A vision for the effective operationalisation of the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage
COP26 and beyond
29 October 2021

The Loss and Damage Collaboration’s Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD) Working Group recently circulated a Short Brief for Civil Society on the SNLD. This paper is intended to provide further detail to that paper to support the effective operationalisation of the SNLD at COP26. This longer brief also builds upon the Loss and Damage Collaboration’s Santiago Network Report; the Joint Constituency Call for Action; Practical Action’s report on the lessons learned from the CTCN and notes from the informal consultations led by the Chilean COP25 and UK COP26 presidencies and work of the SNLD working group.

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Introduction

In August 2021, the United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published the first part of its Sixth Assessment Report (AR6 Report) which brings together the most recent science on climate change and addresses the most up-to-date physical understanding of it. UN Secretary General António Guterres described the report as a “code red for humanity” and said “[t]here is a clear moral and economic imperative to protect the lives and livelihoods of those on the front lines of the climate crisis.” The AR6 Report confirmed that “[h]uman-induced climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe” and that not only has evidence of those changes strengthened since the Fifth Assessment Report in 2013-2014, but those changes will continue to become larger.

Changes include increases in the frequency and intensity of “hot extremes, marine heatwaves, and heavy precipitation, agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions, and proportion of intense tropical cyclones, as well as reductions in Arctic sea ice, snow cover and permafrost.” The global water cycle is also projected to further intensify “including its variability, global monsoon precipitation and the severity of wet and dry events,” and many changes “are irreversible for centuries to millennia, especially changes in the ocean, ice sheets and global sea level”.

The changes that the IPCC refers to are causing loss and damage in every region in the world. This includes economic losses such as loss of income and loss of physical assets such as property. It also includes non-economic losses such as loss of life, impacts on health, human displacement and loss of indigenous knowledge and culture. The IPCC tells us that loss and damage caused by human-induced climate change is happening now and it is becoming worse with every year that passes. This will continue irrespective of the level of action undertaken to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Frontline communities have known for some time that we are in the era of loss and damage. Not because they have been told about it. Not because they have read about it or they have seen it in headlines, in pictures, in scientific reports, and in the news cycle. They know about it because they have seen it. They see it kill their loved ones, destroy their homes, livelihoods, and cultural heritage. They see it make their homelands uninhabitable, forcing them to leave with nowhere safe to go. It impacts their mental health.
as they fear for their future and for the future of their children. Many have not survived and many more will not survive.

Since countries agreed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC/the Convention) they have understood that there are people in the world who are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Those communities do not have the capacity to address loss and damage impacts and they rely on wealthy countries and the humanitarian assistance community. Parties recognised this in article 4.1 of the Convention, that because developed countries are largely responsible for climate change, and they have the capacity to address it, they bear a greater responsibility to act. In 2015, they also agreed to Article 8 of the Paris Agreement which recognised the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage, and the need for Parties to enhance understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage.

In 2019, at COP25 in Madrid the Santiago Network for averting, minimising, and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (the SNLD) was established under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (the WIM). The WIM had been established under the Convention in 2013 “To address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”. Countries had agreed that the WIM would enhance knowledge and understanding; strengthen dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among stakeholders; and enhance action and support, including finance, technology and capacity building. They also agreed to establish an Executive Committee (the ExCom) to guide the implementation of those functions.

In establishing the SNLD, countries had a vision of a body that would have the capacity to implement the functions of the WIM in circumstances where the ExCom, as a ‘policy arm’, has been ill-equipped to do so. The SNLD would catalyse the technical assistance of organizations, bodies, networks, and experts for the implementation of approaches that would help people on the ground in countries and communities most vulnerable to loss and damage including through local, grassroots, subnational, and national level initiatives. Those organisations, bodies, networks and experts tasked with providing technical assistance would also report on their progress to the ExCom and the ExCom would include relevant information in its annual reports.

