing strategies appear to have the strongest impact on violence.

*For technical information on mapping and understanding violence hot spots, see Mapping Crime: Understanding Hot Spots at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=209393>*

## **Replace Aggressive Drug Law Enforcement with Focused Deterrence Drug Enforcement**

A significant and growing body of research shows that aggressive drug law enforcement has a limited impact on drug market violence and may, in fact, do more to increase violence by producing persistent instability in drug markets. A recent meta-analysis of 11 longitudinal studies that used sophisticated regression analyses found that an increase in the intensity of drug market enforcement was associated with an increase in drug market violence.<sup>108</sup> Research that seeks to explain this suggests that removing key players from a lucrative drug market may often result in violent competition by others seeking to fill the

vacuum. Similar evidence and analysis are used to explain the explosion in violence that occurred during alcohol prohibition in the U.S. during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>109</sup>

Some evidence suggests that the violence that results from drug market instability can be tempered when drug enforcement is combined with focused deterrence strategies that were developed as part of Boston's Operation Ceasefire.

The High Point Drug Market Intervention (DMI) targeted open-air drug markets in High Point, North Carolina, and was implemented by the city's police department.<sup>110</sup> The DMI program included:

- An intelligence and data-driven phase to identify four high-density crime areas with a high prevalence of drug arrests that were connected to other serious crimes.
- Police collaboration with the community, narcotics investigators, and probation and parole officers to develop cases against identified drug dealers using confidential informants and undercover officers.
- Notification forums, or "call-ins," with offenders who committed nonviolent or nonfelony offenses to communicate a deterrence message regarding their continued drug offending.
- Needs assessments to help match offenders with community services including education, housing, employment, food, clothing, drug and alcohol treatment, and transportation.

A quasi-experimental evaluation of the DMI using propensity score matching compared violent incidents occurring in the target areas between 1998 and 2008 with similar areas in High Point. The study found that **areas targeted by the DMI saw a 7.9 percent decrease in violence while comparison areas experienced a 7.8 percent increase in violence.** The DMI also led to a decline in drug availability in the targeted areas and was positively received by residents of targeted communities.<sup>111</sup> High Point's DMI provides a promising model of how to reduce the prevalence of drugs in a community as well as its associated violence without alienating local residents.

## End the Use of Juvenile Curfew Laws

Juvenile curfews have a long history in America, dating back over 100 years.<sup>112</sup> They are popular in the United States, with most large cities having a juvenile curfew ordinance on the books. Curfews are targeted at youth under 18 and typically are in effect from the late evening to early morning hours with varying times on weekdays, weekends, and holidays. The rationale for juvenile curfews is fairly straightforward: Requiring youth to be indoors by a certain time of the evening will reduce the likelihood that they will commit a crime or become victimized during later evening and early morning hours. However, this rationale has not been

subjected to systematic empirical scrutiny until recently. A recent systematic review of 12 state and local juvenile curfews found that on average these policies have no effect on juvenile crime or juvenile victimization.<sup>114</sup> One possible explanation for this finding can be drawn from a study that found that most juvenile crimes are committed in the hours before and after school, not in the late evening and early morning.<sup>115</sup> Regardless of what drives the ineffectiveness of juvenile curfews, these policies risk doing more harm than good by subjecting a large number of youth at low risk for violence to higher interaction with the police, fines, and possible arrest. Not only is this an inefficient use of police resources, it risks reducing the legitimacy of police in the eyes of many young people not engaged in crime or violence. The full weight of the evidence on effective violence prevention strongly favors approaches that focus on those youth at greatest risk for violence rather than dragnet-style approaches affecting all youth regardless of risk.



# Summary of Findings and Recommendations



## Summary of Findings

This section of the report synthesizes the evidence on effective violence reduction interventions reviewed so far and organizes them into an integrated framework that can be used to guide violence planning efforts among city leaders. The following key findings emerge from a thematic review of evidence-based programs described in this report:

**1** There is a paucity of structural interventions for violence reduction but some promising avenues for further experimentation.

Only one intervention, the Seattle Neighborhood Matching Fund, was found to have some evidence that suggests it may be an effective way to reduce violent crime through a neighborhood investment strategy. Using neighborhood improvement funding as a strategy for enhancing the cohesion of residents and their active improvement of their neighborhoods serves as a promising avenue for continued experimentation by city leaders.