Despite the urgent need for the assistance this vision of the SNLD promised to provide, countries were unable to agree on a pathway to operationalise it beyond its agreed establishment on paper. Thus civil society groups initiated a survey to identify the needs of developing countries and produced a report. The UNFCCC secretariat also conducted a survey to identify country needs for technical assistance and produced a brief analysis of the results in December 2020. It has since hosted various regional events to gather views. Also in December 2020, the outgoing Chilean COP25 Presidency and the incoming United Kingdom (UK) COP26 Presidency commenced a series of consultations with countries and members of civil society about the questions that needed to be answered to effectively operationalise the SNLD at COP26, culminating in a series of discussion papers as they sought to facilitate cooperation and build consensus.
In November 2021, at COP26 in Glasgow, countries have an opportunity to operationalise an effective SNLD that not only ensures the WIM fulfils its functions but also that countries fulfil their obligations under Article 8 of the Paris Agreement to enhance understanding, action and support on loss and damage. Civil society acknowledges and welcomes that since COP25, the outgoing Chilean COP25 Presidency together with the UK COP26 Presidency, and the UNFCCC Secretariat have consulted with parties and civil society to gather views and build consensus. With COP26 fast approaching, however, the SNLD does not appear on the provisional agenda that has been released. It is therefore not clear whether the SNLD will be discussed under the subsidiary bodies where parties can negotiate its operationalisation and, if it was discussed, whether the decision that would be agreed would enable the SNLD to begin helping frontline communities as soon as possible.

In the **short brief** published on 15 October 2021, we expressed the urgent need for the UK COP26 Presidency to facilitate cooperation between parties, and for parties themselves to take leadership to ensure the SNLD is effectively operationalised at COP26. As acknowledged by the IPCC, the climate crisis is here and loss and damage is already adversely impacting communities who need an effective and operational SNLD to survive. This need will only become greater and the SNLD needs to start work now to enable it to be a useful tool in the global toolkit to address loss and damage caused by climate change. For this to occur, civil society demands:

1. Substantive work at COP26 under the subsidiary bodies to operationalise the SNLD;
2. A comprehensive decision at COP26 that:
   a. Enables the SNLD to begin its work as soon as possible;
   b. Guarantees finance for a secretariat to coordinate the SNLD’s activities;
   c. Guarantees finance for the technical assistance the SNLD will catalyse; and
   d. For any outstanding issues, sets out a clear roadmap under the subsidiary bodies for parties to complete SNLD’s operationalisation at COP27.
3. Parties must learn from the successes and failures of existing technical assistance providers, such as the UNFCCC’s Climate Technology Centre and Network; and
4. Parties must operationalise the SNLD in a way that enables it to deliver inclusive support, fill gaps where technical assistance is not currently available, and empower communities in the long-term through locally led projects that build the capacity of local people and organisations on the ground.

This purpose of this longer brief is to expand upon those demands and summarise the most recent thinking on what a fit for purpose SNLD looks like. The brief first elaborates on the key asks for a fit for purpose SNLD, and then summarises how a fit for purpose SNLD can be delivered at COP26 and beyond.
What does a fit for purpose Santiago Network for Loss and Damage look like?

Structure

It is useful to commence by setting out the structure of the SNLD. Decisions 2/CP.25 and 2/CMA.2, establish the SNLD as follows:

43. Establishes, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, the Santiago network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, to catalyse the technical assistance of relevant organizations, bodies, networks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches at the local, national and regional level, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;

The SNLD thus serves as the implementation arm of the WIM and is embedded in the following institutional structure:

We propose drawing on lessons from the Climate Technology Centre and Network (the CTCN) to further elaborate the structure of the SNLD. Guided by the example of the CTCN, the SNLD could be composed of a Secretariat and a Network. We suggest that requests for the services of the SNLD should be made through national loss and damage contact points. We would suggest parties also consider the benefits of an advisory board.
A secretariat would steer activities, report on progress to the COP/CMA, and coordinate with ExCom activities. The secretariat must be set up within the UNFCCC regime where processes are party-driven and where parties convene regularly. It must also have resources to operate including for staff.

A core network of national, regional, international, and sectoral organizations including academic, NGO, private sector, public sector and research entities which deliver services. The Network could mobilize experts to deliver options and solutions, ensuring that the solutions are tailored to local needs.

Country requests for services would be submitted by the country’s loss and damage contact point. Loss and damage contact points facilitate cooperation and engagement at the national level by engaging with ministries, UNFCCC focal points, the private sector, civil society and academia. They ensure that national circumstances and priorities are reflected in these processes.

The Advisory Board would determine operational modalities and rules of procedure, and periodically identifies different issues to explore in more detail. Its representatives could include Parties, members of relevant institutional arrangements under the UNFCCC such as the ExCom, and technology and finance institutions, and a diverse range of civil society representatives.
## Functions

Building on the functions set out in the [Joint Constituency Call for Action](#) for the effective operationalization of the SNLD we propose the services of the SNLD under three broad functions that must remain flexible and adapt over time in response to changing needs:

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<th>Function 1</th>
<th>Technical assistance and capacity building</th>
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| **Potential services could include but are not limited to:** | ● Facilitating urgent and timely response to severe impacts (e.g., after an extreme weather event or during a slow-onset process). This will require developing a clear set of trigger mechanisms to avoid unnecessary delays in the SNLD provision of technical assistance.  
● Technical support for loss and damage needs assessments.  
● Technical support including capacity building and guidance on human-rights based and gender-responsive approaches to reduce, assess and address loss and damage ex-ante and ex-post and on their appropriate mix.  
● Technical support and guidance for the development of policy and planning strategies and documents.  
● Guidance, approaches and frameworks for implementation of concrete projects to address loss and damage on the ground (guided by types of loss and damage reported by climate impacted communities).  
● Assistance in access to finance for loss and damage measures (ex-ante and ex-post), in particular marginalized populations and those who lack the means to make formal loss and damage claims.  
● Enhance the capacity of national loss and damage contact points and coordination with responsible agencies in-country involved in actions to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. |

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<th>Function 2</th>
<th>Developing and creating access to knowledge and information on loss and damage at scale of impact</th>
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| **Potential services could include but are not limited to:** | ● Developing innovative approaches to effectively address losses and damages at different topographies, geographies, spaces and ecosystems, including in the informal and care economy.  
● Development of responses to sudden and slow-onset hazards with relevant line agencies.  
● Communicating loss and damage impacts, solutions, innovations and good practices.  
● Research on loss and damage (e.g. residual risk and loss and damage assessment, tangible and intangible losses and damages, M&E and quantification, archive with case study evidence and participatory research-|
Based evidence from affected communities) to inform policies, plans, and strategies.

- Prepare and periodically review long-term assessments of risks of loss and damage from extreme weather events and slow onset processes and feed this reporting into the national plans including the NDC review and update, and in periodic reporting for the Global Stock Take.

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<th>Function 3</th>
<th>Fostering coordination and collaboration among key stakeholders</th>
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| **Potential services could include but are not limited to:** | • Providing a coordination mechanism to share knowledge among relevant stakeholders, e.g. Information and experience sharing of countries, communities and other actors that work on addressing loss and damage with national loss and damage approaches.  
  • Facilitating south-south, north-south, south-north, learning and knowledge sharing.  
  • Undertaking an inventory of the technical support that is already available for loss and damage, such as through the CTCN and other groups outside the UNFCCC, so that the SNLD can build on what exists and focus on filling gaps. |

### How would this work in practice?

An operationalised SNLD that implements the WIM mandate and provides action and support to developing countries to avert, minimise and address loss and damage could function as follows:

1. Developing countries, through their **Loss and Damage Focal Point**, submit a request to the Secretariat for either:
   - A. A Loss and Damage Needs Assessment to be carried out to determine their loss and damage needs; or
   - B. Technical assistance to address a loss and damage need identified by the loss and damage focal point.

2. The **Secretariat** responds to the request by identifying and pairing a **Network** member(s) who can fulfil the request with the developing country, including facilitating the provision of access to finance to deliver on the developing country needs and providing guidance, approaches and frameworks to that Network member including policy and planning strategies for the implementation of approaches based on identified needs.

Separately, the **Secretariat** also develops and creates access to knowledge and information on
loss and damage at scale of impact; and fosters coordinating and collaboration among key stakeholders.

The Network member will fulfill the request for assistance, and report back to the Secretariat with recommendations related to specific loss and damage needs including processes undertaken to enhance the capacity of local people on the ground to continue to manage and address the impacts of loss and damage long-term beyond the initial response phase.

What would be the types of events the Santiago Network could address?

Climate-related events that cause loss and damage stretch across a continuum from extreme events to slow onset events. The SNLD should be capable of mobilizing technical assistance for countries to address loss and damage across this entire continuum and at the intersections of impacts from slow onset and extreme events.