**2** There are multiple environments for effective violence prevention intervention.

It is clear from the evidence that effective violence prevention intervention can be deployed in a variety of environments affecting the lives of those at risk for violence. These environments include family, school, community/neighborhood contexts, juvenile justice systems, workplaces, hospitals, and interactions with law enforcement in neighborhoods and other settings. As illustrated in Figure 4 city leaders are wise to target several domains for violence prevention simultaneously and, to the extent possible, document them and evaluate their impacts separately.

**3** Situational and developmental programs work.

Broadly speaking, evidence-based violence prevention interventions are situational or developmental. They are largely targeted at reducing the near-term risk for violence by addressing proximate situational causes, or they are focused on reducing violence in the long term by shifting developmental trajectories away from violence-prone pathways. Cities would thus be well-served to employ both situational and developmental interventions as part of a comprehensive violence reduction approach.

**4** Evidence-based programs target different age ranges starting as early as preschool.

Interventions can be targeted at different age groups that vary in the timing of their risk for violence. Adolescents and young adults have near-term risks for violence, while preschoolers to those in middle childhood face more distant risks. Age also corresponds to likely variations in the institutional attachments that can facilitate violence reduction efforts. Youth under 18 are in school and are therefore more accessible through school-based prevention efforts. Young adults in their 20s may be more accessible through employment-based programs as well as focused deterrence or Cure Violence-type approaches that involve greater levels of interaction in neighborhood settings. Figure 5 depicts the developmental and situational interventions described in this report that target different age ranges and domains.

**5** Violence is concentrated among a relatively small number of individuals, often group-involved, and in a relatively small number of places.

Data from several cities show that violence is concentrated among a small group of actors, often involved in gangs, who are connected to each other through common social networks. In addition, violence is disproportionately located in a relatively small number of hot spots, or micro-places, composed largely of street segments and intersections. Violence reduction efforts are most likely to succeed when they actively target the small number of people and places that drive the lion's share of violent crime.<sup>116</sup> Moreover, the extent of success and its sustainability is likely to be heavily influenced by the degree to which interventions targeting so-called "hot people" and "hot places" improve rather than detract from police legitimacy and community members' desire to cooperate with authorities.

**6** Some programs and practices are harmful either because they increase rather than decrease violence or they yield no positive benefits while incurring harmful collateral consequences.

Evidence shows that Scared Straight programs, juvenile curfews and aggressive drug law enforcement that is unfocused based on targeted offenders or geography are largely counterproductive. Evidence-based violence prevention should entail not only the adoption of innovative programs that work but also the abandonment of failed programs and practices that do more harm than good.

Figure 4. Domains of Community Violence Prevention

## Domains of Community Violence Prevention



Figure 5. An Integrated Framework for Community Violence Prevention

# An Integrated Framework for Community Violence Prevention

PRIMARY SITE / LEAD	AGE		
	3-11	12-18	19-30
Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Chicago Child Parent Centers (3-5)</li> <li>● Perry Preschool (3-4)</li> </ul>		
School		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Aban Aya (10-14)</li> <li>● Becoming a Man (BAM) (12-16)</li> </ul>	
Community		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Cure Violence (16-25) →</li> </ul>	
Employment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● One Summer Plus: Summer Youth Employment (13-18)</li> </ul>	
Hospital			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Hospital Violence Intervention Program (VIP) (18-30+) →</li> </ul>
Juvenile Justice		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● End Scared Straight (11-18) →</li> </ul>	
Law Enforcement: Targeting People, Places, Behaviors		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● End use of Juvenile Curfew Laws (10-17) →</li> <li>● Focused Deterrence (*) →</li> <li>● Hot Spots Policing (*) →</li> <li>● Reduce Aggressive Drug Law Enforcement (*) →</li> </ul>	

Prevention Type

- Developmental
- Situational

Target ages are in parentheses

\*Not applicable or age information not available

## Strategic Recommendations

Based on the evidence-based interventions described in this report as well as key insights garnered from an extensive review of the violence prevention literature, the following strategic recommendations are offered to help city and community leaders develop effective violence prevention strategies.