Extreme events include cyclones, hurricanes, glacial lake outburst floods, wildfires, and seasonal droughts. Slow onset events include sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification. Extreme events may be made more likely because of slow onset events: temperature rise and forest degradation can increase the probability of wildfires; land degradation may make landslides more likely in severe rain events; glacial retreat creates conditions for glacial lake outburst floods; rising sea levels increase the frequency of storm surges and rates of salinity intrusion.

At the intersections of extreme and slow onset events, slow onset events wear away at the resilience of communities and make extreme events more damaging. Extreme events can damage housing and community infrastructure and undermine systems of food security and livelihoods that can push communities into cycles of poverty, food and livelihood insecurity, making them more vulnerable to slow onset events and to further extreme events.

For example, Vanuatu was struck by Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015, which caused significant crop losses across the country. In 2016, Tropical Cyclone Winston had similar impacts on agriculture in Fiji. Both events significantly reduced household income, food security, and nutrition.

Floods also have an impact on long-term food production and food security. For example, floods in 2014 in Bardiya district of Nepal swept away paddy fields, damaged food stores, and killed livestock. Sediment deposits from floodwaters destroyed the productivity of agricultural lands. Floods in Faridpur district in southern Bangladesh have increased over the last ten years, and the floods of 2020 were particularly devastating. Rice crops were lost, as were household food-related assets such as vegetable gardens, aquaculture ponds, poultry, and livestock. Floods damage roads, bridges, and other infrastructure, further increasing community vulnerability.
Damage from cyclones and floods lead to climate-induced migration. In Fiji, over 55,000 people were displaced by Cyclone Winston. When food crops are damaged and productive lands destroyed, families and communities send community members in search of jobs and wages, most often their men. Emergency relief provided after events is insufficient; the longer-term work of rebuilding schools, agricultural fields, new livelihoods that are more climate-resilient is critical to ensuring communities are not pushed into and trapped in spiraling cycles of poverty and vulnerability by extreme weather events, increasing slow onset events, and their impacts.

After extreme events, many people will be displaced within their own countries, not only temporarily, but as productive resources are degraded over the long-term, these may become permanent dislocations. In places like the low-lying nations of the Pacific, people may have no choice but to relocate beyond national borders.

How should Parties think about technical assistance across the extreme event to slow onset event spectrum?

Satkhira district in coastal Bangladesh is exposed to frequent cyclones, tidal flooding, freshwater salinization, and increasing droughts. Impacted communities in the district report that social safety net schemes and microcredit programmes were not available to help them in the wake of disasters. This is an example of a technical assistance need: enhanced social safety nets that can provide immediate support to vulnerable households after an extreme weather event.

In the wake of Tropical Cyclone Pam, Oxfam provided technical assistance to communities in Vanuatu with a pilot voucher system (Unblocked Cash) to quickly deliver cash to affected families, lowering capacity barriers to accessing food and other necessities.

Technical assistance may take the form of rebuilding community infrastructure in climate-resilient ways after extreme events. After Hurricane Irma in 2017, the Climate Technology Centre and Network provided technical assessments of key infrastructure in Antigua and Barbuda, in response to a request for assistance in rebuilding for resilience to climate vulnerability.

If community return to previous settlements is risky, technical assistance may be needed in addressing involuntary climate-related displacement and planned relocation efforts. When migration is required, assistance will be needed to allow people to migrate with dignity.

What needs to happen at COP26?

Recalling the demands summarised in the introduction to this brief, an effective and operational SNLD that is fit for purpose will require negotiations between parties under the subsidiary bodies at COP26. Those negotiations must result in a comprehensive decision that enables the SNLD to begin its work as soon as possible; guaranteed finance for a secretariat to coordinate the SNLD’s activities and for the technical assistance the SNLD will catalyse; and a roadmap or process under the subsidiary bodies for any outstanding issues to be resolved by COP27. In reaching agreement, Parties must learn from the successes
and failures of the CTCN, an existing technical assistance network under the UNFCCC and the SNLD must have the capacity to deliver inclusive support through its members, fill gaps where technical assistance is not currently available, and empower communities in the long-term through locally led projects.

**Negotiations under the subsidiary bodies are required.** The SNLD is a body established under the Convention by Parties. Negotiations under the Convention are Party-driven. As such, the Parties are not only responsible for operationalising the SNLD but they must be enabled to decide how it will be operationalised. The subsidiary bodies is where substantive technical negotiations between Parties occur, and a COP/CMA decision is a critical aspect of recording what has been agreed and creating certainty as to the mandate the SNLD has going forward and the pathway ahead.

**A comprehensive decision must be agreed to enable the SNLD to begin its work as soon as possible.** As explained in the introduction to this brief, loss and damage is impacting communities now, and the severity of those impacts are only becoming worse. The SNLD must be enabled to start helping those communities immediately. A comprehensive decision from which the SNLD can derive its operational activities may include decisions regarding structure, functions, financial arrangements, and mechanisms for review. It is this clarity that will enable the SNLD to become, as soon as possible, an effective mechanism that can carry out its objective of catalysing technical assistance for the implementation of approaches in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change. Key issues that will need attention include:

- **Establishing a secretariat** with a broad operational mandate and resources for adequate staffing to enable it to carry out that mandate. Not only does the SNLD need active coordination (rather than the passive framework of a website), but developing countries need a helpline, a human presence that they can contact to enable them to effectively engage with the SNLD. Lessons learned from the operationalisation and implementation of the CTCN tell us that an umbrella solution will not work and countries need to be assisted to ensure that they are provided tailor-made services that are responsive to their specific needs. It is also critical that the SNLD secretariat is not hosted by another body either within or external to the UNFCCC process. The experience of the CTCN was that the procedure for selecting a host was cumbersome and created uncertainty about funding. This arrangement also creates issues where a host agreement may not be renewed. For the SNLD to become effective there must be continuity and certainty around its operation.

- **Identifying finance for the secretariat and its activities, and also to enhance the capacity of loss and damage focal points.** Without proper resourcing the SNLD secretariat will not be able to operate effectively. This was a major blocker of progress for the CTCN and the SNLD cannot repeat the same mistake. Further, the activities that the SNLD facilitates through its network will need to be financed. Access to finance remains a major challenge for vulnerable communities who, even if they are able to identify their needs and what they may need to address them lack the capacity to pay to address those needs. Finally, Parties must consider the need to enhance the capacity of loss and damage focal points to engage with the SNLD. These are crucial links between the SNLD and the country requesting assistance and they must be able to communicate comprehensively
with the SNLD in a way that best captures their countries’ national circumstances but is also responsive to the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised in those communities for whom the impacts of loss and damage are magnified.

- **Build a common understanding of and agree to the form and functions of the SNLD.** These may be broad with further details to be elaborated over time but at a minimum must go beyond the SNLD being a matchmaking entity and enable it to help countries (1) identify what they need through a streamlined process and (2) link them with an organisation, body, network or expert that can provide a tailored service to address that need or needs.

- **Encourage countries to establish their loss and damage focal point** if they have not already done so to facilitate effective engagement between all stakeholders.

- **Consider the capacity of the ExCom and the UNFCCC secretariat to undertake complimentary work** that assists in identifying gaps in national policies and mapping technical assistance needs to inform the development of the modalities and procedures of the SNLD. Ensuring coherence with the work already being undertaken by the ExCom and the UNFCCC secretariat should also be considered, particularly in regards to fostering coordination and collaboration among key stakeholders (the third broad proposed function of the SNLD).

Finally, there must be a roadmap or process agreed for any outstanding matters to continue to be negotiated under the subsidiary bodies and those negotiations be finalised at COP27. Considering the need for the SNLD to be flexible and adapt to the changing needs of Parties, changes in the international climate regime, and changes in understanding as to how the SNLD could best operate to excel in delivering its mandate, a comprehensive decision does not have to close the door to future negotiations. Part of being comprehensive may be to set out a framework within which the SNLD can commence its work but include an agreement for Parties to continue to develop a vision of the SNLD beyond COP26 under the subsidiary bodies.

**What steps can be taken to build consensus?**

We have every confidence that Parties can operationalise the SNLD at COP26 to respond to the urgent needs of the most climate vulnerable communities. However, we need a proactive proposition to operationalise the SNLD based on the excellent inputs received to date and should not defer this to subsequent COPs.