- 1 Focus violence prevention interventions and resources on the highest risk individuals.**

Across intervention types — whether school-based, summer employment or police-led — interventions that are focused on the highest risk individuals and in the highest risk places yield the greatest reductions in violence. Often this involves targeting the highest risk individuals in the highest risk places. Furthermore, targeting the highest risk individuals typically means meeting them “where they are” both in terms of where they are likely to spend their time and the needs they present as potential leverage for changing their behavior. One practical consideration is that targeting high-risk individuals means having extended hours and having close to real-time responsiveness to developing situations.<sup>117</sup>
- 2 Use data and analysis to develop an ongoing focus on those most at risk for violence.**

Using data and intelligence drawn from a broad set of agencies (e.g. frontline police, parole, probation, schools, hospital emergency departments) and community stakeholders (e.g. street outreach workers, faith leaders, community organizations) is critical for defining the nature and dynamics of the violence problem as well as identifying the priority characteristics of potential target populations. Data and analysis are also essential for ongoing evaluation and refinement of intervention strategies as the violence problem evolves. Analytical tools like group audits, incident reviews, group violence scorecards, and social network analyses can be used to establish and update a shared understanding of the violence problem in a city.
- 3 Make a down payment on developmental prevention for every dollar invested in situational suppression.**

Violence prevention efforts that focus primarily on situational suppression led by law enforcement are attractive for a variety of reasons. However, they are most attractive because the violence reduction benefits they could yield can happen in months or years, well within a mayor’s or city council member’s term. On the other hand, developmental prevention, conducted with a third-grader, for example, may take years to bear fruit. New cohorts of youth enter the age of heightened risk for violence every couple of years. Catching youth in elementary or middle school before they start down the path to violence, like with the Aban Aya Program or Becoming a Man, can help produce long-term and enduring violence reductions that are often difficult for near-term situational interventions like focused deterrence or hot spot policing to sustain over time.
- 4 Interventions that have a well-defined and understood theory of change are most likely to be implemented with fidelity and success.**

Maintaining fidelity to a program model is a big challenge for violence prevention programs. In many

instances, programs deviate from core elements of the canonical models that inspired them, such as focused deterrence or Cure Violence. In other instances, the program experiences “drift” as key elements are poorly implemented or neglected over time. Even the strongest evidence-based violence interventions will fail when not implemented properly. Having a clear and well-understood theory of change is typically a prerequisite for keeping the eyes of various stakeholders on the ball. Understanding how each program component matters to the success of the overall effort is critical, as are high-quality management practices.

- 5 Engagement with system and community stakeholders should be active and ongoing.** A diverse set of institutional and community stakeholders is important for coordinating the data, intelligence and services that matter for reducing violence. While robust interagency collaboration can take years and strong commitment to achieve, the investment is more than worthwhile. Dedicated staff who are committed to relationship-building and openness are generally a prerequisite for sustained partnerships.<sup>120</sup> In addition, an interorganizational architecture that institutionalizes the roles of a diverse set of stakeholders, like that adopted in Cincinnati, can help ensure that violence prevention efforts are sustainable and effective over the long term.<sup>121</sup>



VI

## Endnotes

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<sup>7</sup> Robert Sampson (2012) *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect*. University of Chicago Press

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<sup>12</sup> In the literature, protective factors are further distinguished into two types. "Direct protective factors" predict a low probability of violence in the same way as having a high family income predicts lower levels of violence compared to having a low family income. "Buffering protective factors" predict a low probability of violence in the presence of other risk factors for violence, such as being raised in a low-income family but having a strong attachment to school and prosocial peers. Buffering protective factors are often the target of interventions to reduce violence among youth who face an array of family and community risks for violence such as growing up in a poor family or living in a neighborhood of concentrated disadvantage. See Friedrich Losel, David P. Farrington, "Direct protective and buffering protective factors in the development of youth violence." *The American Journal of Preventive Medicine*; Vol. 43, Issue 2S1; pp S8-S21

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VII

# Appendix

## Appendix: Summary of Interventions

### High Scope Perry Preschool (HSPP)


Primary Site/Lead  
Family

Population Targeted by Intervention:  
Poor African American children, ages 3-4 with low IQ test scores

- Core Program Activities
- A social development curriculum delivered over 4 years from the 5th through 8th grades
  - It is usually delivered in social studies classes by school teachers and includes 16 to 21 lessons per year focused on enhancing social competencies for managing risky situations.

Impact and Cost

% Arrested for a violent felony by early 40s



Program participants were 1/6 as likely (2% versus 12%) as the control group to have been arrested for a violent felony by their early 40s.

Cost: \$17,759 per participant in 2006 dollars.