The outgoing Chilean COP25 presidency, the UK COP26 presidency and Parties must now take leadership to deliver an effective, operational SNLD at COP26. It is the role of the Presidencies to help Parties advance their level of cooperation on climate change and fulfill the objectives and goals of the UNFCCC, and Parties must cooperate to meet this target. Developing countries who are suffering the most from loss and damage must be heard. At the same time, developed countries must also be wholly engaged in discussions as not only do they have an obligation to help the most vulnerable due to historical responsibility but they also are projected to and are suffering impacts both as a result of the global interconnectedness of our societies whereby impacts in one country have flow-on effects with human-displacement, impacts on industry and agriculture but also the physical impacts of loss and damage in their own communities.
Pilot programs will be undertaken, and lessons will be learned about how to address loss and damage that can be scaled up and utilised in communities across the world as climate change impacts intensify. Coordination between stakeholders will shed light on what gaps exist and build a more cohesive international system that understands and is equipped to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. This is to the benefit of all Parties to the Convention. It is also critical that countries are seen to be implementing their obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement to create certainty in communities that the international community is taking climate change seriously and is committed to just and equitable solutions that help those who cannot help themselves.

For the discussions to resume quickly and build on the progress already made, we have summarised:

1. The positions of the Party groups expressed in the informal consultations on the SNLD (Appendix 1);
2. Our position on the latest summary paper from the presidency (Appendix 2); and
3. Key takeaways from the technical agency consultation convened by the presidencies on 20 October 2021 (Appendix 3)
Appendix

1. Positions expressed so far at the presidency-led informal consultations

To build more efficiently on the last discussions, we provide below a summary of Parties positions during informal consultations, highlighting the points of convergence and divergence. We note of course, that these positions may have changed and may continue to change as the negotiations unfold and are merely a summary of what has been expressed previously.

**Decision-making process on the SNLD:** While all Parties with the process leading to operationalisation to happen under the UNFCCC, there is a clear line between USA, EU and Switzerland on one side, that would like the discussions to happen under existing agenda items on L&D (SB item), and AILAC, G77+China, AOSIS, LDCs and AGN on the other side, that wish to create a new agenda item at COP26. Furthermore, USA wishes the discussions on L&D in general to be under the CMA, while AILAC, G77+China and LDCs want to keep a dual governance.

**Nature of the emergency and wished timeframe for discussions:** While groups agree that the matter is urgent, and wish to avoid long discussions, the USA wants to move quickly post COP under the existing items on L&D, while G77+China, AILAC, AOSIS and LDCs push for strong outcomes already at COP26. Some parties (AILAC, G77+China) would be in favour of the quick creation of an interim arrangement that would not prejudge the form of the permanent agreement, while others (AGN) are not in favour of an interim arrangement, under the concern that it would become permanent.

**What remains to be set:** There is the general agreement that the structure, the governance, the scope, and the funding of the SNLD still have to be discussed. There is yet a divergence as to whether, in the Madrid decision, the function of the SNLD was defined along with its mandate (EU), or whether only the mandate of the SNLD was defined in the Madrid decision, but not the SNLD function which remains to be defined in the effort of operationalisation (AILAC, AOSIS, LDCs)

**Entity hosting the SNLD:** EU, USA, Switzerland wish to integrate at least partly, if not all, the operationalisation of the SNLD under the ExCom, while G77+China, LDCs think that although the SNLD should be articulated with the WIM, the WIM was not mandated to operationalise it.

2. Position on the presidency summary paper

As for the CSOs, and reflecting on the most recent version of the presidencies’ summary paper, we make the following points:

- **Ambition:** the paper suggests that the COP26 decision will “endorse the process of party and stakeholder consultation for the development of the network undertaken so far” and “the parties may wish to ask the UK and incoming African presidencies to continue the process of developing the Network in consultation with parties and stakeholders. This could include details of how a
secretariat will be set up, funded and operate, gathering details of organisations who would like to participate and a process to better understand the nature of initial demands for support”. It then proposes a COP27 decision where “parties will be able to consider the results of the intersessional work and may wish to endorse a detailed development plan for the Network”. This process is not ambitious. This sets up multiple years of negotiations without the SNLD commencing its work. Parties need to aim higher than this. They need to agree to something at COP26 that enables the SNLD to start working. Doing so will not exclude the ability of the parties to continue to develop the SNLD functions etc over time at SBs, COP27 and so on.