### Chicago Child Parent Centers (CCPC)


Primary Site/Lead  
Family

Population Targeted by Intervention:  
Primarily poor African American children, ages 3-4, living in high poverty neighborhoods

- Core Program Activities
- 1-2 years of half-day preschool language and math instruction
  - Individualized activities
  - Health and nutrition services
  - Weekly parental participation consisting of parenting education, classroom volunteering, and field trips
  - A certified teacher and classroom aide provided for every 17 participants on average

Impact and Cost

% Arrested for a violent crime as a juvenile



Program participants were 41 percent less likely (9% versus 15.3%) than the control group to be arrested for a violent crime as a juvenile.

Cost: \$8,512 in 2007 dollars

## Aban Aya Youth Project (AAYP)

Primary Site/Lead  
School

### Population Targeted by Intervention:

African American 5th grade boys in “high risk” schools that have low average academic achievement, high truancy, low attendance and high student mobility

### Core Program Activities

- 2.5 hours of daily center-based instruction to develop both cognitive and social emotional skills
- Highly individualized
- Low teacher-to-child ratio
- Substantial parent involvement, including weekly home visits and monthly parent meetings

### Impact and Cost

The growth in violent behavior for AAYP participants was 35 percent lower than for controls, and the effect was three times as large for the most violent male participants at baseline.

Cost: Per participant costs are not available. However, the AAYP program is documented in a program manual and is available for purchase online. As of July 2017, a hard copy costs \$820, and an electronic copy costs \$425. A one-day implementation training session with materials costs approximately \$5,000 with travel expenses included. Additional technical support is provided at \$150 per hour.

## End Investment in Scared Straight

Primary Site/Lead  
Juvenile Justice System

### Population Targeted by Intervention:

Juvenile delinquents, typically ages 11-18

### Core Program Activities

- Organized visits to adult prisons
- Inmates serving life sentences provide aggressive presentations to youth regarding the harsh realities of prison life
- Sometimes, youth are locked inside prison cells
- A visit may last a few hours to overnight

### Impact and Cost

Synthesizing results across eight studies, Scared Straight type programs significantly increased reoffending rates for program participants relative to controls. In fact, results showed that the juvenile awareness programs actually increased the odds of offending (OR=1.47).<sup>122</sup>

## Becoming a Man (BAM)

Primary Site/Lead  
School

### Population Targeted by Intervention:


High risk African American and Latino males in the 7th through 10th grades attending low-performing schools in high violence neighborhoods

**Becoming a Man (BAM) (continued)**

**Core Program Activities**

- Weekly group meetings lasting an hour that incorporate CBT principles and involve group-based learning challenges or “missions”. Participants are allowed to skip an academic class in order to participate in BAM meetings. Group sessions include no more than 15 youth at a time and typically have a group-to-adult ratio of 8:1.
- Mentorship provided by BAM counselors in the form of one-on-one counseling, often in episodic “brief encounters” that occur before, during and after school. BAM counselors serve an average of 55 youth at a time, roughly 20 percent of whom may seek individual counseling.
- Afterschool and out-of-school activities including visits to sporting events or other field trips

**Impact and Cost**



During the program year, program participation reduces violent-crime arrests by about 8 per 100 youth, equal to about 44 percent of the CCM (18 per 100 youth).

Cost: BAM costs about \$2,000 per participant in 2015 dollars.

**One Summer Plus (OSP)**

**Primary Site/Lead**

Summer Employment


**Population Targeted by Intervention:**

African American adolescents ages 14-21 attending low-performing schools and having a history of gang or justice-system involvement, high truancy, and low school engagement. Ninety percent eligible for free-or-reduced lunch.

**Core Program Activities**

- Provides eight weeks of part-time (25 hours per week) summer employment at the Illinois minimum wage of \$8.25 per hour.
- Works to match youth with jobs in the nonprofit and government sectors (e.g., summer camp counselors, YMCA staff, working with elected officials) that supported their exploration of career interests and the development of relevant skills.
- Youth are assigned adult job mentors at a ratio of 10 youth per mentor. Job mentors regularly visited the workplace, taught basic job skills, and helped youth navigate work challenges such as transportation, supervisor conflicts, and family responsibilities.

**Impact and Cost**



Youth assigned to participate in OSP had 43 percent fewer violent crime arrests over the summer and for 13 months afterward. Most of the difference in violent crime arrests occurred after the youth completed the summer employment program.

Cost: The cost to administer OSP for the City of Chicago was roughly \$3,000 per participant, including an average of \$1,400 in wages.

## Violence Intervention Program (VIP)

### Primary Site/Lead

Hospital


### Population Targeted by Intervention:

Mostly African American repeat victims of violence admitted to the emergency room who are 18 years or older and on parole or probation. More than half of the sample were older than 30 and roughly 60 percent were high school dropouts.


### Core Program Activities

- Program clients receive up to 2.5 years of intensive follow-up services that may include substance abuse treatment, employment training, educational services, and family or group therapy.
- Social workers and members of a VIP team composed of “two social workers; two case workers; a program manager; a parole and probation agent; and representatives from psychiatry, epidemiology, and preventive medicine, as well as trauma and critical care” conduct home visits and weekly “group encounter sessions

### Impact and Cost



Control group participants were found to be three times as likely to have been arrested for a violent crime (57 percent versus 18 percent)



Control group participants were four times as likely to have been convicted of a violent crime (55 percent versus 13 percent).

Cost: Cost data for the VIP could not be identified from the literature scan.

## Cure Violence

### Primary Site/Lead

Community

### Population Targeted by Intervention:

Violence interrupters target those at immediate risk for violence based upon intelligence gathered in the community, from law enforcement or emergency rooms

According to the Cure Violence model, Individuals targeted for outreach services should meet at least four of the following seven risk criteria for engaging in violence:

- Carries or has ready access to a gun.
- Is involved with a gang.
- Has a criminal history.
- Is involved in high-risk street activity such as drug dealing.
- Is a recent shooting victim (past 90 days).
- Is between 16 and 25.
- Has recently been incarcerated for a crime against a person.

Cure Violence (continued)

Core Program Activities

- Violence interrupters are tasked with detecting potential violent events, particularly acts of retaliation as part of ongoing conflicts, and engaging in tactics to prevent those events from occurring.
- To intervene before a conflict escalates to violence, interrupters are trained in mediation methods to connect with relevant parties and defuse violent situations. They may meet one-on-one with parties to the conflict, host small group peace-keeping sessions, or bring in respected third parties to help broker a nonviolent resolution.
- Outreach workers are similar to case managers and work as “behavior change agents, connectors, and mentors” on both short- and long-term risk factors for violence. They typically carry a caseload of up to 15 individuals with whom they stay in constant contact and help connect with services and opportunities related to employment, housing, education, substance abuse treatment, anger management counseling, and support for leaving gangs.

Impact and Cost

Implementation*	Impact
<i>Chicago Ceasefire</i>	Using 17 years of data, the study found that four of the seven program sites receiving Cure Violence intervention experienced an average decline in shootings of between 16 and 28 percent.
<i>Baltimore Safe Streets (BSS)</i>	From 2007 to 2010, monthly homicides declined by 56% in one neighborhood and 26% in another. However, homicides did not decline in a third neighborhood and increased by 270% in a fourth.
<i>Brooklyn Save Our Streets (SOS)</i>	Average monthly shootings fell by 6 percent in Crown Heights while increasing by 18 percent to 28 percent in comparison neighborhoods. Gun violence in Crown Heights was found to be “20 percent lower than what it would have been had gun violence trends mirrored those of similar, adjacent precincts.
<i>Phoenix’s Truce Project (PTP)</i>	A time series analysis evaluation of the program for June 2010 through December 2011 found that it was associated with a decrease in monthly assaults but an increase in shootings.

\*Not all features of the Cure Violence model were implemented with fidelity across replication sites. See pages 30-33

Focused Deterrence

Primary Site/Lead

Law Enforcement

Population Targeted by Intervention:

- People involved in group- or gang-related gun violence

Core Program Activities:

- Data and intelligence are used to identify specific violent offending groups and violent individuals at a citywide or neighborhood level. (continued)

## Focused Deterrence *(continued)*

### Core Program Activities *(continued)*

- Formation of a diverse working group: A diverse working group is composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including probation and parole, as well as social **service providers, street outreach workers, and community leaders**.
- Face-to-face communication with targeted groups and offenders: In face-to-face gatherings typically known as forums, notifications, or call-ins, offending groups and individuals receive deterrence and moral messages as well as concrete offers of help
- Sustained follow-through on promises made in face-to-face communications includes the provision of promised social services as well as the close monitoring of groups for signs of possible violence, followed by special enforcement operations should groups continue to engage in violence