- **Detail:** We need to resolve more details - the new presidency paper has removed a lot of detail particularly on form and function of the SNLD and we need to build upon what we have done so far and not go backwards. The absence of detail leaves a lot of things open to interpretation - it is not necessarily a bad thing to leave things open ended but we definitely need more detail than what there is now.

- **Inconsistencies:** there are inconsistencies in the paper that we need to be careful of, for example, the paper refers to catalysing technical assistance as meaning “increasing and showcasing action already undertaken” at the beginning of the paper then later says the SNLD will need to “catalyse action that would not have otherwise taken place” - the second option is what we want (the next dot point expands this point).

- **Gaps:** The SNLD is needed to fill gaps. It is not just a matchmaking service to link countries to existing providers of technical assistance/match them with what is already out there - it will go beyond that and expand what is available by helping countries to (1) identify what they need and (2) link them with an organisation that can provide a tailored service to address that need or needs.

- **Finance:** Critically the SNLD will need to have a clear and concrete source of finance for the technical assistance to be provided to vulnerable countries, and it will need a secretariat which is adequately funded to enable the SNLD to function - it will not be able to operate without this. The presidency paper is too vague on this point - it must be anticipated that vulnerable countries will not be able to pay for technical assistance themselves. Parties need to think about linkages with the financial mechanisms under the Convention, and the finance conversation more generally. The SNLD should be kept separate from the general LD finance conversation but it should also be kept in mind as a tool to broaden access to LD finance.

- **Secretariat/coordinating entity:** The presidency paper recognises that this is needed and that it will manage the SNLD. Parties now need to set it up so the SNLD can commence its work. They need to have conversations about what this looks like, and we need to keep pushing for this to be under the UNFCCC so the SNLD has longevity, is able to be party driven, and is guided by the principles of the Convention. There has been push back to say that if it was an organisation outside the UN donors will be more interested and it will be able to be more flexible but we need to be careful to keep the SNLD within the Convention - there are already organisations outside the convention and the SNLD is different - we need to continue to develop our arguments around this.
• **CTCN**: we can still learn a lot from the CTCN. There still doesn’t seem to be an appreciation of the value of looking at how the CTCN was operationalised and what it does now and learning from it. The SNLD shouldn’t be a copy of the CTCN but the CTCN is a really important source of knowledge that we can learn from to determine what to do and what not to do.

• **WIM ExCom**: the parties need to consider the linkages between the SNLD and the ExCom and its expert groups - particularly the expert group on action & support. How can they complement and enhance each other’s work? The current paper does not mention this.

• **Governance**: any language relating to decisions around the SNLD must refer to both the COP and the CMA to capture both the mandate coming from 2/CP.19 and 3.CP.18 and the mandate coming from PA art 8 until such time as parties reach a conclusive decision about the governance of the WIM.

What is reflected from our ask (based on the Joint Constituency Call for Action)

• The secretariat of the SNLD will report on network activities to the COP/CMA, although “through the Executive Committee of the WIM as envisaged in 2/CMA.2. Para 44”

• Recognition of the need for a SNLD coordinating secretariat, “The network will be managed by a secretariat”.

• Recognition that “The Santiago Network secretariat will require finance to enable its work”, while recognising that the role of the secretariat is to mobilise technical assistance as per 2/CMA.2. But then says “It will also need to be in a position to help parties source finance for technical assistance”?

• Mentions that the SNLD will need to be proactive in assisting them (parties) to identify and prioritize the assistance they need. As is a challenging process for many countries not knowing what they need or which need is the priority, including when a loss and damage event unfolds, the secretariat can assist in guiding them, in a transparent manner.

• Recognition that the SNLD will need to “provide a service which responds to countries’ individual needs”, but it should be through a streamlined and ongoing ability to assist with holistic planning such as through needs assessments

3. Reflections on the 20th October technical agency consultation

Questions

1. What barriers are there to understanding the technical needs of developing countries?
   - What actions could the Santiago network take to help overcome these? What mechanisms do agencies use now to understand how their work can benefit and inform technical development in developing countries?

2. In what way could these be improved?
   - How could the operation of the Santiago network help?

3. What enabling factors need to be in place to enable agencies’ response to the technical assistance needs of developing countries?
What role could the Santiago network play in enabling agencies’ response?

Key takeaways

1. **There is confusion from the perspective of technical agencies that suggests they understand the SNLD to be already operational.** One technical agency representative had attended some of the UNFCCC secretariat’s regional ‘marketplace’ meetings. She said it was a great way to connect parties, countries and technical agencies but although needs had been expressed and organisations had responded during those meetings nothing had eventuated because the follow-up process was unclear. For COP26, it is important that Parties (and stakeholders) understand that the SNLD has only been established on paper and a website created. This does not mean it is operational. Operationalisation of the SNLD is yet to happen. In fact, **this intervention further supports the need for a secretariat** with staffing that Parties and stakeholders can liaise with through their loss and damage focal point in the case of Parties, and directly for stakeholders. Without this institutional framework, it is unclear what technical agencies will be joining when they express interest in the SNLD, other than putting their names on paper.

2. **Finance was raised as a challenge.** Technical agencies expressed a need for the SNLD to consider and address how to increase finance flows to deal with loss and damage in the context of an already overstretched humanitarian sector. One technical agency participant suggested that the SNLD could look into ways to adjust funding structures to attract funding to this space. The SNLD needs to have resources to build support at the country level and support people to access the finance they need.

3. **There was a consistent call for the need for better coordination across diverse sectors to take these conversations beyond the technical climate space and to ensure people on the front lines who are facing risks and impacts are also being consulted.** For coordinated action, there is a need to have strong connections between the SNLD and local actors so that they are not only listened to but are also guided by the best available information. The loss and damage contact person and key ministries must coordinate to enable the technical assistance from the SNLD to effectively address loss and damage. It must be noted, however, that the technical climate space mostly relies on voluntary contributions and there is little incentive for people not already in this space to engage – these are all unfunded mandates on top of an already overstretched humanitarian system. The scale of risks is multiplied significantly due to climate change and significant efforts and resources will be required to address these issues.

4. **There was a suggestion that the SNLD could address the need for a more holistic approach to the provision of technical assistance** whereby needs are not only resolved in a technical way but the social dimension is also considered. A technical agency participant suggested that the SNLD could map the process from climate related events to the social aspects of the loss itself.

5. **Agencies expressed concern that the SNLD should not duplicate efforts, noting that there are many actors in this space already.** There is a dichotomy between building on what is already there versus the reality that there are huge gaps that need to be filled and this needs policy, institutions, capacity and finance. Unfortunately, the discussions focussed on the former. It is important to
find links between existing mechanisms, systems and platforms to find the most effective tools to address loss and damage but the SNLD must not lose sight of its critical role to fill gaps.

6. **Agencies indicated that there is a lack of data available to make loss and damage assessments to identify needs and do long-term risk forecasting and the SNLD could address this, for example by a universal agreement to share data on loss and damage impacts that facilitates linkages particularly with the health sector, investment, and through long term partnerships at the national level.** One role of technical agencies is to collect data from the field to understand how people are living with impacts. Agencies then try to inform national policies with the data that they collect from the field. One agency reported a lot of good will on sharing data, risk models and risk data in a lot of countries but that there are a lot of barriers to sharing data still which is often where organisations don’t know if they can share data. A Party indicated that data is already shared to the UNFCCC through reports such as INDC’s and it would be useful if countries could better understand what technical agencies can offer to enhance data sharing.

7. **Agencies highlighted the importance of building capacity through education.** A lot of grassroots and locally led projects don’t necessarily have the capacity to connect with organisations like the SNLD and it can make obtaining assistance time consuming. People on the ground need to be assisted to understand the SNLD including what it can offer and how to connect with it.

8. **The SNLD needs to be operationalised under the UNFCCC where it is accountable to the Convention and the Paris Agreement.** As part of global climate action, this would reinforce the importance of loss and damage as a political issue and would ensure that actions are commensurate with the global challenge of the climate emergency. In a similar vein, there was a suggestion that the SNLD could help advocate for and create better recognition of loss and damage at the global level including by expanding capacity at the national and local level.