### Impact and Cost

<i>Implementation</i>	<b>Impact</b>
<i>Boston Operation Cease Fire</i>	63 percent reduction in youth homicides, a 32 percent decrease in gunshot-related calls for service, a 25 percent decline in monthly gun assault incidents across Boston, and a 44 percent decline in youth gun assaults in a targeted police district.
<i>Stockton Operation Peacekeeper</i>	Monthly homicides fell citywide by 42 percent after the program was implemented, and reductions in homicide persisted for three years after the intervention was concluded.
<i>Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership</i>	34 percent decline in citywide monthly homicides between 1999 and 2001. In addition, gang-involved homicides decreased by 38 percent and black male homicide rates, specifically, decreased from 145.2 to 54.1 per 10,000 of those at risk.
<i>Philadelphia Youth Violence Reduction Partnership</i>	Program participants were 38 percent less likely to be arrested for a violent crime and 44 percent less likely to be convicted of a violent crime.
<i>Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods</i>	Police beats receiving PSN strategies experienced a 37 percent decline in quarterly homicides. Homicide declines were greatest in beats that held an offender notification forum.
<i>Lowell Project Safe Neighborhoods</i>	44 percent decline in monthly gun violence assaults.
<i>Boston Operation Ceasefire II</i>	Participating gangs showed a 31 percent reduction in total shootings compared with matched comparison gangs.
<i>Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence</i>	Gang-involved homicides declined by 41 percent over 3.5 years while non-gang homicides increased. Moreover, the CIRV was associated with a 22 percent decrease in violent firearm incidents.

**Focused Deterrence (continued)**

**Impact and Cost**

**Implementation**

**Impact**

*Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy*

Attendance at a call-in meeting resulted in 23 percent fewer shootings by gang factions in the year after the call-in.

*New Orleans Group Violence Reduction Strategy*

The program reduced homicides by 17 percent, gang-involved homicides by 32 percent, homicides of young black males by 26 percent, and both lethal and nonlethal firearms violence by 16 percent.

**Hot Spots Policing**

**Primary Site/Lead**

Law Enforcement

**Population Targeted by Intervention**

People located at crime hotspots

**Core Program Activities**

Hot spots policing strategies focus enforcement efforts on small geographic areas where violent crime is concentrated and recurrent.

**Impact and Cost**

**Implementation**

**Impact**

*Kansas City Gun Project*

The treatment beats showed a 65 percent increase in guns seized and a 49 percent decrease in gun crimes.

*Philadelphia Drug Corners Crackdown*

There were statistically significant reductions in violent crimes and drug crimes in treatment areas.

*Boston Safe Street Teams Program*

17 percent reduction in violent crime incidents compared with controls.

*Jacksonville Policing Violent Crime Hot Spots Program*

The problem-oriented policing activities generated a 33 percent reduction in street violence. Direct-saturation patrols, however, did not generate any statistically significant reductions in violence.

*Philadelphia Foot Patrol Program*

Places that received the foot patrol intervention showed a 23 percent reduction in street violent crime incidents.

**Replace Aggressive Drug Law Enforcement with Focused Deterrence Drug Enforcement Drug Market Intervention**

**Primary Site/Lead**

Law Enforcement

**Population Targeted by Intervention:**

Drug offenders at targeted hot spots




## Replace Aggressive Drug Law Enforcement with Focused Deterrence Drug Enforcement Drug Market Intervention *(continued)*

### Core Program Activities

- An intelligence and data-driven phase to identify high-density crime areas with a high prevalence of drug arrests that were connected to other serious crimes.
- Police collaboration with the community, narcotics investigators, and probation and parole officers to develop cases against identified drug dealers using confidential informants and undercover officers.
- Notification forums, or “call-ins,” with offenders who committed nonviolent or nonfelony offenses to communicate a deterrence message regarding their continued drug offending.
- Needs assessments to help match offenders with community services including education, housing, employment, food, clothing, drug and alcohol treatment, and transportation.

### Impact and Cost



Areas targeted by the DMI saw a 7.9 percent decrease in violence while comparison areas experienced a 7.8 percent increase in violence.

## End Use of Juvenile Curfews

Primary Site/Lead  
Law Enforcement

Population Targeted by Intervention:  
Youth under 18

### Core Program Activities

- Curfews involve citation or arrest of youth not indoors during late evening to early morning hours with varying times on weekdays, weekends, and holidays.

### Impact and Cost

A recent systematic review of 12 state and local juvenile curfews found that on average these policies have no effect on juvenile crime or juvenile victimization.

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